“My future is not here”: Migration, Borders and the political Hope in Gambia
Thousands of young Gambians have attempted an irregular journey to Europe, and many of them know that the journey could end in death, detention, and torture. The journal written by Saidyejeng and Drammeh opens up with a question: Why do young Gambians risk death and detention to reach Europe, especially because a lot of people are aware of the dangers of a “Backway”? The question matters far beyond Gambia; the question sits beneath nearly every conversation about migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Every choice and policy governments make to control borders, oversee asylum procedures, and defend the use of scarce public funds. People on the move in turn face the consequences of those policies and of their own decisions, , which includes desert crossing, detention facility and a claim that may or may not be believed. The article surveys 88 young Gambians on why they leave or intend to leave the country (Saidyjeng & Drammeh, 2026).
Saidyejeng and Drammeh describe the “backway” as an irregular overland route through Niger and Libya, followed by a dangerous sea crossing to Italy or Malta, on which many have died or face detention, torture and forced labour (Camara, 2021). They place it within an economy marked by high youth unemployment, few formal jobs, seasonal agriculture, unstable tourism, and heavy reliance on remittances. They also argue that poverty alone cannot explain why some young people intend to leave while others in similar circumstances do not. They turn to de Haas’s aspirations-capabilities framework: “When people have the means to relocate and have aspirations that are unachievable where they are” (Haas, 2021, p. 2-3).
Using a questionnaire completed by 88 respondents aged between 18 to 35 across five regions, the authors found that perceived economic opportunity has a negative and highly significant association with migration intentions. Neither social belonging nor personal hope was significantly associated with them. Respondents rated belonging (3.94) and hope (4.04), which is fairly high and economic opportunity (3.48). The authors conclude that “Migration is a survival strategy driven by material necessity, not by emotional states or social bonds” (Saidyjeng & Drammeh, 2026, p. 23), although they note that near-zero coefficient may hide opposing forces, such as family expectations of remittances (Saidyjeng & Drammeh, 2026).
Seen from the government’s side, the problem might look different. A Gambian government would say it wants young people to stay and succeed, but it governs an economy with few formal jobs. The authors suggest sharing stories of young Gambians who built a good life at home, supporting young entrepreneurs and writing the findings into the National Youth Policy (Saidyjeng & Drammeh, 2026). The authors also warned that hope and belonging will not keep people home unless the economy improves. In my view, officials face two hard questions: Are young people’s pessimism accurate? How can the government reduce departures when the economy depends on migrant’s money? It is also important to note that the study did not measure real economic conditions, so they cannot be sure how far young people’s pessimism is justified.
Destination governments see the issue through border control. The article does not discuss them, so this is general background. Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, a country must not send people back to places where they face persecution (UNHCR, 1951). Nonetheless, the country must oversee an asylum system that separates applications for protection from other types of migration, and it should still decide who is permitted entrance. If people migrate for economic reasons, governments will argue that development and legal migratory routes, rather than asylum are the best options. However, statistics alone cannot prove that no one on the backway had a valid claim.
For the young Gambians surveyed, what matters most is whether they can build a decent economic future at home. As the title of the article puts it, “My Future is not here”. In my view, these findings matter for everyone involved in the conversation. Governments are more likely to reduce irregular departures by creating visible opportunities than sending hopeful messages. Advocates for migrants and refugees should also understand and accept the limitations of the governments. Improving life at home must not become an excuse to ignore the safety and the dignity of people on the move.
References
Camara, S. (June 18, 2021). 17,345KM ‘backway journey: Kidnap, rape, shipwreck, torture. Mimupada lati The Point: https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/17345km-backway-journey-kidnap-rape-shipwreck-torture
Haas, H. d. (February 2021). A theory of migration: the aspirations-capabilities framework. Mimupada lati ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349554878_A_theory_of_migration_the_aspirations-capabilities_framework
Saidyjeng, L., & Drammeh, S. (August 31, 2026). “My Future Is Not Here”: Youth Perceptions and Migration Intentions in The Gambia. AHMR, 23. Mimupada lati SIHMA: https://sihma.org.za/storage/journals/1.%20Youth%20Perceptions%20and%20Migration%20Intentions%20in%20The%20Gambia.pdf
UNHCR. (1951 ). The 1951 Refugee Convention. Mimupada lati UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/overview/1951-refugee-convention
Categories:
Tags:
- Refugee Rights
- West Africa Migration
- Youth Displacement
- Migration Drivers
- Illegal Migration
- Irregular Journey
- Economic Opportunity
- Migrant Safety
- Border Control
- 1951 Refugee Convention
- Asylum Policy
- Remittance Economy
- Youth Unemployment
- Capabilities Framework
- Migration Aspirations
- Mediterranean Sea Crossing
- Niger Libya Transit
- Backway Route
- Gambian Youth
- Irregular Migration