The African Union (AU) and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have long been viewed as the cornerstones of an integrated Africa. The AU, through the creation of its flagship vision, the African Economic Community (AEC), aims to unify the continent’s diverse economies, ensuring greater stability, political cooperation, and social development. Despite the strong theoretical foundations and numerous initiatives to promote continental integration, progress remains scarce and uneven, with significant disparities in the levels of integration across various RECs. The fourth mid-year coordination meeting between the AU, the RECs, and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) held in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2022 further highlighted these challenges. At this meeting, it became evident that some RECs were much more economically and socially integrated, while others were stagnating or operating ineffectively, creating a fragmented regional integration landscape. The underlying issue lies in the political and economic diversity across Africa. While the vision of the AU is to harmonize the activities of its eight recognized RECs, the reality is far more complicated. There are structural barriers, national interests, and historical legacies that block true regional integration. As laid out in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, which set the foundation for AU transformation, integration should be achieved incrementally. However, countries’ memberships in multiple different RECs has complicated this process. As of today, 33 African countries belong to 2 RECs, while 16 countries are members of 3 different regional economic communities. This overlap results in conflicting policies and regulatory frameworks, making it difficult to implement integration measures across the continent.
Differences in levels of integration between the African Union’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
The diversity in integration levels between the RECs becomes particularly apparent when analyzing their varying progress in economic, political, and social cooperation. The East African Community (EAC) stands as the most integrated REC, boasting an economic community with a regional parliament and plans to evolve into a confederation. The EAC has made significant strides in trade liberalization, political cohesion, and infrastructure development, demonstrating a high degree of cooperation and coordination. This has led to notable successes, such as the establishment of the East African Monetary Union (EAMU) and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), which further support regional integration. Following the EAC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are also relatively advanced in terms of regional integration. ECOWAS, in particular, has made significant progress in peace and security, free trade, and even political cooperation, with initiatives like the ECOWAS Parliament and the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). Similarly, SADC has made some progress in areas such as infrastructure development and economic cooperation. However, the level of integration within these RECs still falls short when compared to other global economic unions, such as the European Union, which has achieved a much deeper integration model.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) remains the least integrated of the African RECs. Originally envisioned by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi as a tool for his political ambition to create a "United States of Africa," CEN-SAD is a relic of a past political project. It currently has 24 members, yet its activities have been limited to the extent that it has not held a formal summit since 2013. Attempts to revive it in 2019 with a new secretariat and action plan have not led to substantial progress. The fact that its members are also part of more active RECs like ECOWAS, the EAC, or SADC, only highlights the redundancy of CEN-SAD. Given the lack of political will and financial resources, the continued existence of CEN-SAD raises the question of whether it is time to consider disbanding the organization in favor of more effective regional cooperation. One of the main challenges facing African integration is the diversity of approaches to integration across RECs. Some regional organizations advocate for a bottom-up approach to integration, prioritizing integration within sub-regions before harmonizing with other RECs. This method allows for gradual integration but often leads to delays and fragmented policies. On the other hand, some RECs and the AU itself favor a top-down approach, in which the AU takes the lead in fostering coordination and harmonization across RECs. This approach is intended to create a more cohesive framework for integration, yet it faces challenges in gaining political consensus among member states, many of which are hesitant to relinquish some degree of sovereignty for the sake of regional cooperation.
The disparities in the levels of integration also extend to trade. Despite the creation of a free trade area comprising SADC, EAC, and COMESA — known as the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) — many African countries are not fully able to participate in this zone. The low levels of intra-African trade, which hover around 12%, stand in stark contrast to other regional trade areas like the European Union (60%) or Northern American Free Trade Area — NAFTA — (40%). The obstacles to intra-African trade are multifaceted, ranging from poor infrastructure and high transportation costs to restrictive border policies, tariffs, and lack of product diversification. These barriers prevent African countries from fully benefiting from regional trade liberalization. The agricultural sector is another area where the integration process is highly differentiated. While ECOWAS, SADC, and COMESA have established common agricultural policies at the regional level, policies are at different stages of development and implementation. ECOWAS, for example, has its Regional Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP), which aims to improve food security and agricultural productivity across West Africa. SADC has only recently rolled out its own agricultural policy, and COMESA continues to develop its approach to agricultural integration. The lack of uniformity in these policies has made it difficult to integrate them into a continent-wide agricultural policy that addresses the region’s food security challenges. Moreover, the absence of reliable data on the implementation of these policies makes it difficult to assess their effectiveness.
Furthermore, the reluctance of many African countries to abolish tariffs on agricultural goods remains a significant barrier to deeper integration. Tariffs and taxes on agricultural products often serve as a vital source of revenue for governments, and some countries are understandably reluctant to forgo this income. Additionally, some sensitive products, such as crops, may have socio-political importance, further complicating efforts to dismantle protectionist measures. The reluctance to harmonize these policies across the continent reflects the larger issue of lack of political will and mutual trust among African leaders, which undermines the AU’s ability to effectively promote economic integration. The disparities in levels of integration across RECs are symptomatic of a larger issue of political fragmentation, divergent national interests, and failure to adopt a uniform approach to integration. The AU, with its structure, often struggles to provide the necessary leadership to unify the continent’s economic, political, and social landscape. The uneven integration process, along with the challenges faced in the agricultural sector and intra-African trade, underscores the need for bold and decisive action by African leaders.
The issue of multiple and overlapping RECs memberships
The issue of overlapping memberships within Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and their impact on the African Union’s (AU) integration goals has long been a critical challenge for the organization. According to an integration report, the eight RECs and two Regional Mechanisms (RMs) in Africa encompass 106 memberships, despite the AU having only 55 member states. This proliferation of memberships, described as a “spaghetti bowl” of overlapping regional organizations, complicates efforts to achieve cohesive continental integration. While the configuration of these entities is meant to address the rapidly changing economic, political, and security landscape, the reality is that states are constrained by limited resources, making it very difficult to effectively engage in multiple RECs. The AU already faces challenges in collecting dues from member states, and embassies in Addis Ababa as well as diplomatic missions to the RECs are often understaffed, further straining the capacity to implement decisions and initiatives. This gap in implementation undermines the reputation and efficacy of the AU and the RECs in the eyes of the African public. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides a stark example of these complexities. Having joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2022 while already a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the DRC is now stretched thin in terms of diplomatic capacity. While its membership in the EAC is seen as economically advantageous for other member states, with benefits such as access to the DRC’s abundant natural resources and its strategic position, fully participating in the activities of three RECs places pressure on the country’s governance and administrative structures. At the 2022 mid-year AU meeting in Lusaka, overlapping REC memberships were identified as significant obstacles to coordinated integration, with AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat emphasizing the need for clear direction to optimize their efficiency. Other officials described the situation as “chaotic”, highlighting the need for reform to address the constraints and lack of cohesion resulting from multiple memberships.
Regional integration is a global trend, with the World Bank estimating that 40% to 60% of world trade occurs within regional trading blocs. Africa’s pursuit of integration is unmatched in its ambition, but it has resulted in a paradoxical situation where countries often belong to two or more RECs simultaneously. This scenario generates conflicts, inefficiencies, and higher transaction costs for both governments and business communities. Southern Africa provides a microcosm of this challenge, where entities such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), SADC, COMESA, and EAC operate with overlapping memberships and mandates. For instance, SACU’s agreement prohibits its members from entering into new trade agreements without the consent of other member states, while COMESA and the EAC allow such agreements as long as they do not conflict with their protocols. This creates a web of competing obligations that undermine the coherence of regional integration efforts. Moreover, as these RECs move towards deeper economic integration, such as the formation of customs unions, the overlapping memberships exacerbate the problem of overlapping obligations and requirements from regional organizations. While free trade areas (FTAs) allow countries to maintain autonomy over their external trade agreements, customs unions require a common external tariff, which is incompatible with multiple memberships. For example, a country cannot apply two different external tariffs simultaneously, a requirement inherent in being a member of more than one customs union. This issue is compounded by the fact that there is no overarching plan to harmonize the tariffs of different RECs, leaving Africa far from achieving its goal of a unified African Economic Community by 2025.
The situation is further complicated by external agreements such as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU). Ideally, each REC would negotiate its own EPA, but overlapping memberships force countries to form new negotiating blocs, as seen in southern Africa. For instance, South Africa has negotiated its own agreement with the EU, while other SADC members have split into different groups, with some aligning with COMESA members for EPA negotiations. These fragmented approaches dilute the bargaining power of African states and create inconsistencies that hinder the development of a unified trade policy. This fragmentation is not limited to trade but extends to other areas such as security, infrastructure development, and political coordination. The lack of synergy among RECs not only delays progress towards continental integration but also places an unsustainable burden on member states. The AU has recognized the need to streamline REC memberships to address these challenges. However, progress has been slow, due to the political sensitivities involved in rationalizing memberships and the entrenched interests of member states. While the AU’s Agenda 2063 envisions a fully integrated and prosperous Africa, achieving this goal requires a fundamental shift in how RECs operate and interact with one another. A potential solution lies in creating a phased approach to harmonizing policies and mandates across RECs, prioritizing areas of overlap and conflict such as customs unions and trade agreements. Additionally, increasing the financial and institutional capacity of both the AU and the RECs is critical to ensuring that integration efforts are not hampered by resource constraints. The current model of overlapping memberships is unsustainable and counterproductive, creating a fragmented framework that undermines Africa’s potential for cohesive regional and continental development. Without significant reforms, the vision of a unified African Economic Community will remain elusive, and the continent risks perpetuating inefficiencies that stall its progress in global economic and political arenas.
The Future of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
The Maghreb Arab Union (UMA), established on February 17, 1989, in Marrakech, has faced persistent challenges that have rendered it one of the weakest Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa. The perennial conflict between Algeria and Morocco and the political collapse of Libya in 2011, has hindered any substantial progress toward achieving the goals outlined at its inception. Despite being sustained by a secretariat in Rabat and maintaining some representation at African Union meetings, the UMA operates with minimal efficacy, and its member states do not take part in its work and meetings. Paradoxically, UMA contributes significantly to the AU budget, as Morocco and Algeria are among the five biggest contributors of the AU. However, financial support has not translated into meaningful regional cooperation. Instead, UMA members have sought to join other RECs, underscoring the value placed on functional regional integration and the limitations of UMA’s structure and political context. The underlying tensions, particularly the territorial dispute between Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara, have proven insurmountable, creating an atmosphere of distrust and hostility between Algeria and Morocco. This rivalry violates the foundational principles of UMA, such as Article 15 of its Constitutive Act, which requires member states to respect the territorial integrity and political systems of their counterparts and to avoid any alliances that undermine these commitments. The breakdown in relations reached a critical point in 1995 when Morocco requested its own suspension from UMA as an act of protest against Algeria’s support for the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. Since then, circumstances have deteriorated further, with the closure of the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (MEG) in 2021 marking a significant regression in regional cooperation. Once a symbol of shared prosperity and strategic collaboration akin to the European Coal and Steel Community, the MEG’s termination highlighted the death of trust between Algeria and Morocco.
Efforts to revive or reimagine UMA have been sporadic and largely ineffective. Algeria’s proposal for a new Maghreb bloc that excludes Morocco has failed to gain traction, as other members, such as Libya and Mauritania, continue to advocate for inclusive approaches to Maghreb integration. Libya, in particular, has called for the revitalization of UMA, appealing to both Morocco and Mauritania for renewed dialogue. However, Algeria's influence and its strained relations with Morocco have created significant barriers, leaving UMA in a state of paralysis. Diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco are effectively nonexistent, with land borders sealed, airspace closed, and accusations of espionage and provocations adding to the hostility. This volatile environment has influenced regional dynamics, as seen in Tunisia’s increasing alignment with Algeria: for example, Tunisia’s hosting of Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front, at the 2022 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) 8th summit led to a severe diplomatic fallout with Morocco, illustrates how the broader Maghreb region is caught in the crossfire of Algeria-Morocco tensions. The economic ramifications of UMA’s failure are stark. Intra-regional trade among its five member states accounted for only 2.4% of their total trade in 2021, one of the lowest rates globally. This figure is unlikely to improve in the current political climate, with the closure of the MEG further undermining potential economic collaboration. UMA’s dysfunction has driven its members to explore integration opportunities outside the Maghreb framework. Morocco’s bid to join ECOWAS in 2017 and Tunisia’s agreement with ECOWAS in 2018 exemplify the search for more effective regional affiliations. However, geographical and political constraints have limited their success. Mauritania has championed the G5 Sahel, an initiative focused on counterterrorism and development, though this organization has faced its own challenges, including insufficient external funding and limited regional buy-in.
Despite these setbacks, the idea of Maghreb integration remains a compelling goal, given the region’s shared history, cultural ties, and economic potential. The failure of UMA underscores the need for a reimagined framework that addresses the root causes of its paralysis, particularly the Algeria-Morocco rivalry. Any successor organization must prioritize conflict resolution, trust-building, and the establishment of clear, enforceable mechanisms to ensure compliance with foundational principles. It must also foster inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders, recognizing the importance of regional unity in addressing shared challenges such as economic development, security, and climate change. Efforts to establish a successor to UMA are likely to face significant obstacles, given the entrenched political dynamics and mutual mistrust among its key players. Algeria’s push for a Maghreb bloc without Morocco reflects the divisions that continue to define the region. However, the persistence of calls from Libya and other stakeholders for a reinvigorated integration project suggests that the dream of a united Maghreb is not entirely extinguished. For such a vision to materialize, it will require a genuine commitment from all member states to prioritize regional interests over bilateral disputes, coupled with active support from the African Union and the broader international community. In the absence of such reforms, UMA’s legacy will likely serve as a tale of how political rivalries can derail even the most promising regional integration efforts. Its failure underscores the importance of addressing political and structural barriers to cooperation, as well as the need for leadership capable of navigating the complexities of regional diplomacy. While UMA’s successor remains uncertain, the lessons of its demise provide valuable insights into the prerequisites for building a functional and sustainable regional organization in the Maghreb.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) represents a pivotal milestone in Africa’s pursuit of economic integration and development. With its foundation rooted in the historical trajectory of African unity, the AfCFTA is a cornerstone of Agenda 2063, aiming to transform the continent’s fragmented economies into a cohesive and prosperous single market. Signed by 54 of Africa’s 55 countries and ratified by 43, the AfCFTA promises to reshape intra-African trade dynamics, address longstanding structural barriers, and foster deeper economic ties across regional blocs. Its operational phase began in May 2019, following its entry into force, signaling the commencement of Africa's most ambitious integration project to date. The AfCFTA's design draws heavily on lessons from existing regional integration efforts, including the tripartite free trade agreement involving COMESA, EAC, and SADC. While these RECs have shown the potential of economic cooperation, they also exposed persistent challenges like overlapping memberships, regulatory complexities, and limited capacity to harmonize trade policies effectively. Recognizing these challenges, the AfCFTA aims not to replace RECs but to complement and build on their existing frameworks while addressing inefficiencies.
The agreement establishing the AfCFTA underscores the importance of coexistence with RECs, acknowledging their acquis and leveraging their structures to achieve broader continental objectives. However, this layered approach requires clarity in roles and coordination mechanisms to avoid redundancy and resource wastage. The AfCFTA introduces a phased negotiation framework, covering areas like tariffs, rules of origin, and priority services, with a built-in agenda for future rounds. This progressive strategy allows for flexibility and adaptability but also underscores the complexity of achieving consensus among diverse economies and political contexts. The AU’s efforts to establish a clear division of labor between itself, RECs, and member states highlight the critical need for subsidiarity and collaborative planning. This approach seeks to streamline resource allocation, minimize duplication, and enhance implementation efficiency, aligning with Agenda 2063’s broader aspirations for integration, peace, and prosperity. Despite its promise, the AfCFTA faces significant challenges that could hinder its realization. Intra-African trade remains low, accounting for less than 20% of the continent’s total trade volume. Structural issues such as inadequate infrastructure, divergent regulatory environments, and limited industrial capacity impede the seamless flow of goods and services. Political will and national interests often conflict with regional and continental goals, as seen in the overlapping memberships of RECs, which complicate compliance and dilute focus. Moreover, the negotiation and implementation of rules of origin, critical for determining the eligibility of products for preferential treatment under the AfCFTA, remain contentious and unresolved in some areas. These challenges are further exacerbated by external economic pressures, fluctuating commodity prices, and the lingering impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, which strained African economies and exposed vulnerabilities in supply chains.
The AfCFTA’s potential benefits outweigh challenges, provided that the hurdles are systematically addressed. By creating a single market of 1.3 billion people with a combined GDP of approximately $3.4 trillion, the AfCFTA offers unprecedented opportunities for economies of scale in Africa, industrialization, and diversification. It is expected to increase intra-African trade by eliminating tariffs on 90% of goods, reducing non-tariff barriers, and harmonizing trade policies. Enhanced trade facilitation measures, such as streamlined customs procedures and improved logistics, could lower transaction costs and boost competitiveness. The AfCFTA also presents a platform for fostering innovation, attracting investment, and promoting inclusive growth by integrating smaller and less developed economies into regional value chains. By prioritizing the development of strategic sectors like agriculture, manufacturing, and digital technology, the AfCFTA could address structural unemployment and contribute to poverty reduction. The socio-political implications of the AfCFTA are transformative. A successful implementation could strengthen Africa’s collective bargaining power on the global stage, enabling it to negotiate more equitable trade agreements and assert its interests in multilateral forums. The harmonization of trade policies and standards could enhance political cohesion and foster a sense of shared destiny among member states. Furthermore, the AfCFTA aligns with Africa’s broader goals of fostering peace and stability by addressing the economic root causes of conflict and creating interdependencies that discourage interstate rivalries. The inclusion of provisions for sustainable development and gender equity within the AfCFTA framework highlights its commitment to inclusive and equitable growth, ensuring that the benefits of integration are widely shared.
The operationalization of the AfCFTA coincides with broader reforms within the African Union aimed at enhancing efficiency and accountability. The recent establishment of a mid-year meeting between for coordination the AU, RECs, and other stakeholders reflects a commitment to fostering synergies and ensuring coherent policy implementation. The focus on joint planning and resource mobilization is critical for addressing financial constraints and optimizing the use of available resources. Initiatives like the AU Peace Fund, which has garnered significant contributions from member states, underscore the importance of financial independence in achieving Africa’s integration goals. The integration of public and private sector actors, civil society, and academia into the AfCFTA’s implementation process further enriches its inclusivity and potential for success. As Africa moves forward with the AfCFTA, the lessons of past integration efforts remain instructive. The challenges of overlapping memberships, resource inefficiencies, and political divergences must be addressed through innovative and collaborative approaches. Capacity-building initiatives, investment in infrastructure, and the alignment of national policies with continental objectives are essential for realizing the AfCFTA’s transformative potential. The AfCFTA represents not just an economic project but a vision for Africa’s future, rooted in the principles of unity, self-reliance, and shared prosperity.
The Future of Free Movement of Persons (FMP) in Africa
The future of free movement of people in Africa rests on a multifaceted framework of protocols, laws, and strategic initiatives designed to foster continental integration and socio-economic transformation. The adoption of the Draft Continental Strategy on Free Movement at the 28th AU meeting, in November 2024, represents the latest milestone in a journey that has roots in the pan-African aspirations of the mid-20th century. The Free Movement of Persons Protocol, adopted in January 2018 alongside the Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA, is pivotal to this vision. It operates in three progressive phases:
- The right of entry,
- The right of residence,
- The right of establishment
Central to the protocol is the African Passport, introduced during the February 2019 AU Summit, which aims to eliminate visa requirements and simplify cross-border travel across the continent. To date, 33 member states have signed the protocol, with Rwanda, Niger, Mali, and São Tomé and Príncipe leading in ratification. The philosophical basis of free movement in Africa predates the establishment of the African Union, finding resonance in the national and liberation movements that sought to dismantle colonial boundaries. This aspiration was institutionalized with the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and bolstered by the Lagos Plan of Action, which envisioned an African common market as a step toward unity. Other initiatives, such as the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, the East African Community's policies promoting unrestricted mobility, and various frameworks by RECs, exemplify the continent's enduring commitment to this goal. The African Union's executive decisions, including the launch of the African Passport in 2016 and the adoption of the Free Movement Protocol in 2018, have provided additional momentum.
The benefits of free movement are manifold. By facilitating intra-African trade and investment, the protocol addresses a significant shortfall in regional commerce, which constitutes just 10% of Africa's total trade, compared to significantly higher rates in other regions. The elimination of travel restrictions is expected to boost economic activities by enabling the efficient flow of goods, services, and people. The movement of students and professionals across borders will enhance access to education and healthcare, fostering human capital development crucial for Africa’s economic transformation. Labor mobility is another critical advantage, allowing for the redistribution of skills to address mismatches in labor markets. This will support regional economic development, reduce inequalities, and increase remittance flows, which are vital for both individual households and national economies. Tourism, another sector poised for growth, will benefit from relaxed visa policies, as evidenced by the positive outcomes in countries like Rwanda and Ghana. By promoting travel and cultural interactions, free movement strengthens a shared African identity and pan-africanism, reinforcing the continent's integration objectives. Despite these advantages, however, the implementation of free movement faces signficant challenges. Concerns over national security, public health, and economic disparities have hindered the adoption and ratification of the Free Movement Protocol. Fears of terrorism, human trafficking, and organized crime have led some member states to resist removing travel restrictions. However, evidence suggests that migrants are not inherently more likely to pose security threats than citizens. To address these concerns, strengthening border management systems, enhancing civil registries, and fostering international cooperation are essential. Rwanda’s implementation of a visa-on-arrival policy, supported by robust security infrastructure, offers a model for other nations. Public health challenges, such as the Ebola outbreak, highlight the need for coordinated regional responses to health crises. Closing borders is an ineffective strategy, as informal movements persist. Instead, the focus should be on improving health systems and implementing the International Health Regulations of 2005 to ensure public safety while maintaining the principles of free movement.
Economic disparities between member states raise fears of mass migration from less to more developed countries, potentially causing social and economic strains. However, concerns can be mitigated through well-regulated labor migration schemes that ensure fair access to opportunities while safeguarding host communities. Developing frameworks for the recognition of qualifications, labor market analysis, and information-sharing across borders will further support this process. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) advocates a phased approach to implementing the protocol, allowing member states to gradually adapt and address specific challenges. The AU's Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 2, envisions a continent with seamless borders and integrated economies. Free movement of people, capital, goods, and services is integral to achieving this vision, fostering trade, investment, and pan-African solidarity. Despite notable progress, including the adoption of the Free Movement Protocol and the development of the African Passport, significant hurdles remain. The slow pace of ratification and restrictive visa regimes continue to constrain cross-border mobility. Technical and logistical challenges, such as the production and distribution of the African Passport, further complicate implementation. Addressing these issues requires concerted advocacy efforts, technical support, and the designation of a high-profile champion to lead the free movement agenda. Member states must also prioritize the establishment of systems to facilitate information exchange and streamline entry and visa-granting processes.
Regional economic communities play a critical role in advancing free movement. ECOWAS, the EAC, and other RECs have demonstrated varying levels of success in implementing protocols that promote mobility. Their experiences offer valuable lessons for the continental framework. Smaller membership sizes within RECs facilitate decision-making and enable faster implementation of policies. For example, ECOWAS has successfully abolished visa requirements within its sub-regions, and the EAC has implemented measures to allow free movement of people and goods. Other RECs, such as COMESA, SADC, and ECCAS, have also developed protocols, although their implementation remains uneven due to limited ratifications and other challenges. The African Union's strategic roadmap for the Free Movement Protocol provides a clear framework for its phased implementation. Phase one focuses on the right of entry and visa abolition, while subsequent phases address the rights of residence and establishment. The flexibility of the protocol allows member states and RECs to adopt accelerated programs tailored to their unique contexts. This pragmatic approach recognizes the varying levels of readiness among African countries and underscores the importance of regional integration as a precursor to continental unity. To sustain momentum, the AU must continue to engage member states, RECs, and international partners in promoting the benefits of free movement. Collaborative efforts with organizations like the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Organization for Migration will be essential in overcoming technical barriers and enhancing member states' capacities. Advocacy campaigns should emphasize the economic, social, and cultural dividends of unrestricted movement, countering misconceptions and building public and political support. Ultimately, the success of free movement in Africa depends on the collective commitment of AU member states to uphold the principles of integration and cooperation. By addressing security concerns, public health challenges, and economic disparities through targeted strategies, the continent can unlock the transformative potential of free movement.
Glossary
AEC - African Economic Community
AfCFTA - African Continental Free Trade Area
AU - African Union
AMU/UMA - Arab Maghreb Union
CEN-SAD - Community of Sahel-Saharan States
EAC - East African Community
EACJ - East African Court of Justice
EAMU - East African Monetary Union
ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAP - ECOWAS' Agricultural Policy
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
EPA - Economic Partnership Agreements
EU - European Union
FMP - Free Movement of Persons
FTA - Free Trade Area
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOM - International Organization for Migration
MEG - Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Area
RECs - Regional Economic Communities
RMs - Regional Mechanisms
SACU - Southern Africa Customs Union
SADC - Southern African Development Community
TFTA - Tripartite Free Trade Area
TICAD - Tokyo International Conference on African Development
WAMZ - West African Monetary Zone