Central African Republic

 

GEOGRAPHICAL INFO

Population: 4,7 million (Migration Data Portal, 2018)

Capital city: Bangui

Largest cities: Mbaiki, Bimbo

Independence from France: 13 August 1960

Government structure: Presidential Republic, the Council of Ministers is appointed by the president, who is elected every 5 years by universal direct suffrage. The country is divided into 14 prefectures, 2 economic prefectures and one commune. The legislative branch is composed of a 140-seat unicameral National Assembly, elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority. The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court (judges are appointed by the president) and the Constitutional Court.

President: Faustin Archange Touadera (2016)

Neighboring countries: Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan

Ethnic groups: Gbaya (33%), Banda (27%), Mandjia (13%), Sara (10%), Mboum (10%), M’baka (4%) and Yakoma (4%)

Official languages: French, Sangho

Recognized regional languages: none

Religions: Christian (50%), indigenous beliefs (35%), Muslim (15%)

Economic activities: subsistence agriculture, forestry and mining; export of diamonds, gold, uranium, cotton, cassava, yam, bananas, coffee and tobacco

Transports: very poor infrastructures, roads mainly unpaved and impassable during the rain season. Water transportation is traditionally made via Ubangi river, which joins River Congo to reach the Congo-Ocean railroad in Brazzaville. 

Environmental/social/climatic issues: HIV, malaria, dengue fever, measles, malnutrition, illiteracy, poverty, genital mutilation.

 

Historical Background

One of the poorest countries in the world and having the lowest GDP per capita after Somalia, the Central African Republic has historically been marked by political instability (with at least five coups d’etat) and insecurity. In 2010, multidimensional poverty affected 76% of the entire population, with 55% presenting severe poverty conditions (UNDP, 2016), so that, rather than a destination for immigrants, the country is a source of refugees and asylum seekers basically since its independence from France. 

The difficult conditions of governmental offices (many have been destroyed or burnt by armed groups) and the lack of a political policy to monitor migration movements makes it extremely hard to have accurate and updated data, the last census being held in 2003. In the latest years, thousands of people fled from the country without any monitoring activity by the institutions, so it is even more complicated to have a clear perception of the migratory phenomenon.

As far as it is known, emigration has increased since 2010, to the point that figures tripled in the following three years, while immigration still has a minor impact on CAR’s social and economic realm. More and more working migrants have entered the country from 1993 to 2013, when under Patassé’s and Bozizé’s governments visas were easily issued. The figures of immigrants began to decrease since 2000, with the resurgence of violence and insecurity. 

Little is known on emigration, especially for education or labor purposes, and there are no records on remittances or returnees. Moreover, the presence of nomadic groups of herders crossing national boundaries to move their livestock (to Chad, Cameroon and DRC) and the delicate issue of ethnicity over citizenship makes the overall picture even more blurred. 

Massive internal displacements remain one of the most important problems the government needs to solve, with over 1,000,000 people forced to relocate (IOM, 2014), along with the hemorrhage of refugees seeking protection in neighboring countries (mostly Cameroon, DRC, Chad and Republic of Congo), especially after the escalation of violence started in 2012, when Muslim armed group Séléka overthrew Bozizé. Michel Djotodia, the first Muslim to lead the country, formed a short-lived government while violence spread throughout the CAR: looting, raping, torture were perpetrated by Séléka as well as by their opponent anti-Balaka members while the country knew one of its darkest periods. After Djotodia resigned, the CAR went through an instable transitional period, which ended with the 2016 electoral victory of Faustin Archange Touadera. Even if the situation has apparently become politically more stable, both Muslim and Christian militias have not been dismantled, and violence is still perpetrated all over the country, urging people to move or leave in what seems an endless exodus inside and outside the national borders. 

 

Migration Policies

The CAR has never developed a migration policy and so far has not ratified any of the ILO conventions on labour migration, so the legislation regulating emigration and immigration is often obscure, incomplete and ineffective. 

Although being a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), CAR still cannot grant immigrants freedom of movement and residence, mainly for security reasons, and still requires from them visas to stay in the country (UNECA, 2017).

 

Governmental Institutions  

As highlighted in the CAR profile presented by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (2017), the country is still struggling to reduce violence and conflict rather than organizing and regulating migrations, so it was an external institution, the MEUX (Migration EU Expertise), that is trying to foster a network for the management of migration issues. The Ministry of Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Integration and Central Africans Abroad are supposed to develop a multifocal plan to manage, control and implement migration policies, especially as internal displaced persons and refugees are concerned.

 

Internal Migration

If we exclude internal displacements, mobility within the CAR follows a double trajectory: on one hand, the people move from rural to urban areas for educational and working purposes; on the other, conditions and opportunities in the main cities are not always good and most of the urban population has to live in informal settlements, often without having access even to the basic facilities. The route is then reversed, from urban to rural areas, where internal migrants either turn to subsistence agriculture or find an employment in the mining sector, which in 2010 was estimated to involve 80,000 to 100,000 people across the country. (IOM, 2014)

As anticipated, nomadism and pastoralism are extensively practiced in the CAR and often turn into a seasonal migration to neighbouring countries, which is difficult to record, and which complicates even more issues of nationality and citizenship. Herders ‘feel’ to be Chadians rather than Central Africans, for instance, or affirm their national identity according to the circumstances (for instance to get the refugee status or to enter freely another country).

 

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

One of the emergencies faced by the CAR is the forced displacement of people, due to the conflict between the two main armed groups, Séléka and anti-Balaka, but also between them and the governmental police forces. The emergency is difficult to manage also because of the instability of the situation, which evolves rapidly and is therefore difficult to document. Before the events precipitated in 2013, IDPs were estimated to be less than 130,000. In 2007, for instance, UNHCR accounted for 157,000 internal displacements, especially in the northern regions. But, after Michel Djotodia’s coup in 2013, figures rocketed to 935,000 (IDMC, 2017), to lower again in the following years, when peace agreements seemed to grant some security and numbers were halved to 400,000-450,000 people. An increase was recorded again in 2017, with 600,000 IDPs (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Central African Republic Migration Profile, 2017), mostly located in hosting families (76%). The latest statistics (IDMC, 2018) highlight a stabilizing trend in internal displacements in 2018, when the number of IDPs is estimated to be 641,000 (510,000 of which are due to conflict, while the rest is caused by natural disasters).

Nowadays, internal displacements continue to affect the country, with thousands of people leaving unsafe areas and heading to Bangui or other cities. Only a small percentage of those forced to migrate internally (24% in 2017, IDMC) are located in camps, while the majority prefers to be hosted in families. Problems related to this type of emergency are food scarcity, malnutrition and health issues.  

 

Immigration

The Central African Republic has never been a first-choice destination country for migrants, partly because of its poor and underdeveloped economic system but, above all, for its instability and violence.   

According to UN DESA (2019), the number of immigrants increased significantly from 1990 to 2000, passing from 67,200 to 123,500, to drop to 94,400 in 2005, reaching the lowest number in 2015 (81,600), when the country was going through a difficult transition period. The migrant stock, representing 3,4% in 2000, went down to 1,8% in 2015 (UN DESA, 2019) and so did the net migration rate. If in 1990 the rate was -6, after reaching a positive trend in 1995 (3.3), constantly decreased until it reached its negative record in 2015 (-17.8), when the instability of the country urged nationals to leave the country, either as working migrants or as refugees (UN DESA, 2019).

The four major countries from which immigrants come are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Chad and France, the latter because of its historical colonial ties; for some of them the number of people reaching the CAR has increased or decreased significantly during the last 25 years. For instance, while in 1990 migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo were 13,173, in 1995 figures reached 20,510 and in 2000 26,065 Congolese people had moved to the country, probably due to the Second Congo War. Since then, their number has lowered to 19,930 (in 2010) and was estimated to be 17,219 in 2015. 

Most immigrants are non-qualified or poorly educated people who move to find employment in the informal sector or to start their own business.

 

Gender/Female Migration

Few data are available to analyse the size and impact of female migration in the country. Since 1990 the percentage of female migrants has not changed consistently, remaining at an average of 47% of the international migrant stock. 

The numbers of female migrants increased from 1990 (31,548) to 2000 (57,893), but started to decrease in the following years, with 44,213 women in 2005, 43,723 in 2010 and 38,435 in 2015 (Maastricht School of Governance, 2017). Little is known about the contribution of female migrants to the economic sectors or about the challenges and difficulties that they must face.

 

Children

According to the 2017 UNICEF report, children represent 26% of the immigrant population (while CAR migrant children are 16%). From 1990 to 2000 the number of under-19 migrants increased considerably from 1.5 million to over 3.2 million but decreased in the following years until it reached 2.4 million in 2010 (UNICEF, 2017). There is no significant difference between male and female migrant children. 

The main challenges that minors must face when settling down in the CAR are basically the same as national children have, as the laws to protect children from economic and sexual exploitation and grant them their rights have not been implemented. Broad impunity persists as far as crimes against minors are concerned. 

Children often live in areas lacking food and sanitation facilities, and which are often attacked by armed groups. The latter kidnap or recruit children (both girls and boys) as sex slaves or child soldiers: from 2014 to 2018, for instance, 13,000 children (of which 3,200 girls) were released from armed groups, even though very few of them could receive support for social reintegration (UNICEF, Child Alert November 2018).

Even if education is compulsory and free from 6 to 15, most children, including migrant, drop school (70% according to UNICEF, 2018), due to the fact the most school buildings are occupied by armed groups and used as barrack or headquarters. 

Children are often employed in agriculture, mining, street vending and domestic work despite a law that prohibits child labour; others are forced to prostitute in order to survive. Sexual abuses, perpetrated even by UN peacekeeping forces, have been documented, but remain still unpunished.

Minors in the CAR are extremely vulnerable, especially if they are immigrants and refugees, as they are more easily exposed to famine, illness and exploitation, and their rights are often violated because of a weak legislative system. 

 

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

in the CAR

Since 1964, the CAR has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries, even if the percentage of people seeking protection in the country remains considerably lower than that of those fleeing from it. Moreover, figures strongly oscillate according to different periods: for instance, one of the years recording a peak in the number of refugees was 1994, with 47,800 people (1.5% of the population) coming mainly from Sudan (54%) and Chad (44,9%). The highest number was recorded in 2000, with 55,700 people, especially from Sudan (64.9%) and DRC (27,5%). Since then, after the escalation of violence within the country, figures dropped: in 2009, for instance, 27,000 refugees were recorded (77% coming from DRC, 16,6% from Sudan). In 2018 the number was reduced to 6,647, with an increase in South Sudanese people (38.7%) crossing the borders in search of protection (all data are taken from Migration Data Portal). 

As data reveal, the majority of refugees come from Sudan, DRC, Chad and South Sudan and are moved by the same reasons: violence, food scarcity, illness. 

According to UNICEF global database, in 2017 children under 18 years of age were the 49% of the refugee population (10,000 people), which leads to think they might be unaccompanied and thus more vulnerable and exposed to the risk of exploitation.

Unfortunately, no data are available for refugee women, whose forced mobility is still understudied. 

In the CAR, people seeking asylum are supposedly granted refugee status within 30 days from their application and after being interviewed, which could explain the relatively low number of asylum seekers (1,000 in 2017, according to UNICEF Global Database). Once obtained the status, refugees basically have the same rights as nationals, they can move freely and have access to the labour market but once they leave the refugee camps their safety is at risk.

 from the CAR 

Mostly a country of origin for refugees and asylum seekers, the CAR has known a progressive increase in forced migration: if in 2013, before the coup and the ensuing civil war, the refugee population was about 9,000 people, numbers escalated dramatically in the following years (140,000 in 2014 and 308,000 in 2015). In 2016 480,000 Central African refugees moved to Cameroon (57%), DRC (21%), Chad (15%) and the Republic of Congo (6%) (data from UNHCR, 2017). The percentage of children reached 60%, while that of women and girls was slightly higher than that of men and boys (52.4% and 47.6% respectively, according to UNHCR, 2017). 

Asylum seekers from the CAR multiplied from 2013 (when they were 175) to 2014 (14,338) but then decreased in the following years and in 2016 10,601 people were seeking protection mainly in Cameroon, DRC and Chad (UNHCR, 2017).

Most Central African refugees and asylum seekers are resettled in far-off camps, with poor hygienic facilities, lack of food and health services that often cause clashes with the host population, as in the case of the DRC. 

Other major challenges that all refugees must face are human rights violations, child protection and gender-based violence, due to the high percentage of women and children amongst them and the precarious conditions in hosting camps, where humanitarian assistance and governmental control are made logistically difficult, if not impossible. 

 

Emigration

 Few data are available as far as emigration is concerned: the latest referred to 1993 and were presented by the World Bank in 2017, but no accurate study or analysis has been led so far to give accurate and reliable figures on emigrants. For instance, while according to the World Bank (2011), Central African working migrants were 130,000 in 2010 (2.9% of the total population), UN DESA (2019) accounted for 245,900 nationals involved in labour migration in the same year: such difference highlights the lack for a systematic migration policy monitoring migratory movements inside and outside the country and the consequent impossibility to implement the management of a human flux which has been increasing in the last years. If we consider UN DESA’s statistics, in 2015, emigrants summed up to 685,800 (46-47% of which are women) and the number is estimated to reach 767,900 by the end of 2019, with a net migration of -200,600 people.

The main reasons for emigrating are poverty and unemployment: most emigrants are poorly educated (few can complete their primary education) looking for job opportunities mainly in other African countries, especially other members of the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), such as Chad, Cameroon and DRC, where Central Africans have freedom of movement, residence and establishment without having to apply for a visa. Other destination countries are Mali and, in Europe, France (UN DESA 2013). 

  

Labour Migration/Brain Drain

Due to the lack of data, the issues of labour migration and brain drain in the CAR are inevitably subjected to some speculation: even if the exact percentage of working age migrants is unknown, it is most likely to be very high, as most of the CAR population is under-25.

Another important factor to consider is the level of education of emigrants: according to IOM (2014), the percentage of those who had at least completed secondary education was very low, namely 10.3% for women and 26.3% for men. In 2013, only 699 CAR emigrants were highly skilled professionals (MSOG, 2017), suggesting that the majority of those leaving the country might look for jobs in the agricultural or mining sector, or be employed in informal activities. 

Therefore, the CAR seems to have little, if no brain drain, as emigrants are mostly people with little education trying to find better and safer living conditions outside the country.

 

Unauthorised Migration/Trafficking and Smuggling

 With no clear legislation and little control over migration, the Central African Republic is supposed to have a high percentage of unauthorised and unrecorded migrants, to be found especially in the informal economic sector. Data are, again, insufficient to help one understand the real situation of people illegally crossing the national borders.

Conflict-torn and unsafe, the CAR seems not to be on the route for smuggling: as far as this illegal activity is concerned, literature lacks data and reliable information, but it can be affirmed that this phenomenon does not represent a relevant issue for the country.

On the other hand, human trafficking is one of the most rampant illegal activities regarding migration. The CAR is at the same time an important country of origin, transit and destination for the victims of this crime, also because the government, despite ratifying the main international protocols against human trafficking, neither act to protect its victims nor persecute traffickers. Even if the penal code includes harsh penalties such as life imprisonment for those exploiting child labour (art. 151), laws have not been implemented or enforced, so that this kind of crime often remain unpunished.

Trafficked people are mostly IDPs, women and children, forced to domestic labour or prostitution, while men are forced to work in the mining or agricultural sector. 

Children are often kidnapped and recruited by armed groups, where they can be employed as cooks, sex slaves or child soldiers. According to UNODC (2018), in 2015 39 children (28 boys and 11 girls) were newly recruited by the main armed groups, while in 2014 and 2015 5,541 children were removed from armed groups.

In 2015 the transitional government reached an agreement with ten major armed groups at the Bangui Forum, according to which the latter were supposed to release all child soldiers and not to recruit others in the future. In fact, 7,500 children were released but the lack of programs for their social re-integration increased the risk for them to be re-recruited. 

 

Remittances 

The CAR has not been able to control and account for remittances since 1993, where inflow remittances were last recorded (World Bank, 2016). The latest UNICEF report (2019) on the country highlights a 36 million-dollar outflow in 1990 but does not provide any data as far as money sent by Central African migrants living abroad. On one hand, this is the inevitable result of a fragile migration policy, often shadowed by major priorities, such as internal displacements and massive fluxes of refugees. On the other, not monitoring people’s movements means ignoring their magnitude and, more importantly, their potential. Nothing is known about Central Africans’ diaspora and about the contribution that formally or informally they make to the country’s economy, which could benefit from remittances and use them for its own development.

 

Returns and returnees

The absence of a clear legislation on migratory movements and the non-ratification of the main international protocols on migrant labour lead to the lack of returning programs for emigrants. Even if since 1992 IOM and other international organizations have assisted 1,488 Central Africans in returning and family reunification projects, and even if the government is trying to create an inter-ministerial network dealing with nationals abroad, these measures have proved to be insufficient for a stable and significant returning policy. 

 

International and civil society organizations

The main international organizations working in the CAR are IOM and the United Nations (UNHCR), which are actively involved in the management of emergencies with refugees and IDPs, building shelters and organizing settlement camps. IOM has also helped migrants in some family reunification and returning programs, while the UN in 2014 started the MINUSCA operation, a multidimensional humanitarian project to protect civilians, facilitate the transition process, give humanitarian assistance, protect human rights, disarm and demobilize armed groups and provide assistance in reintegration and repatriation processes.

Unfortunately, the premises and the staff of humanitarian organizations have been the target of violent attacks by armed groups: offices were burnt down and staff were kidnapped for some hours. Such episodes make it a challenge for international institutions and NGOs to stay in the country and provide support and protection to the most vulnerable groups of the population.

 

References

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html

https://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1518183851.pdf

http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/central-african-republic

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/forgotten-crisis-displacement-central-african-republic

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/central-african-republic 

https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78725.htm

https://web.archive.org/web/20110417022856/http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/tda2001/central-african-republic.htm

https://web.archive.org/web/20100905183727/http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_CAF.html

 

Banner photo from UN Women/Ryan Brown via Flickr Creative Commons

Central African Republic