Responding to Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Barking Up the Wrong Tree?  
Jean Pierre Misago

Territorial Control and Cross Border Movement in Eastern Ethiopia: The case of Togochale Border  
Namhla T. Matshanda

Models for Migrant Leadership: The Cape Town Women’s Platform  
Leah Mundell and Emma Carone

Exploring youth migration and the food security nexus: Zimbabwean youths in Cape Town, South Africa  
Sean T. Sithole and Mulugeta F. Dinbabo
AHMR

Chief Editor

Dr Mulugeta F. Dinbabo  University of the Western Cape, South Africa

Board Members

Dr Beneberu Assefa Wondimagegnhu  Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia
Dr Delali Margaret Badasu  University of Ghana, Ghana
Dr Edmond Agyeman  University of Education, Winneba, Ghana
Dr Ernest Angu Pineteh  University of Pretoria, South Africa
Dr Joseph Yaro  University of Ghana, Ghana
Prof Laurence Piper  University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Dr Linda Oucho  African Migration and Development Policy Centre, Kenya
Prof Loren Landau  University of Witwatersrand, South Africa
Dr Lothar Smith  Radboud University, Netherlands
Dr Meselu Alamnie Mulugeta  Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia
Prof Raul Delagdo Wise  Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico
Dr Razack Karriem  University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Dr Sharon Penderis  University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Prof Shimelis Gulema  Stony Brook University, New York
Prof Thomas Faist  Bielefeld University, Germany

AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed on-line journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects (socio-economic, political, legislative and developmental) of Human Mobility in Africa. Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence research papers, AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of contemporaneous trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues. AHMR is published by the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA) a member of the Network of the Scalabrini Centers for Migration Studies, with institutions in New York, Paris, Rome, Buenos Aires, Basel, Sao Paulo and Manila.

Articles and reviews in AHMR reflect the opinions of the contributors.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the written permission from the publisher. ISSN 2410-7972 (online) ISSN 2411-6955 (print)

Copyright © 2016 by the SCALABRINI INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN MOBILITY IN AFRICA
47, Commercial St, 8001 Cape Town – South Africa
Tel. 0027 021 465 6433 Email: editor@sihma.org.za
Webpage: www.sihma.org.za
African Human Mobility Review

Volume 2 Number 2 May – August 2016

ARTICLES

443  Responding to Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Barking Up the Wrong Tree?
Jean Pierre Misago

468  Territorial Control and Cross Border Movement in Eastern Ethiopia: The case of Togochale Border
Namhla T. Matshanda

489  Models for Migrant Leadership: The Cape Town Women’s Platform
Leah Mundell and Emma Carone

512  Exploring youth migration and the food security nexus: Zimbabwean youths in Cape Town, South Africa
Sean T. Sithole and Mulugeta F. Dinbabo
Responding to Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Barking Up the Wrong Tree?

Jean Pierre Misago *

Abstract

This paper highlights the general failure to effectively respond to and prevent xenophobic violence in South Africa and offers critical reflections on reasons thereof. Drawing mainly on the evaluation of a number of anti-xenophobic programmes by government and civil society organisations, the paper argues that past and current interventions, instead of muzzling dogs that bite, have been rather barking up the wrong tree. National government and relevant local authorities have thus far either tended to ignore the problem or categorise violence against foreign nationals and other outsiders as normal crime with no need for more specific or more targeted interventions. Although well-intentioned, civil society efforts to foster peaceful cohabitation and tolerance through social dialogues and campaigns aimed at changing attitudes have also largely proven ineffective in reducing violence. There are many reasons why these interventions continue to fail. Chief among these reasons is the fact that interventions are not evidence-based and are not informed by a clear understanding of the drivers of the violence. Similarly, past and current responses and interventions are based on shaky foundations and untested theories of change. Indeed, by focussing almost exclusively on public attitudes, interventions neglect factors and motivations that trigger violent behaviour; perhaps ignoring that attitudes are not always a good predictor of behaviour. Without a clear understanding of the drivers of the violence and of what type of responses work or do not work, intervention strategies can only be ineffective at best, and counter-productive at worst.

Keywords Xenophobia, violent exclusion, foreign nationals.

* African Centre for Migration & Society, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, PO Box 67 Wits 2050, Tel: 011 717 14093, email: Jean.Misago@wits.ac.za
Introduction
Xenophobic violence generally refers to any acts of collective violence (by local communities, groups or crowds) targeted at foreign nationals or ‘outsiders’ because of their being foreign or strangers. Dodson (2010) reminds us that xenophobic violence is an explicit targeting of foreign nationals or outsiders for violent attacks despite other material, political, cultural or social forces that might be at play. Its main characteristics include murder, assaults causing grievous bodily harm, looting, robbery, arson attacks (burning of people and property), displacement, intimidation and threats, harassment, eviction notices, etc. This type of violence has become a longstanding feature in post-Apartheid South Africa (Landau 2011). Indeed, since 1994, tens of thousands of people have been harassed, attacked or killed because of their status as outsiders or foreign nationals. Despite claims to the contrary, violence against foreign nationals in South Africa did not end in June 2008 when the massive outbreak that started a month earlier subsided (Misago 2011). Hostility towards foreign nationals is still pervasive and continues to result in rising cases of murder, injuries, threats of mob violence, looting and the destruction of residential property and businesses, as well as mass displacement (UNCHR ROSA 2015a).

Perhaps not surprisingly, the unprecedented nature of the May 2008 xenophobic violence triggered not only a frenzy of analyses and explanations as scholars, policy analysts and government officials attempted to make sense of what was happening in the multiracial ‘rainbow’ nation (Fauvelle-Aymar & Segatti 2011; Nieftagodien 2011), but also a wide range of government and civil society responses and interventions aimed at stopping on-going and/or preventing future violence. This paper offers critical reflections on the effectiveness of these interventions and argues that they have generally failed to prevent xenophobic violence in the country particularly because, by addressing the wrong sources of violence and using untested theories of changes, they have been barking up the wrong tree instead of muzzling dogs that bite. Indeed, the paper shows that, in addition to the lack of government political will, impunity and lack of civil society muscle to hold government
accountable for its failure to protect all countries’ residents, interventions have failed particularly because of their critical ontological and etiological blind spots. More specifically, the paper argues that interventions have failed to address xenophobic violence in the country because i) they are not evidence-based and are not informed by a clear understanding of the drivers of the violence; and ii) they are based on shaky foundations and untested theories of change. Indeed, by focussing almost exclusively on public attitudes, interventions neglect factors and motivations that trigger violent behaviour; perhaps ignoring that attitudes are not always an accurate predictor of behaviour.

After a brief methodology outline, the remainder of the paper proceeds through three main sections. The first provides a brief overview of the history and nature of xenophobic violence in post-Apartheid South Africa. The second offers critical reflections on the effectiveness of responses and interventions by different actors including government, the police, civil society and communities. The third and concluding section summarises the paper’s main points and arguments.

**Methods**

The paper draws on evaluation of past and current government and civil society responses to xenophobic violence in South Africa. In addition to smaller-scale evaluations and observations, the paper draws more specifically on primary and secondary data collected by the African Centre for Migration in Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2014 as part of a systematic evaluation of four anti-xenophobia programmes by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Office for Southern Africa (UNHCR ROSA 2014). The overall aim of UNHCR ROSA programmes and other interventions referred to in this paper was to stop on-going violent attacks on foreign nationals and to prevent the reoccurrence of such violence in the future.

In order to assess the effectiveness and impact of UNHCR ROSA programmes to address xenophobic violence in South Africa, as well as the reasons for their
relative success or failure, we (ACMS) simultaneously conducted two complementary types of evaluation: an impact evaluation and a process evaluation. The impact evaluation assessed the impact that programmes have had or are having in stopping and preventing xenophobic violence. The process evaluation assessed the programmes’ theories of change and logical frameworks, such as the relevance of programmes and activities in addressing the targeted problem; whether programmes and activities were implemented as planned; the challenges encountered during implementation and how these may have affected the achievement of the programmes’ goals and objectives. The combination of these two types of evaluation afforded us an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the entire programme process from its conceptualisation to its implementation and impact.

To capture all the necessary information, the evaluation used a combination of a variety of sources of information and data including document reviews, individual interviews and focus group discussions. In particular, we conducted individual interviews with a wide range of relevant stakeholders including UNHCR and implementing partner staff, key informants at national, provincial, municipal and research site levels, target populations and ordinary members of communities in selected sites. Altogether, the evaluation comprised of a total of 105 individual interviews. In addition to individual interviews, the research team conducted two focus group discussions with members of target populations and communities in the selected sites. Using the combination of these information sources allowed not only the acquisition of the necessary information but also quality control through triangulation of findings from those sources. We applied content analysis techniques to analyse the data collected.

Assessing the effectiveness of interventions to stop and prevent xenophobic violence requires a clear understanding of the conceptual and empirical distinctions between ‘xenophobia’ and xenophobic violence. There is indeed an epistemological necessity – and practical utility – to understand the conceptual differences between xenophobia and xenophobic violence. With the reminder that xenophobia denotes negative attitudes towards the ‘other’
while xenophobic violence is just one of many forms of manifestation of those attitudes, there is a need to recognise that, while causally linked, xenophobia and xenophobic violence are two conceptually and empirically distinct concepts and phenomena. This conceptual distinction is epistemologically and practically important because understanding and addressing xenophobia (attitudes) requires methodological and intervention approaches that are different from those required for xenophobic violence (behaviour). Indeed, interventions designed to address attitudinal challenges are not necessarily suitable for, nor should they be assumed capable of, effecting behavioural change, even if the behaviour in question is rooted in those attitudes (Misago et al. 2015). In other words, interventions to change attitudes may and should be different from those aimed at stopping and preventing those attitudes from taking on violent forms of expression. Indeed, as Brubaker & Laitin (1998: 426) remind us, “violence is not a quantitative degree of conflict but a qualitative form of conflict, with its own dynamics.” They argue, and I agree, that “even where violence is clearly rooted in pre-existing conflict, it should not be treated as a natural, self-explanatory outgrowth of such conflict, something that occurs automatically when the conflict reaches certain intensity, a certain temperature” (Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 426).

Unfortunately, as this paper shows, most interventions lack this conceptual clarity and are loaded with the unfounded assumption that programmes targeting xenophobic attitudes will eventually stop xenophobic violence. The paper offers critical reflections on the effectiveness of past and current interventions in stopping/preventing xenophobic violence and not in changing xenophobic attitudes. Naturally, the paper also discusses the effect of this and other conceptual and methodological blind spots on the ineffectiveness of these interventions.

**History and Morphology of Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

Xenophobic violence has become a longstanding feature in post-Apartheid South Africa. Since 1994, tens of thousands of people have been harassed, attacked or killed because of their status as outsiders or foreign nationals
During this period, xenophobic violence has increased across townships and informal settlements (Landau 2011) and the situation has become alarming to the degree that the African Peer Review Mechanism’s country report on South Africa warned that xenophobia against other Africans was on the rise and needed to be nipped in the bud (Johwa 2008).

Xenophobic violence was most intense and widely scrutinised in May 2008 when attacks across the country left at least 62 dead, 670 wounded, dozens raped and more than 100,000 displaced. Millions of Rands worth of property was also looted, destroyed and appropriated by local residents in just over two weeks (CORMSA 2009). Although the majority of those attacked were foreign migrants, a third of those killed were South African citizens “who had married foreigners, refused to participate in the violent orgy, or had the misfortune of belonging to groups that were evidently not South African enough to claim their patch of urban space” (Landau 2011: 1).

Despite official claims that the government and South African society has “moved on” (Black Sash 2009), the violence did not end in June 2008 when the massive outbreak that had started a month earlier finally subsided. Although the country has not since witnessed violence of the intensity seen in May 2008, the incidence of violence has not decreased. Rather, there is a growing recognition, even among some government officials, that violent attacks on foreign nationals “have taken on disturbing proportions” (DAC 2012). Indeed, violence continued post May and the media reported at least 10 violent incidents during June 2008. In the following months and years, attacks on non-nationals continued, resulting in rising cases of murder, injuries, threats of mob violence, looting and the destruction of residential property and businesses, as well as mass displacement. In every individual year since 2008, violence has claimed more lives than it did during the May 2008 attacks.

Indeed, CoRMSA (2011) reports that in almost every month since mid-2008, there has been at least one attack on groups of foreign nationals in the country; and that between mid-2009 and late 2010, there were at least 20 deaths, over 40 serious injuries, at least 200 foreign-run shops looted and more than 4,000 persons displaced due to violence targeting foreign nationals. In 2011,
at least 120 foreign nationals were killed (five of them burnt alive), 100 were seriously injured, at least 1,000 displaced, and 120 shops/businesses permanently or temporarily closed through violence or selective enforcement of by-laws (UNHCR ROSA 2014). In 2012, the number of violence incidents increased: the UNHCR ROSA reported at least 250 incidents resulting in 140 deaths and 250 serious injuries. In 2013, UNHCR ROSA recorded an average of three major violent incidents per week, with attacks regularly reported in many areas across the country during 2014. There were an estimated 300 incidents of violence against foreign nationals, an estimated 200 shops looted and 900 persons displaced between January and March 2014 (UNCHR ROSA 2014). The South African Police Service (SAPS) was overwhelmed by the increase in violence against foreigners and required support and assistance from all relevant government departments. In 2015, violence continued in many parts of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo provinces. Information from the police indicates that 16 people (nine in Gauteng and seven in KwaZulu Natal) were killed, more than 6,000 people displaced and hundreds of businesses looted and destroyed (UNHCR ROSA 2015b). In March 2016, xenophobic violence erupted in Katlehong Township in Gauteng (Mkhize, 2016)

While violence once seemed concentrated in the townships around the country’s big cities, it is now increasingly spreading across the country’s nine provinces and into rural areas. The most affected provinces remain the Western Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Eastern Cape, where some locations and sub places have become scenes of repeated violent attacks. In all provinces, this violence occurs mostly (but not exclusively) in poor and economically marginalised informal settlements where citizens (many of whom are themselves internal migrants) and immigrants meet amidst poor living conditions and a general scarcity of public services, employment and business opportunities.

In sum, the above brief discussion shows that xenophobic violence in South Africa is a reality that continues to threaten lives and livelihoods of many foreign nationals living in the country. As the next sections shows, continued
and increasing violence is clear evidence that no effective preventive mechanisms have been put in place.

Responses to Xenophobic Violence and their Shortcomings

As alluded to above, although it is impossible to say what would have happened in the absence of past and current initiatives, levels of continued (and in some areas repeated) xenophobic violence is clear evidence that responses and interventions designed to address the problem have largely been ineffective. National government and relevant local authorities have thus far either tended to ignore the problem or to categorise violence against foreign nationals and other forms of xenophobic behaviour as part of ‘normal’ crime with no need for additional targeted interventions. Civil society efforts to foster peaceful coexistence and tolerance through social dialogues and awareness campaigns have also largely proven unsuccessful in changing attitudes and reducing violence and other forms of outsider exclusion. This section discusses the reasons behind these failures and shows that in some cases, despite their good intentions, interventions risk doing more harm than good.

Early efforts by the government included its commitment to uphold the ‘Declaration’ adopted at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) held in Durban in 2001. The conference recognised the urgent need to translate the objectives of the Durban Declaration into a practical and workable plan. Unfortunately more than a decade later no such a plan exists although a ‘National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’ spearheaded by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has been under discussion for many years.

The first and most significant of civil society’s response to xenophobia in post-apartheid Africa was the Roll Back Xenophobia (RBX) Campaign. In a partnership between the South African Human Rights Commission, the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the RBX Campaign was launched in December
1998 in response to the rising levels of xenophobia particularly targeted at African migrants and refugees in South Africa. The campaign aimed to combat xenophobia through public education in the media, communities, schools and work places. Its funding ended and it was formally terminated in 2002 with “the promise of the initiative [...] never realised” (Crush & Ramachandran 2009: 84). Whatever its potential benefits, it did little to prevent the most acute manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa’s history, that was the unprecedented wave of xenophobic violence in May 2008.

Responses and interventions to counter xenophobia and its different manifestations proliferated after May 2008. Indeed, following the outbreak of violence, numerous state and non-state actors at different levels of government and society got involved in various interventions to stop the violence, mitigate its effects and prevent future occurrences.

**Post-May 2008 Government Response**

During the May 2008 violence, the government called on specialised units, created ad-hoc committees and designated task teams in parliament, ministries, the police and provincial and local governments. However, once the acute violence subsided, so too did government’s commitment to counter xenophobia. Both before and after the 2008 attacks, it is fair to say that the overall government response to xenophobia and related violence in South Africa has been characterised by denialism. In many cases, this denialism is rooted in a discourse which labels all xenophobic violence as ‘just crime and not xenophobia,’ a categorisation that demands few specific interventions or policy changes. As Crush & Ramachandran (2009: 19) note:

Despite the overwhelming research evidence of a powder-keg of xenophobic sentiment, the issue was largely ignored in public political discourse, until it was too late. Even then, the response of those in government to May 2008 was largely denialist in character. Several prominent politicians initially voiced surprise and concern and acknowledged that xenophobia was a significant problem. They were quickly silenced by an official ‘party line’ from the President’s office. The attacks were criminal, not xenophobically motivated,
said President Mbeki at an official day of mourning for the victims. South Africans were not xenophobic and anyone who said so was themselves being xenophobic.

Similarly, in its 2011 report, the African Peer Review Mechanism Monitoring Project gave South Africa a ‘red rating’ for its failure to address, and indeed its denial of, xenophobia (SAIIA, CPS & AGMA 2011). The denialism characterising government response in 2008 continues to date. Such positions and the lack of sustained political will to address xenophobia led efforts initiated in 2008 to be abandoned or allowed to wither. Task teams and units have been dissolved or are no longer functional and – somewhat ironically – ‘xenophobia’ has been almost entirely excised from the country’s ‘national action plan to combat racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance’. The unwillingness to recognise xenophobia coupled with a general weak judicial system has also led to an alarming culture of impunity and lack of accountability for perpetrators and mandated institutions: foreign nationals and others have been repeatedly attacked in South Africa since 2004 but few perpetrators, some of them government representatives at local level, have been charged. Even fewer have been convicted. In some instances, state agents have actively protected those accused of anti-foreigner violence (Misago 2011). Similarly, there have been no efforts to hold mandated institutions, such as the police and the intelligence, accountable for their failure to prevent and stop violence despite visible warning signs.

In explaining government denialism in the face of overwhelming evidence, Polzer & Takabvirwa (2010: 7) argue that admitting the existence of a xenophobic citizenry is both “ideologically and politically uncomfortable” for the ANC which “understands itself as heir to a long non-discriminatory, pan-African tradition.” Admitting that various forms of violence against outsiders even within the black population remain a striking feature of the ‘rainbow nation’ is likely to be a similarly uncomfortable truth to acknowledge as it sits uneasily with long-standing ANC visions of ‘unity in diversity’ and poses serious challenges to the state’s legitimacy and sovereignty. That said, it is worth noting that there are on-going small scale initiatives to counter
xenophobia and promote social cohesion within various departments. These include Home Affairs’ (DHA) programme aimed at ‘Strengthening Communities of Peace and Diversity,’ the Justice and Constitutional Development’s (DoJ) ‘National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,’ and the Arts and Culture’s (DAC) ‘National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and a Cohesive South African Society.’ While the last two initiatives are still under discussion, the success of these strategies is uncertain given the consistent lack of coordination and complementarity among different government departments in addressing xenophobia and related violence since 2008.

It should also be noted that some senior officials within the national and provincial governments acknowledge the problem’s severity and have appealed for tolerance. For example, in her keynote speech on World Refugee Day on 20 June 2013, the Minister of Home Affairs publicly condemned xenophobia and acknowledged that much needs to be done to combat the violence and educate the community. Similarly, the Deputy President and Gauteng Premier recently spoke out against xenophobia and again stressed that more needs to be done to address it. In addressing a Gauteng social cohesion summit in Johannesburg in August 2014, the Deputy President stated:

As the province with the largest number of immigrants, Gauteng must lead the way in combating xenophobia in all its manifestations. The people of this province must, through their actions, underscore the fact that foreign nationals pose no threat to our desire for social cohesion nor do they present any impediment to the achievement of a common South African nationhood (Gabara 2015).

Similarly, the Gauteng Premier stated that “South Africans should self-reflect before blaming all their problems on foreigners and urged the country to unite against xenophobia” (Kubheka 2014). While these pronouncements (like the ones in the past) have not translated into concrete action, they contrast starkly with the national government’s populist turn over the last few years. A sign of this is a series of current policy proposals intended to restrict immigration and
the socio-economic rights of non-nationals in South Africa. So while government has tentatively accepted the need to fight xenophobia, it has left this largely in the realm of rhetorical appeal while actively working to restrict immigration and opportunities for non-nationals in South Africa. As Landau & Freemantle (2014: 1) note, it is somewhat ironic that efforts to promote social cohesion in the country are “premised on separating groups and denying some segments of the population rights guaranteed to others.” It is important to note that even this general acceptance of xenophobia again reinforces the position that this is fundamentally an issue of immigration and not one rooted in potentially violent divisions within South Africa’s population.

**Police Responses to Xenophobic Violence in South Africa**

Although the police are charged with protecting all residents of South Africa from physical harm, they have often expressed ambivalence towards the rights and welfare of outsiders or been actively hostile and complicit in violence against them (Amnesty International 2014; Landau & Haithar 2007). In line with government reactions, rather than grapple with the issue as distinct from high levels of ‘ordinary’ crime, police officials have resisted pressure to approach xenophobic violence as anything rooted in attitudes, political instrumentalism or economic ambition. Instead, they argue, the language of xenophobia is merely a cover for criminality or even a conscious effort to bring South Africa’s reputation into disrepute. According to a police spokesperson quoted in Bauer (2013):

*Holistically speaking, South Africans are not xenophobic and many cases are merely crime. [...] We cannot conflate this issue and we commonly see this as Afrophobia that is underpinned by criminality. When we see children looting shops and people robbing people of their goods it is to us a blatant sign of crime that is being excused as xenophobia.*

CORMSA (2011) argues that because the “police are very quick to dismiss attacks on foreign nationals as simply ‘criminal’ rather than xenophobic,” they have limited ability to detect prejudice motives in criminal incidents. This has serious implications on their ability to counter violence: when the police arrest
or bring perpetrators to justice (which they rarely do), the focus is almost exclusively on those caught in the act rather than on instigators behind the scenes. While the instigators are often well known to the community, they have de facto impunity and may – as they have in many cases – act again. Indeed, by eliminating economic competition, seizing housing or winning political favour through their actions, their incentives are further strengthened.

In explaining their insufficient response, the police often point to lack of capacity and fear of victimisation at the hands of a hostile community. This may be true in many instances, but one must not overlook their own anti-foreigner sentiments and support (or at least passive condoning) of the violence and their unwillingness to draw attention to a politically sensitive topic (Misago et al. 2009). In the run up to the 2010 FIFA world cup, the police minister labelled those raising concerns about overt threats of xenophobic violence as “prophets of doom” (TV footage showed interviews with township dwellers preparing to “finish the war” they started in May 2008).

The ‘evacuation strategy’ has become a characteristic feature of police responses to xenophobic violence. In almost all cases, the police have limited their role to escorting victims to places of safety rather than protecting them and their property in situ. Even where well-intentioned, such activities may inadvertently abet perpetrators trying to remove ‘unwanted’ foreigners from their midst. In some instances, the police have been accused of actively collaborating with such campaigns (Landau & Haithar 2007). While appreciating the police efforts to save their lives, some victims of the attacks believe that effort should also be made to protect their property. For them, saving livelihoods is as important as saving lives. A Somali shop-owner in Orange Farm states:

Well, the problem... helpers, the police, they are coming. And they come to save our life, but not our property. They say “leave the shop; let us take you to the police station.” And they take us to the police station. Tomorrow, how can we survive? Yes, okay... they save my life... tomorrow, what can I...I eat and drink?
Yes, they have to protect us with our property. Even last time, they robbed our shops. Now even I don’t have a shop.

**Post May 2008 Civil Society Response**

The widespread anti-outsider violence in May 2008 elicited a range of responses from local and international civil society and international organisations. Many have been involved in providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the violence. Others have launched interventions aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of such a violent conflict by promoting social cohesion. These have had mixed effects. While some have undoubtedly provided needed succour and others have had little impact, some have risked exacerbating tensions by reinforcing notions that foreigners are a privileged group or promoting conflict resolution strategies that bolster inter-group boundaries.

Although characterised by much chaos due to a lack of coordination and communication among different stakeholders, the immediate humanitarian response to the May 2008 crisis was generally laudable: NGOs (local and international), UN agencies, faith-based organisations (FBOs) and individuals proffered volumes of donated food, clothes and other goods and services to the displaced populations (Polzer et al. 2009). Beyond the humanitarian crisis, various civil society organisations initiated programmes aimed at preventing the occurrence of violence and promoting social cohesion. The Nelson Mandela Foundation, for example, organised social cohesion community dialogues in violence affected communities across the country. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) initiated the ‘ONE’ Movement, a social change campaign that seeks to reverse attitudes that result in discrimination, xenophobia, racism and tribalism. This was intended to use media campaigns, community conversations, youth mobilisation, curriculum interventions and human rights training with a wide range of civil society partners to promote a culture of tolerance, human dignity and unity in diversity across South and Southern Africa (IOM 2009).
Together with many other initiatives organised by interested parties and organisations, these interventions may have increased awareness of xenophobia as a social problem. They have, however, done little to address social and institutional xenophobia and its various manifestations. Indeed, official and public xenophobic pronouncements and attitudes are as pervasive as ever and violence against foreign nationals is on the rise (Misago et al. 2015). The following discussion highlights at least six reasons why these civil society interventions have failed or have not yielded desired outcomes.

First, there is a lack of consistency and political muscle to hold government accountable for its failures to protect people's fundamental rights or to influence strong and sustained official response to xenophobia and related violence. Pugh (2014: 1) rightly notes that “much civil society response tended to be humanitarian in nature, rather than presenting any sustained political challenge that would address the underlying structural causes of such violence.” In trying to address xenophobia and its different manifestations in South Africa, civil society has almost exclusively targeted affected communities with awareness campaigns and moral appeals for tolerance but has largely failed to mobilise government responses to address the institutional xenophobia that fuels anti-foreigner attitudes and behaviour among the public. It has also failed to generate official, policy level response aimed specifically at building a society inclusive of foreign nationals and other outsiders (or at least obtain government’s official support and sustained involvement in on-going initiatives). As Pugh (2014: 232) further notes, there appears to be no, “space available for CSO actors to effectively advocate for structural and political change in the management of migration, refugee, and asylum seeker issues, let alone for addressing the root causes of violence.” With a focus on communities, interventions often overlook the broader institutional structures that help reinforce perceptions and practices that disadvantage and threaten lives and livelihoods of many foreign nationals living in the country. As Misago et al. (2015) note, the root causes of intolerance and discrimination in South Africa are located in mutually reinforcing social and institutional configurations at local and national levels.
Indeed, reflecting on UHNCR anti-xenophobia programmes, many civil society organisations acknowledged that one of their collective failures in addressing xenophobic violence in South Africa has been their inability to secure a government buy-in. For example, a CORMSA official observed “[…] one of the things which continue to be missing is the issue of getting government buy-in and commitment…. So for me I think one of the shortcomings would have been that relationship with government in terms of getting the buy-in of the programme.” The official believes that not having government on board is a major challenge to addressing xenophobia and related violence. In a similar vein, Amnesty International (2014) stated that they “remained concerned that in the six years since the large-scale violence and displacements of 2008, the South African authorities have not put in place any systematic measures of prevention and protection.”

Second, civil society organisations often base their interventions on shaky foundations and untested theories of change. For one, they have focused almost exclusively on attitudes, neglecting factors and motivations that trigger violent behaviour towards foreigners. This shifts attention from factors critical to combatting the immediate effects of xenophobia (law enforcement, accountability and the like) to ones with (only potential) long-term consequences. Although promoting tolerant attitudes is an important objective in any fragmented society, the psychological research is inconclusive regarding relationships between attitudes and behaviour. Attitudes are not necessarily a good predictor of behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein 1977). As research evidence shows, anti-foreign attitudes are consistently high across different sections of the country’s population, but manifestations of violence and acts of discrimination differ significantly across locations (Crush 2008). People may value an inclusive society in general but are nonetheless willing and able to alienate particular, demonised sub-groups. Hence, attitudes alone cannot explain why certain forms of violence tend to happen in certain types of communities and not in others. Apart from questionable efficiency, the emphasis on attitudes overlooks the importance of political mobilisation of xenophobic discourses or institutional configurations – formal or informal – that help to differentiate and divide populations based on race, ethnicity,
nationality, legal status or any other factor that might become fulcra for xenophobic discrimination (Landau 2011). Political entrepreneurs and local leaders often deliberately capitalise on distrustful climates and make political or economic gains from discrimination against and violent exclusion of those deemed to be outsiders (Misago 2011). By overlooking these instigators and their motivations, interventions are unlikely to succeed because they are ‘barking up the wrong tree.’

Indeed, to be effective, the theories of change and other assumptions informing most of civil society’s xenophobia related programming need to be evidence-based and, particularly, be broadened beyond changing public opinions and attitudes and shift towards programmes and interventions targeting political and behavioural change. For example, apart from the Militia/Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Programme (Militia/DMPSP) and, to an extent, the Agency for Refugee Education, Skills, Training & Advocacy (ARESTA) programme, the UNHCR ROSA programmes evaluated were oriented towards public attitudes, not xenophobic behaviour or practices, politics on the ground and national policy. For example, ARESTA identified poor service delivery, poverty, unemployment and political infighting as sources of violence but, nevertheless, designed a public awareness programme instead of programmes to address these sources of conflict. Public awareness programmes have value as long as they are complemented by other approaches targeting the political and economic incentives and configurations driving violence and discrimination.

Third, civil society interventions and programmes are immigrant-orientated and run the risk of exacerbating rather than eliminating bias and violent exclusion. Overt pro-migrant, pro-minority rights programmes may further isolate migrants or minorities by reinforcing existing boundaries and fuelling tensions. Such programmes risk reinforcing the categories by (a) drawing attention to them; (b) requiring people to seek remedy as membership in said groups; and (c) bolstering popular conceptions that foreigners receive special aid and attention. By demonstrating that foreign nationals (or other minorities) have international allies (UNHCR, AI, etc...), well-meaning agencies
and their interventions may unwittingly build resentment among the disadvantaged citizenry who feels forgotten and angry. Some of this may be unavoidable, but campaigns organised around more transversal or universal themes like law enforcement, rule of law, administrative restructuring or the like may help diminish, rather than reinforce, difference. This may require a different set of partners and expertise beyond the normal human rights and migrant protection collaborators. Such a ‘stealth’ approach may be more politically palatable and sustainable and less visibly pro-migrant/minority.

One of the UHNCR ROSA initiatives (the Militia/DMPSP) could serve as an example in this regard. Called ‘Promotion of Social Cohesion among Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Nationals’, the programme’s objective was to prevent and mitigate violent attacks on foreign nationals, particularly UNHCR’s people of concern. Although activities and implementation approach varies depending on the situation at hand, Militia/DMPSP indicated that their general modus operandi consisted of i) intelligence gathering to have a clear understanding of the situation; ii) dispersing crowds of perpetrators using force and dogs when necessary (working with the police or on their own); iii) evacuating victims of attack to safe places; iv) searching for and retrieving stolen goods; v) arresting perpetrators and handing them over to the police; and vi) negotiating with communities and their leaders for reintegration of displaced foreign nationals (see more details on this programme in Misago et al. 2015). Visibly, while these activities may provide foreign nationals with short term relief, they may actually exacerbate their long term vulnerability. Indeed, these are law enforcement duties which, when performed by civil society organisations (like in this case), have questionable legality, to say the least, and create unsustainable parallel systems of protection or reinforce divisions between foreign nationals and other community members. Interventions that create parallel systems of protection and/or prioritise the wellbeing of foreign nationals over the general welfare of other community members risk exacerbating tensions and resentment and may end up doing more harm than good in terms of protecting outsiders from violent exclusion.
Fourth, many civil society interventions target the wrong sources of conflict. For example, assumptions that events like community dialogues and cultural and sport festivals that bring different groups together will help achieve peaceful coexistence among groups, ignore the fact that these initiatives are unlikely to reach those behind the violence. While there is potential value in bringing people together who otherwise might not engage, they do little to address the political economy of violence within South African communities. Indeed, ample research evidence indicates that the micro-politics and the political economy of violence are the key drivers of violent attacks on foreign nationals in affected areas (Misago 2011). Moreover, when managed poorly, even supposedly ‘non-political’ events such as soccer tournaments, intercultural dialogues or cultural events easily become politically charged and divisive. Such events require very careful management and a clearly structured framework for establishing dialogue around issues of mutual concern to avoid the worsening of existing tensions.

Fifth and lastly, many civil society organisations use ‘one size fits all’ approaches that fail to recognise the specific sources of violence in particular sites. While there are commonalities across many sites, initiatives that fail to recognise the triggers, targets and forms of discrimination as practiced in a specific place are unlikely to succeed. Thus, it is important that interventions are adapted to the specific dynamics of a locality, carefully considering which local institutions to target, which residents and actors to work with, and which specific tensions to address.

**Community Responses**

In the absence of effective government and civil society responses, foreign nationals and local communities and their leaders are forging new ways to deal with discrimination and violent exclusion. In a few instances, local communities have resisted violence mobilisation and have actively protected foreign nationals and other groups living in their midst (BBC 2011) However, much of this ‘protection’ or ‘welcoming’ of foreigners in the community is motivated by self-interest too, rather than a principled stance of tolerance and hospitality. In some places, foreign nationals and local communities have
resorted to unlawful compromises such as limiting the number of foreign-owned business in a given locality and setting minimum prices on basic goods. Segatti (2011: 3) notes that “these agreements are problematic because they set precedents akin to market division and price-fixing.” In other instances, foreign nationals pay protection fees to local leaders or gangsters or are forced to drop criminal charges against their assailants to appease communities or in response to threats of further attacks (Misago et al. 2009). There are also growing concerns that foreign nationals are making efforts to acquire firearms (even if illegally) for self-protection (Amnesty International 2014), and there are already examples where this practice has led to more tensions and violence. For example the January 2015 violence in Soweto started after a foreign shop owner shot and killed a local boy during an alleged robbery (Sapa 2015) These community initiatives are evidently unsustainable coping mechanisms that are already causing more chaos, exacerbating existing tensions and leading to more violence.

**Conclusion**

This paper argues that government and civil society responses and interventions to address xenophobic violence in South Africa have largely been ineffective as evidenced by on-going and increasing levels of such violence. The paper further argues that, in addition to the lack of government political will, impunity and lack of civil society muscle to hold government accountable for its failure to protect all country’s residents, interventions have failed particularly because of their critical ontological and etiological blind spots. Indeed, most of past and current interventions by civil society a) fail to address the presence of institutional roots of xenophobia and related violence and neglect the importance of political mobilisation of xenophobic discourses or institutional configurations, and b) are based on untested theories of change such as unfounded assumptions that changing attitudes, even if successful, will necessarily prevent violence. As such, interventions are not informed by a clear understanding of violence dynamics, motives and triggers. Without a clear appreciation of the dynamics, instrumental motives and organisational triggers of the violence as well as of what type of responses
work or do not work, intervention strategies can only be ineffective at best, and counter-productive at worst.

If nothing else, this paper demonstrates that addressing xenophobic violence or at least minimizing its effects requires more than moral appeals and awareness campaigns. Rather it requires, (a) sustained, and coordinated and broad-based efforts; (b) greater support from public programmes and politicians; (c) a more nuanced understanding of the space specific drivers of violence; and (d) efforts to counter the culture of impunity, promote the rule of law and enhance community-based conflict resolution mechanisms that respect the constitutional principles of universal rights and due process. To reiterate the third point, this means shifting from one size fits all approaches towards strategies that consider the localised political and social variations and area specific histories of conflict in order to respond appropriately and in a more sustainable manner.

References


Nieftagodien, N. 2011. Xenophobia’s local genesis: Historical constructions of insiders and the politics of exclusion in Alexandra Township. In Landau, L.B.


Territorial Control and Cross Border Movement in Eastern Ethiopia: The case of Togochale Border

Namhla T. Matshanda

Abstract
The movement of people across national boundaries on the African continent, for the purposes of earning a living through gainful employment, engaging in cross-border trade or visiting their kin, is commonplace. However, the extent to which political power and authority permits this mobility is dependent on specific historical and political factors of each country. This paper traces and examines Ethiopian state presence at the Togochale border in the east of the country by examining patterns of cross-border movement – namely migration, refugee movement and cross-border trade – since the 1960s. Using archival sources and secondary sources, the paper constructs a historical narrative of strong state presence in this border area. Furthermore, the paper argues that the notable presence of the Ethiopian state at this border is a consequence of how the Ethiopian state conceptualises the notion of territorial statehood, which is shaped by the country’s history. Popular understandings suggest that local populations hold much sway in African border areas, rather than the central state, which is often confined to the capital – miles away from the border. Therefore, the presence of the Ethiopian state at the Togochale border appears to depart from the norm of limited state presence in African borderlands.

Keywords Territoriality, statehood, borderlands, eastern Ethiopia, Togochale border.

Introduction
This paper foregrounds the control of territory by the Ethiopian state in the eastern periphery by constructing a historical narrative of strong state presence in this border area. It traces and examines Ethiopian state presence at the Togochale border by examining patterns of cross-border movement – namely migration, refugee movement and cross-border trade – since the 1960s. The focus of the paper is the manifestation of statehood in eastern
Ethiopia. As such, the paper takes the border as an ideal representation of territorial statehood. The interplay between territorial control and cross-border movement thus reveals the conceptualisation of territorial statehood by the Ethiopian state.

In the mid-1950s, following the withdrawal of the British Military Administration (BMA) from Ethiopia, there emerged competing ideas of what the border means and represents to the Ethiopian state. These notions related to the nature of the Ethiopian state at the time and the thinking that characterised the country’s rulers. Borders, therefore, can be seen as directly linked to the determination of the limits of the state and as markers of the limits of the intended exercise of power by the state. Borderlands, on the other hand, raise a different set of dynamics vis-à-vis the state and the exercise of power. However, borderlands have similar characteristics, as spaces that owe much of their character to the nature of the border, regardless of whether they are in Ethiopia or elsewhere in Africa (Asiwaju 1985).

According to Vandergeest and Peluso (1995: 389), “experienced territory or space is not abstract and homogenous, but located, relative, and varied.” This suggests that the manner in which a state elects to establish territorial statehood varies and is dependent on a range of factors. Indeed, Sack (1986: 3), argues that “territoriality is a historically sensitive use of space.” Most of the literature on the relationship between African states and their borders is informed by the colonial experience (Kapil 1966; Englebert & Hummel 2005; Englebert 2009). The majority of this literature does not take into account countries such as Ethiopia, which have different experiences with colonialism. Recent literature demonstrates that it has not been easy to assess Africa’s recent past, which in many ways has departed from the colonial past. As Nugent (2004: 1-2) suggests, although there has been much written about contemporary Africa, “a lot of it is unreflective and does not seek to place the material in any kind of historical context.” This paper rejects this approach by contextualising and historicising the relationship between the Ethiopian state and its borders in order to understand contemporary practices of territorial statehood.

The paper begins by conceptualising African notions of territorial statehood. It traces current understandings of territoriality in Africa and locates these in the post-independence consensus on African borders. The paper then moves on to a discussion of Ethiopian understandings of territoriality. This section highlights the constitutive role of peripheries in Ethiopian statehood. The
paper then discusses a period of rigid state borders in the post-BMA period in Ethiopia. The section examines how this period influenced the manner in which the state viewed the border. To provide context, this section explores internal political dynamics within the eastern periphery under imperial rule. Next, the paper surveys the increased militarisation and further rigidification during the period of the Dergue from 1974. Finally, the chapter examines the nature of this border since 1991, a period that has experienced unprecedented levels of cross-border movement, most of which is underlined by cross-border trade.

**Understanding territorial statehood in the African context**

There is a research gap in the literature on state formation in Africa, in particular the relationship between African states and their borders. Approaches to state formation in Africa have been dominated by analyses that are rooted in Weberian sociology of the state and its notions of statehood. This has led to the categorisation of all manifestations of statehood that do not conform to this model as instances of state failure, collapse or weakness (Rotberg 20021982). This literature has struggled to make sense of political development outside the confines of state capitals, and has equally been unsuccessful in explaining inter-state relations in Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism has emerged as a prime ordering principle on the continent, with many African countries organising and cooperating at the sub-regional level. This inevitably requires a rethinking of statehood. The inability of the literature to grasp rapid and often unconventional political development is problematic and requires further investigation.

The inability of the literature and analysts to imagine African statehood beyond the confining category of the nation-state has been the main challenge. The preoccupation with internal state ‘disorder’ has meant that the legitimacy of African cases of secession, for instance, is questioned and met with contempt, as demonstrated by Zartman’s (1996) assessment of Somaliland. The fixation on internal ‘collapse’ or ‘disorder’ has led others to argue that there is, in fact, logic behind the seeming disorder that is found within African polities (Chabal & Daloz 1999). Indeed, while Chabal and Daloz’s main claims are open to debate, their approach nevertheless demonstrates that, in Africa political dynamics and practices exist that do not conform to ideal-type forms of political organisation.

The contemporary African state system is based on the decisions reached by newly independent African countries in 1963 in Addis Ababa and in 1964 in
Cairo – to retain the territorial boundaries inherited from colonial rule. Consequently, there has been general agreement on the absence of inter-state conflict on the continent, regardless of the persistence of states that emerged from seemingly arbitrary boundaries – the paradox of African boundaries (Herbst 1989). There is consensus on some of the reasons why this paradox has persisted. A number of commentators such as Christopher Clapham (1996) and Jeffery Herbst (2000) have noted that the nature of the international state system supports this paradox, particularly the popular idea of the nation-state. Others, such as Pierre Englebert (2009), have gone a step further by attempting to demonstrate how the international system supports this paradox. The overall consensus is that African countries have largely remained viable and peaceful towards each other, regardless of internal turmoil, because the international system ‘rewards’ them for remaining intact. The conclusion, therefore, is that African norms of statehood find institutionalised legitimacy in the international system (Young, 1991).

However, the African territorial consensus and its popular understandings are challenged in the Horn of Africa. In most analyses, the Horn is acknowledged for its exceptional nature, but the discussion tends to focus on the remarkable feat of peacefully retaining ‘artificial’ boundaries elsewhere on the continent. Crawford Young (1991) acknowledges that “Ethiopia cries out for creative imagination and careful study” but does not offer ways to go about this. Similarly, Englebert (2009) and Englebert and Hummel (2005) do not adequately address why in the Horn the seemingly low odds of international recognition for breakaway states does not seem to deter secessionist states from emerging. Nor do they explain why, unlike elsewhere on the continent, as Englebert has demonstrated, actors in the Horn appear to be disinterested in the “domestic power of command” that is afforded by the legalities of the international system. Although some of this literature has attempted to challenge the state weakness/failure discourse, it has not been able to provide the necessary analytical tools to take the analyses to a level that historically and contextually investigates the variegated forms of empirical statehood that continue to emerge in the Horn of Africa.

To successfully challenge some of the assumptions that exist in the literature we must focus on history and context. This paper thus contributes to the current turn in the literature on African state formation, which rejects ahistorical analyses. This is highlighted by Spears (2003), when he notes that the Horn of Africa, Somaliland in particular, raises significant questions about Africa’s territorial order. Others have suggested other explanations for the
unusual expressions of statehood in the Horn. For instance, Kornprobst (2002) argues that “there is no consensus on who constitutes a colonial power in the Horn,” unlike in other African sub-regions. Kornprobst suggests that some states might perceive Ethiopia as a colonial power in the Horn. However, such an assertion needs to be interrogated. The formation of the contemporary Ethiopian state in the late nineteenth century and the complexities of the decolonisation process in the twentieth century would need to be considered.

This paper employs an interpretive approach and a qualitative methodology that combines historical and ethnographic research methods. As such, a constructivist inspired methodology should be inductive, interpretive and historical (Pouliot 2007). Indeed, a study of the state in Ethiopia, as this paper demonstrates, is a study of the motives and practices of how the state has fashioned itself toward its peripheries. Here, the task of the researcher is to contextualise and historicise this experience in order to arrive at a particular understanding of the relationship between the centre and the periphery. And most importantly for the purposes of this paper, the state’s relationship with its borders needs to be historicised and contextualised.

**Territorial conceptions of statehood and the constitutive role of peripheries in Ethiopia**

The formation of the contemporary Ethiopian state in the late nineteenth century – the empire state – was shaped by the incorporation of territories located south, east and west of the political centre (Donham & James 2002). Subsequently, the peripheries shaped the evolution of state bureaucracy and the definition of the national territory. Central to these processes was the extension of state power over a particular territory, which instituted the use of territory as a means of asserting imperial state power and authority. However, the territorialisation of state power in Ethiopia was not an unambiguous process.

The political and economic transformation of Ethiopian society was delayed because of the organisation of state power under the imperial order. The traditional base of legitimate state power in Ethiopia, initially for the Christian groups and later for the Ethiopian nation, ensured that a large section of the population within the Ethiopian territory remained on the fringes (Markakis & Beyene 1967). The ‘fringe’ or lowland peripheries, where pastoralists were much harder to keep track of and to control, experienced the least amount of administration (Donham 2002). In the period following the Italian occupation, the state saw an increase in peripheral dissent. However, this change was less
about a periphery that became more belligerent, and more about structural changes that were taking place in the centre and in the wider region, specifically state centralisation and decolonization. The state became increasingly centralised, and for the first time, the territorial boundaries of the state became more defined than they were previously.

Territoriality became more salient in the post-1942 period in Ethiopia. The geographic and political organisation of space found an immediate and direct expression in an increasingly centralised state. Indeed, centralisation required an exact articulation of the territorial limits of the state. Elsewhere on the continent, the post-colonial relationship between central state power and the national territory has been conceptualised in slightly different ways. To a large extent, the centre-periphery relationship was shaped by the colonial experience, and thus it was this experience that influenced the nature of the post-colonial state (Herbst 2000). In most cases, the core-periphery relationship took the form of the urban-rural divide (Bratton 1994). The post-colonial state sustained this dialectic and adapted it to suit its peculiar mode of power and control. Callaghy (1987) describes the trend of increasing the power of central authority while simultaneously weakening local power structures in the periphery as the “coverover strategy.” This experience was widespread in the colonies and saw the colonial state transferring its most undesirable features to its post-independence successor (Young 1994).

Although the practice of exercising control over the peripheries was similar to elsewhere on the continent, the motives and structures with which it was created and carried out was differed in Ethiopia. Unlike the post-colonial state in other places in Africa, the state in Ethiopia had been actively involved in the determination of its territorial boundaries. Ethiopia participated in the drawing of boundaries in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, the centre-periphery relationship in Ethiopia is different because the demarcation of boundaries and incorporation of conquered territories into the state was actively pursued by Ethiopian rulers even prior to the formal demarcation of boundaries.

The period following liberation from the Italian occupation was a key moment in Ethiopia’s modern political history. This period was characterised by a determined effort by the state to: a) consolidate its territorial gains from before the occupation; and b) consolidate its political dominance, particularly in the peripheries. These two goals were essential for the survival of the imperial state following the five year Italian occupation. The pursuit of these aims was accompanied by strong rhetoric on modernisation. This rhetoric was
rooted in a provincial administrative structure that sought to maintain the status quo of centre-periphery relations. The main goal of the provincial administration was to maintain the traditional role of the centre in the administration of the conquered territories and to preserve the territorial integrity of the state. This became the dominant theme in the articulation of Ethiopian statehood, with subsequent state rulers adapting their ideologies in a way that they too could maintain the role of the state as an agent of control and authority.

The aforementioned objectives of the state were given impetus by the presence of the BMA in Ethiopia from 1941. The military arrangement that ultimately threatened Ethiopian territorial sovereignty began as an Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA), and later, in 1942, became a full British Military Administration (Rennell-Rodd 1948). Zewde (1991) notes that under the convenient cover of the continuation of the war, Britain came to assume extensive control over Ethiopia's finances, administration and territorial integrity. The changes that occurred during the period of the BMA are crucial as they brought to the fore the (in) ability of the Ethiopian state to control its territory and assert its authority in the peripheries. During this period, Ethiopian statehood shifted to an increasingly territorial conceptualisation, one that was not seen in the pre-Italian occupation period.

Prior to the occupation, administration entailed the radiation of power from the centre to a vast and vaguely defined territory. However, the need for exact delimitation of the territory became increasingly urgent and significant after the occupation. During this period, the state sought to fashion itself as a modernising empire with a secure territory and a stable community. The preconditions for ‘modern’ statehood crystallised because the territorial foundations of the state came under threat during the period of the BMA. The effects of this threat were most evident in the peripheries, which had hitherto been vaguely defined and loosely administered.

**Attempting territorial control by militarising the eastern periphery**

The rationale for the uncompromising approach of the imperial state with regards to the border with the Republic of Somalia in the early 1960s can be found in the events of the preceding decade. The period of the BMA presented a significant threat to the territorial integrity of the imperial state; this was mainly because the state was yet to consolidate its territory and political authority in the eastern regions. However, the official end of the BMA in 1954 left residual territorial ambiguities, particularly in people’s minds. Therefore,
the formation of the Somali Republic in 1960 added another dimension to the anxieties of the imperial state vis-à-vis its uncertain presence in the east.

The 1960s began with a series of rebellions in the southern and eastern regions of Ethiopia – in Hararge and Bale provinces. These revolts were staged by pastoralist sections of the population in response to increased state centralisation, particularly the introduction of livestock tax. The revised Ethiopian Constitution of 1955 was meant to signify a shift to a modern state and government. The supposed transformation entailed the introduction of new revenue collection measures, which implied a more centralised bureaucracy (Gilkes 1975). Many, particularly the pastoralists, found the increasingly centralised administration to be offensive as it curtailed some of their movements and freedoms. This led to a conflict that was ignited when a police force was deployed to collect taxes in Bale province. On arrival, the police were immediately surrounded and overpowered by the local tax rebels, who until then were no more than a loose formation (Gilkes 1975). The rebellion was exacerbated by the formation of a secessionist movement – the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) – in south-eastern Ethiopia.

According to Gilkes (1975), there were similar movements against taxation and tax collection among pastoralists in the Ogaden district of Hararge province. However, he also states that “these are impossible to verify since most of the area is closed to outsiders.” This statement indicates the initial stages of the militarisation of the eastern periphery of Ethiopia. The state insisted on tax collection as part of a comprehensive effort to assert its authority in these remote areas. The militarisation of the region also coincided with the commencement of oil and gas exploration in the late 1960s. What then developed was the state’s territorialisation of resource control (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995), where the state mobilised means of coercive enforcement in the Bale and Hararge provinces. Gilkes (1975) notes that, by the early 1970s the Ethiopian Army’s third division was permanently based in the Ogaden district, where it “spen[t] a substantial amount of time collecting tax.” The administrative ambiguities that were created by the BMA in the eastern periphery led to suspicions by imperial state authorities regarding the loyalties of some of the borderland populations.

Thus, the presence of the imperial state in this periphery was first and foremost about making claims to the territory, but also increasingly to claim the population. The territorialisation of central state power and authority thus increased exponentially in the 1960s up to the 1970s and suggests an
increasingly territorial approach that reflects a range of possible objectives by the imperial state:

Rulers territorialized state power to achieve a variety of goals. Foremost among these was the need to make claims on territory to protect access to people and income from taxes and natural resources, in a world in which only territorial claims were recognised as legitimate. Second, territorialization enabled increased efficiency in the collection of regular taxes. A regular money income was necessary to finance permanent militaries, assess the viability of young men for a conscript military, and finance a growing bureaucracy as well as government investments that sustained local production in a context of global competition (Vanderveer 1995).

The foregoing was true in Ethiopia where the imperial state deployed severe strategies in the administration of its peripheries in order to comply with its ideas of territorial statehood. The ‘modernisation’ of the state, which included an increase in revenue collection and establishing an elaborate bureaucracy, provided both the context and pretext for the militarisation of the eastern periphery.

With modernisation as state rhetoric in the post-liberation period, there was much optimism about the transformation of Ethiopian society. However, this optimism was thwarted when the apparent transformation failed to live up to expectations. The imperial state adopted a version of modernisation that was implemented within already established political structures of traditional hierarchy (Clapham 1969). The focus on centralisation, often framed as modernisation, was underlined by a conceptualisation of territorial control as a key component of political power. There was, therefore, more continuity than transformation in the process of modernising the empire.

Huntington (1969) outlines what could have occurred in Ethiopia as part of political change in a traditional polity, stating:

To cope successfully with modernization, a political system must be able, first, to innovate policy, that is, to promote social and economic reform by state action. Reform in this context usually means the changing of traditional values and behaviour patterns, the expansion of communications and education, the broadening of loyalties from family, village, and tribe to nation, the secularization of public life, the rationalization of authority structures, the promotion of functionally specific organizations, the substitution of
achievement criteria for ascriptive ones, and the furthering of a more equitable distribution of material and symbolic resources.

This was not to be in Ethiopia since the overriding concern was to maintain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. The making of territorial claims, protecting resources and collecting taxes, often through violent means, marked the beginning of the challenges that have affected the administration of this periphery since the BMA period.

The pastoralist populations who formed a majority and other ‘cross-border populations’ were the most affected, as the policies favoured a sedentary lifestyle. The imperial state favoured a sedentary existence particularly for the pastoralist communities whose loyalties the state could not guarantee. To a large extent, a sedentary way of life was achieved in the Jijiga area up to the border at Togochale where a number of pastoralists became ‘agro-pastoralists.

**Post-BMA patterns of cross-border migration**

The unstable political climate in Hararge and Bale provinces and the nationalist fervour that accompanied the formation of the Somali Republic led to the strengthening of rules that governed cross-border migration in Ethiopia. Policies on the use of the borders of the empire were decisive in their intention to determine who belonged and who did not.

Some of the most important decrees that were passed on the use of the border appeared in the Negarit Gazeta – the Ethiopian government gazette. These included the Immigration Proclamation of 1943 (Negarit Gazeta Vol.1). This was followed by the Customs and Export duties Proclamation of 1943. The customs and duties proclamation also defined illegal activities, such as smuggling, and the penalties they carried. To confirm these proclamations, a former government employee who worked in Hararge province in the 1960s and 1970s noted that there were customs posts at the border at Togochale, as well as sixty five kilometres further inland at Jijiga. Elders interviewed by this author all confirmed that more rigid rules and regulations were introduced by the imperial state and, in particular, they noted the regulation of customs duties at the Togochale border in the 1960s. Customs duties were collected by state agents and went directly to the state and not to local leaders. In the Jijiga-Togochale region, the state rarely used local ‘chiefs’ or balabbats. This is because the central state authority had directly administered this section of Hararge province since its official incorporation into the state. Therefore, it
was the northern military-settlers – the neftegna – who oversaw administration, including revenue collection, in the Jijiga and Togochale areas. Interviewees in Jijiga noted that imperial authorities were very strict about the use of passports at the border. The state became even firmer following Somali independence. This change coincided with the beginning of the territorial claims of the Republic on Ethiopian territory. Imperial rulers attempted to alter the movement of people on this border. However, those crossing the border often flouted these rules since they had always known and participated in unhindered cross-border movement.

The conflict between Ethiopia and the Republic of Somalia shaped the territorial (border) discourse for the next few decades. The Ethiopian state became increasingly strict at the border by monitoring the movement of people.

**The start of a refugee problem**

In the 1960s and 1970s, refugees in sub-Saharan Africa were mainly a consequence of “explosive internal social and political situations” (Milner 2009). In eastern Ethiopia, in addition to internal conditions, the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict of 1964 produced the first wave of refugees across the Togochale border. However, this movement was not massive and did not lead to the establishment of refugee camps. In the 1960s, the vast majority of refugees in Africa lived in rural settlements located in the host countries (Milner 2009). Unfortunately there is little documentation on this particular movement of refugees. Yet, we can assume that the refugees were, in one way or another, absorbed into the border villages of eastern Ethiopia. The movement of large numbers of refugees across state borders has since become a defining characteristic of human migration in the Horn of Africa and, in the process, shaped the various states from below in quite significant ways.

During the 1963-64 Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, one of the catalysts for the movement of people from eastern Ethiopia was the “Declaration of State of Emergency in the Region Bordering the Republic of Somalia” Order, (Negarit Gazeta Vol. 3). This Order brought the Ethiopian army to the region and severely restricted the movement of people, causing many to flee across the border to the Somali side. The entire region came under emergency laws as the imperial state struggled to distinguish between those who were fighting against taxation and those that were advocating for secession.
In 1964 the Somali Republic initiated a ceasefire that remained until the close of the decade before the civilian government in Mogadishu was overthrown by a military junta in 1969. The latter later re-visited the 1964 conflict and the unresolved issues thereof, and in the process plunged both Ethiopia and the Republic into a deadly war that generated the greatest number of refugees.

**Limited cross-border trade**

There is no indication that the Togochale border was involved in extensive cross-border trade during the imperial period. This is partly due to the limited available data on this area during this period. There is evidence, however, of trade in khat, to the British Protectorate and beyond. The export taxes of this popular drug are reported to have been high – at two Ethiopian dollars per kilo (Foreign Office 1954). It is likely that this was the only Ethiopian export that passed through this border. Following Somali independence, all forms of cross-border trade were official and heavily regulated. Khat remains one of the main Ethiopian exports to pass through at Togochale. As part of the process of modernisation and centralisation in the 1960s, cross-border trade was standardised and formalised according to strict customs rules and regulations.

Trade activities that take place outside official channels are perhaps the most common and rooted forms of cross-border trade at Togochale. In conversations with people in Jijiga, several people had personal stories of smuggling small quantities of goods and products across the border. Regardless of strict rules at the border, local populations often managed to utilise the border for their own needs, where they deployed what can be termed as “practical norms” (Blundo & De Sardan 2006), based on personalised understandings of the meaning of the border. The populations were, overall, aware of the rules and regulations on cross-border trade, however, because of their familiarity with the landscape, they still managed to smuggle a limited number of goods. They were engaged in these activities because the goods were useful for daily consumption and for other more immediate needs.

However, the changing official nature of the border had an impact on how the locals experienced it. The transformation of the border from a loosely defined concept during the BMA to a more clearly defined entity after the BMA, created a situation similar to what Nugent (2002) sees as a “dual aspect,” where the border presents both constraint and opportunity. Yet, from the perspective of central authorities, the strict measures and practices were a way of constituting a state (Mitchell 1991).
Radical centralisation, war and a refugee crisis

In order to create and sustain the required levels of centralisation, the military regime that overthrew the ancien regime in 1974 needed to secure its territorial borders. Unstable borders not only threatened the revolution, but also the territorially defined state, which was an integral component in the ongoing transformation of Ethiopian society. By 1977, the Ethiopian state was involved in a military confrontation with the Eritreans in the north and at the same time faced increasing threats from Somalia in the eastern front. These confrontations heightened the urgency to maintain the territorial integrity of the state. The resolve to maintain territorial control is evinced in a statement that was delivered by Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam to the 14th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Libreville, Gabon, in July 1977:

[…] the frontiers between Ethiopia and Somalia are regulated by a series of international treaties. If Somalia refuses to recognise these treatises, then Somali itself which owes its very existence to a set of international agreements and decisions to which it was not a part must cease to exist. This fact may well be unpalatable to the Somali leaders, but is a reality nonetheless. Somalis are infiltrating with terrorists recruited, trained and financed by the government in Mogadisho for sabotage and subversion in Eastern Ethiopia […] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1977).

The combination of internal upheaval in Ethiopia and the war with Somalia gave rise to the first major wave of refugees in the Togochale border area. The current reasons for refugee flows in this region are not always political, but tend to be a combination of social, political and environmental factors. The human tragedy is often compounded by drought and famine. A refugee camp coordinator in Jijiga aptly noted this, stating:

Environmental issues are additional, but it is political issues that are the major factors contributing to refugee inflows. If there was political stability, environmental issues like drought would not force people to flee and become refugees (Mugoro 2011a; 2011b).

The conciliatory spirit of the 1964 ceasefire between Ethiopia and the Republic of Somalia was short lived. Border skirmishes resumed when the Dergue came to power in 1974. This was followed by reinforced security at the Togochale border, as noted by an elder in Jijiga. The elder recalled that after the Dergue came to power she set out on a journey to Hargeisa in northern
Somalia but was detained at the Togochale border. By her own admission, she was crossing the border illegally without the correct documentation. She spent a night in jail and was released the following day after her brother in Hargeisa received news of her arrest and intervened. She noted that she was interrogated throughout the night, where she was shown photographs and asked to identify the people in the photos. It appears that the main objective of regulating cross-border movement was the apprehension of those that were deemed to be dissidents; under the new regime, the new role of the border was to contain and eliminate dissent. A recurring theme from the interviewees at Jijiga is that everyone needed a passport to cross the border, but not everyone had one or could have one.

From 1974 to 1978, immigration policies and practices were radicalised at the Togochale border. The period after the war with Somalia in 1978 saw the most significant changes in the usage of this border as internal political dynamics in the eastern periphery of Ethiopia became radicalised. The militarisation of the region and the increasing tensions between Ethiopia and the neighbouring Republic of Somalia led to stricter measures at the border. These measures were, indeed, a consequence of the radicalised conception of territorial statehood by the central state. This conceptualisation entailed the removal of perceived sources of discontent (Clapham 2002), the origins of which the state was only too aware. The state’s security apparatus is reported to have routinely arrested people suspected of engaging in activities deemed hostile to the state, and generally terrorised anyone with contrary nationalist ambitions (Hassen 2002).

**The economic revival of the Togochale border**

The centuries-old objective of gaining access to the coast by successive Ethiopian rulers has once again taken centre stage since 1991. The coming to power of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ushered in an era of economic renewal in Ethiopia, one not seen since the post-war period in the 1950s. Changes in the domestic and regional political landscape called for a pragmatic approach on the part of the Ethiopian state vis-à-vis its new neighbour, Somaliland.

In 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked country following Eritrean independence, making it the most populous landlocked country in Africa. Ethiopia needed additional coastal outlets that, according to Clapham (2006), can in principle be attained through any of its neighbours. However, political necessities are an ever-present reality in inter-state relations in this region.
Thus, in reality, Ethiopia did not have many coastal options. In addition to the Djibouti port (closest and overused) and Mombasa (much further away), Addis Ababa was compelled to consider the opportunities presented by its new neighbour. However, by the Somaliland authorities’ own admission, the Berbera port lacks the adequate infrastructure to be a serious competitor to Djibouti and Mombasa.

With very little to lose, Somaliland has made several economic bilateral arrangements with Ethiopia. However, its lack of international recognition makes formal arrangements with neighbouring countries a challenge. Yet, Ethiopia and Somaliland have developed amicable relations, the political challenges notwithstanding. Ethiopia was the first country to have permanent diplomatic representation in Hargeisa, with Ethiopian Airlines one of the first to fly into the capital. Yet, to the frustration of officials in Hargeisa, Ethiopia has not issued formal recognition. Ethiopia’s reluctance to recognise Somaliland is related to the unwillingness of authorities in Addis to be seen to encourage secessionist states but it also has to do with the fact that “Ethiopia rides several horses in the Somali regional calculus [...]” (Jazhbay 2007).

The extent of the cordial relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland is reflected at their mutual border at Togochale and the surrounding Ethiopian borderlands. The regulation of cross-border trade flows appears to be one of the main reasons for the presence of the Ethiopian state at this border, to collect customs revenue. We can distinguish between unofficial and official trade. Within these two categories, we will further differentiate between large-scale and small-scale trade. In their 2002 cross-border trade study, Tekan and Azeze (2002) noted that, unofficial imports and exports abound in the border areas between eastern Ethiopia and the neighbouring Somali territories, and that the Ethiopian government calls this trade ‘contraband.’

Small and large-scale official and unofficial cross-border trade is present at Togochale. This trade involves livestock, khat, some grains and cereals, coffee and second hand clothing. The unofficial trade of these goods is sometimes also referred to as informal cross-border trade, but is not always illegal. According to a United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) report, informal cross-border trade occurs when business activities cross borders based on supply and demand imperatives (UNECA 2012). Informal or unofficial trade at Togochale is regulated by government import/export licenses, which are issued for fixed commodities to individual traders. Some of
these licences were, at the time of research, capped at two thousand dollars a month for people who live in Togochale and surrounding areas.

The stimulant khat dominates both official and unofficial cross-border trade at Togochale. The demand for khat is overwhelming on the Somali side of the border and the supply appears endless on the Ethiopian side. In January 2012, cross-border trade in khat was estimated at one million Ethiopian birr a day, an amount approximately the equivalent of fifty thousand US dollars at the time. This was an official estimate, based on the trade that was accounted for. The illegal trade is said to be equally profitable. The economy of the Harar-Jijiga-Togochale area is dominated by khat. Both large- and small-scale informal trade in khat is present in the border area, as well as in the nearby towns of Jijiga and Harar.

Next to khat, livestock trade features prominently in cross-border trade activities at Togochale. Sheep, cattle, goats and camels are the main types of livestock that are exported across the border. Central to this trade are the extensive Somali networks that control the trade. The trade is regulated by intricate systems that have been developed by various Somali clans. Indeed, large-scale livestock trade is dominant not only in the eastern Ethiopian borderlands, but in the entire Horn of Africa sub-region. For the best way to witness the intricate trans-border trade in eastern Ethiopia, one needs only to visit the Babile camel and cattle market. Babile market is the biggest in the eastern part of Ethiopia and is strategically located on a major trade route. Babile is located on what Majid (2010) calls the “Harar-Jijiga-Hargeisa-Berbera corridor.” This village-town is located on the main road between Harar and Jijiga, where the Harar highlands give way to the Jijiga plains.

It is arguable that informal cross-border trade features high on the trade that takes place across the Togochale border. The numbers have increased exponentially since the early 1990s. As mentioned previously, this has much to do with the political changes that have taken place in the region. The current Ethiopian government has prioritised and accelerated economic development in the country, and this is reflected in the country’s economic statistics. It is also observable at the Togochale border, which witnesses a high traffic volume. A number of borderland inhabitants are engaged in many sectors of informal cross-border trade on which they rely for their livelihood.
Conclusion

This paper explored patterns of cross-border movement – namely migration, refugee movement and cross-border trade – since the 1960s in eastern Ethiopia. The paper used archival material and secondary sources to construct a historical narrative of strong state presence at the Togochale border of Ethiopia. In doing this, the paper argued and demonstrated that the notable presence of the Ethiopian state at this border is a consequence of how the Ethiopian state conceptualises the notion of territorial statehood. The Ethiopian state has a long history of statehood, which is much longer than most African countries. This is a result of the unique processes of state formation that unfolded beginning in the nineteenth century. From this experience, the peripheries became central to the conceptualisation of territorial statehood in Ethiopia. Even in the face of many challenges to Ethiopian territory, successive rulers prioritised the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the state. This meant paying close attention to the country’s borders. This explains why the Ethiopian states’ relationship with its territory, and borders in particular, appears to go against the African norm of limited state presence at the border.

The paper problematised the lack of history and context in contemporary analyses of African statehood. In particular, the paper rejected the traditional approaches to statehood that are rooted in Weberian sociology of the state. These approaches frown upon forms of statehood that depart from the Weberian framework. To overcome this limitation, the paper employed an interpretive approach and a qualitative methodology that combines historical and ethnographic methods. And by using a constructivist inspired methodology that is inductive, interpretive and historical, the paper contributes to the body of knowledge that seeks to provide historical context for contemporary processes of state formation in Africa. A blanket approach to understanding African territorial statehood does not get us far since it is often embedded in a singular colonial narrative, which then impedes our ability to understand atypical cases such as Ethiopia. The paper has demonstrated that a country like Ethiopia developed its own specific conception of territorial statehood, which led to the establishment of a unique relationship between the state and its borders.
References


Negarit Gazeta. Institute of Ethiopian Studies Library, Addis Ababa University.


Abstract

Since 2011, South Africa has increasingly moved toward an immigration system of enforcement and exclusion, seeking to discourage immigration through punitive policies that make daily life for migrants difficult to bear. The closing of refugee reception offices in urban centers and restriction of job offers to South African ID holders have caused many asylum seekers to become undocumented migrants and prevented them from working in the formal economy. In this context, some services that refugee organisations traditionally offer, such as job training and placement, become less useful for migrants who are undocumented and/or unable to work. This paper explores a new initiative of a Cape Town refugee organisation designed to support grassroots organising and to foment new networks of support and entrepreneurship for migrant women. Members of eleven nationality groups currently participate in the Scalabrini Centre Women’s Platform, coming together across differences in migration status, religion, socio-economic class and language to fight the isolation often caused by migration and to support business and personal development. Our research uses interviews and participant observation to explore the role of mediating institutions in facilitating migrant leadership and organising. We suggest that efforts such as The Women’s Platform are setting the groundwork for long-term leadership development among migrants and refugees. Nonetheless, the restrictions of the political and economic climate of South Africa, as well as the professionalised expectations of mediating institutions, make this a slow process that may favor individual advancement over collective action for systemic change.

Keywords Migration, development, gender, organising, solidarity.
Introduction

This paper examines one approach to the challenge of migrant integration in the face of xenophobia and restrictive immigration policies and practices. Researchers have argued that migrant associations in South Africa are typically fragile and transient. The Women’s Platform seeks to increase the longevity and efficacy of such associations by building a cross-nationality network supported by an established NGO that can provide access to resources. What is gained and what is lost through such an approach? This early assessment of The Women’s Platform suggests that this structure is setting the groundwork for long-term leadership development among migrants and refugees. Nonetheless, the restrictions of the political and economic climate of South Africa, as well as the professionalised expectations of mediating institutions, make this a slow process that may favour individual advancement over systemic change.

Background/Context

In the context of the current, high-profile surge of North African and Middle Eastern migration to Europe, the fact that most African migration remains within the continent is relatively undiscussed (Shimeles 2010). After the 1994 transition to democracy, South Africa’s relatively strong economy and liberal asylum policy made it a welcome destination for migrants from across the continent. From 2006-2012, it is estimated that South Africa received more applications for asylum than any other country in the world (Wellman & Landau 2015). Asylum applications have dropped in recent years, primarily because of a new, limited visa category for Zimbabweans fleeing the country’s economic and political crisis, but also because new immigration policies and practices have made it so difficult for migrants to apply for asylum (Carciotto & Mavura 2016; Pugh 2014). Until 2011, those seeking refugee status could apply for asylum at a refugee reception center in any one of the major cities in the country and then, with their asylum-seeker documents, were entitled to (though not always granted) basic services. Soon after changing procedures to require asylum seekers to apply within five days of arriving in the country, the Department of Home Affairs closed their refugee reception offices in Johannesburg (closed in 2011), Port Elizabeth (closed in 2011) and Cape Town (closed in 2012). Now refugees must go to Pretoria, Durban or back to the Zimbabwean border at Musina to file and renew their paperwork every three to six months (Ngwato 2013). For migrants living in Cape Town, the time and expense of this long-distance travel precludes their maintaining asylum-
seeker paperwork, even for those who would likely eventually be granted refugee status (Johnson 2015).

As a result, more and more migrants are living in South Africa without valid immigration documents. At the same time, even those with valid asylum-seeker documents or even approved refugee status, report that basic eligibility requirements for most employers include a South African identification card. An asylum seeker from the DRC explained one way that employers screen out applicants without South African citizenship or permanent residency:

The hotel will tell you that they’re not allowed to take CVs, that you must go to the agency. Then they send you to agencies and the agencies will ask you if you are South African [...] They will tell you, bring ID. Imagine, I am in South Africa for nine years, but I only have the paper [that requires] renewal every six months... You will see in that paper, it is written “work and study,” but this [work and study] is for South Africans, this is not for foreigners (Interview 25 February, 2015).

Thus, while it is becoming increasingly difficult for migrants to obtain valid documents, those documents are worth less and less in terms of access to employment opportunities. Our research explores whether this reality is beginning to erode the strict boundaries among asylum seekers, refugees and migrants – and between those who are viewed as deserving or undeserving – that have been carefully maintained by the state and by the civil society institutions that support refugees and migrants (Newton 2008; Sales 2002). Does this context open up new opportunities for solidarity across these migration categories and is it spurring migrant support agencies to reconsider the services they provide?

The Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town is a refugee services organisation founded in 1994 “with the commitment to alleviating poverty and promoting development in the Western Cape while fostering integration between migrants, refugees and South Africans” (Internal document). Their mission also includes “promoting and protecting the human rights of highly vulnerable refugees, asylum seekers, displaced people and the poorest of the poor South Africans as well as fostering democracy, non-discrimination, equality, participation and inclusion” (Internal document). In recent years, their work has expanded to include an English school, a welfare desk to provide referrals for basic resources, an employment access program, school-based tolerance
education programs, an LGBTI rights and awareness program and an advocacy department providing individual legal counseling and policy-level advocacy.

The Scalabrini Centre is a professionally run organisation with both local and international staff members. The centre relies on the volunteer support of long-term interns, primarily from Europe and the United States. It receives funding from European and American foundations and government aid organisations, private donations and income from its on-site guest house. In general, its programming priorities are set by staff and approved by its volunteer board, with clear program objectives and measurable goals.

The Women’s Platform was new for Scalabrini in several ways. The idea grew out of a proposal brought to the director by a Zimbabwean staff member who had helped to found a Zimbabwean women’s support group and informal business incubator. The staff member hoped that Scalabrini might be willing to provide training and other capacity-building support to her group. In response, the director proposed that Scalabrini launch a new initiative that would build and expand upon the model of the Zimbabwean group to provide mutual support, training and networking opportunities. At the outset, the model for The Women’s Platform was to support existing, self-organised, nationality-based groups as well as to incubate new groups of this type. The Women’s Platform would then become a cross-national support network giving participants access to skills training, personal development workshops and small business development.

In the early conceptualisation of The Women’s Platform, both the Scalabrini director and the program manager (Carone) expressed their excitement about the platform as a project designed and led by the participants themselves, unlike most other professionally-led Scalabrini services. A collaborating researcher (Mundell) worked with Scalabrini staff, using surveys, small group meetings and interviews, to assess needs and interests and to help identify indigenous leadership. The idea was not to replace the successful nationality-based groups but to give their members access to a wider network of both migrant and South African female leaders.

The early participants in the platform included groups representing the Rwandan, Congolese, Somali, Angolan, Zimbabwean, Malawian, Nigerian and South African communities. Demographically, the group was extraordinarily diverse. While some had not completed high school (less than 20%), others had professional training but had not been able to find jobs in their fields because of their immigration status and/or lack of English language skills or
South African certification. In terms of immigration status, 39% had been granted refugee status, 23% carried an asylum-seeker permit, and the remainder carried other work permits, were undocumented or declined to reveal their status. About a third of participants were working, either in the formal or informal sector, while two-thirds had been unsuccessful in finding work or were caring for their children\(^1\).

At first, The Women’s Platform worked primarily to engage participants in services the Scalabrini Centre already offered, such as computer literacy classes, health education programs and immigrant rights workshops. But because of the increasing lack of access to documentation and restrictions on foreigners’ rights to work, the centre’s traditional employment access program was becoming less and less relevant for migrants who were excluded from traditional employment or financial structures. The Women’s Platform staff considered how entrepreneurship training and micro-finance might provide alternate sources of income for participants.

Within the first six months, Scalabrini staff had applied for international foundation and government funding, receiving grant support from the U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. In their report on the first quarter of grant funding, Scalabrini staff explained that members of The Women’s Platform are encouraged to participate in both the personal development and financial sustainability areas of the platform. Personal development includes leadership, health education and human rights workshops, as well as trainings on work-readiness skills needed in specific industry sectors. From The Women’s Platform’s inception, staff spoke about their desire to utilise a “multipliers model, with trainings aimed at developing women’s leadership skills to enable them to bring this information back to their communities and become local resources themselves” (Internal document). Women's Platform participants are also beginning to lead workshops themselves, as part of the platform’s Peer-to-Peer training initiative.

The financial sustainability component seeks to build on existing skills of women in the platform. Currently, the sectors identified are beauty, childcare, crafting and food, all traditionally feminine areas of experience that can be utilised outside of formal employment structures. Scalabrini staff have expressed their concern about gender niching, pushing women into
marginalised skill areas, and so they have been careful to voice their support for women who are seeking different areas of employment. However, the approach is also intensely practical. As Carone (Interview 10 May, 2016) explained in an interview,

Yes [it is gender niching], but it’s also market niching. Those industries are available to women. These are industries that have a high turnover rate that women are able to find work in [...] If you want to learn how to be an accountant, we still want to work with you, but our sector development is peer-to-peer. If you want to be an accountant, I can work with you, but right now we’re looking at what is the broad knowledge we all share.

The question is whether these marginalised economic niches will give women the financial stability they seek. Ideally, The Women’s Platform will be able to give them the business savvy, workplace experience and start-up capital they need to make it in these familiar but difficult sectors.

**Theoretical Framework**

In the wake of South Africa’s violent xenophobic attacks in 2008, social scientists searched for a cause. Explanations for the violence ranged from structural inequality (Worby et al. 2008; Gelb 2008; Pillay 2008) to negrophobia (Gqola 2008) to failures of local leadership (Misago et al. 2009) to inadequacy of immigration policy (Crush 2008) to a history of “violent entrepreneurship” in the townships (Charman & Piper 2012).2

Social scientists went on to critique the public outrage that followed the attacks, arguing that horrified liberal whites were really expressing their own worst fears that, in a context of lawlessness and wealth redistribution, they might be the next targets (Landau 2008). Similarly, the state’s characterisation of the attacks as the work of common criminals masked the historical antecedents of the crisis, development policies that divide township residents into undeserving outsiders and insiders with access to services (Nieftagodien 2008). Bekker (2015) notes that a week after violence flared again in 2015, the state sought again to link immigrants with criminality by creating a new program initially carried out by the South African National Defence Force called Operation Fiela-Reclaim. The operation targeted illegal weapons, drugs,
prostitution “and other illegal activities;” undocumented immigrants were also regularly caught up in its sweeps.

These social analyses are critical to understanding the context for migrant lives, but in few of these works are the voices of migrants themselves foregrounded (McDonald 2000b). In fact, migrant voices are missing not only from scholarship but also from public debate. Landau argues that this is strategic, a kind of “tactical cosmopolitanism” utilised by migrants who “organize themselves to avoid the ethics of obligation to other migrant groups and their home communities” (Landau & Freemantle 2010: 381; Landau 2006). Our research among Cape Town migrant women shows that while migrants are hesitant to engage in collective action for policy change, they are in fact becoming highly organised around exactly their ethics of obligation to their own and other migrant groups.

As evidence of this “tactical cosmopolitanism,” Landau cites the “fragility and fragmentation of migrant associations,” (Landau & Freemantle 2010: 376) among the Johannesburg groups he studied. Others have pointed to the ways that migrant civil society organisations have been ignored and excluded from more established civil society and non-governmental organisations (Everatt 2011; Polzer & Segatti 2011). Yet we have very little research that actually examines the activities of such migrant organisations, whether they are government-supported agencies, traditional NGOs or unions, church groups or mutual aid societies. This project seeks to examine the role such institutions play in mediating the experiences of migrants as they make their way in this often hostile environment.

South African migrants are often analysed in terms of their social and economic needs, as victims of violence (in their home countries and then again in South Africa), bigotry and poverty. In this way, despite research showing that migrants are critical to South Africa’s economic development, migrants are popularly understood as recipients of social welfare and in need of government response (Crush & Williams 2003; Crush & Williams 2010; Polzer 2008). This may be especially true for women migrants, who are often portrayed as victims in the migration process (Agustin 2005). As Kihato (2007) and others have pointed out, a focus on women migrants, not as merely victims of forced migration but also as agents in their own migration choices and experiences, may help to broaden often narrowly economistic explanations for migration (Dodson 1998; Harzig 2001). Today, women represent almost half of all migrants worldwide and 45.9% of migrants in
Africa (OECD-UNDISA 2013). This research makes an ethnographic intervention into questions of how women migrants themselves are organising, with South African mediating institutions, for their right to live peacefully in their host country.

**Methodology**

Research for this project began soon after the first meetings of The Women’s Platform in November 2014. As a visiting scholar at the University of Cape Town, Leah Mundell entered into a collaborative research agreement with the Scalabrini Centre to conduct ongoing qualitative research as a volunteer staff member of The Women’s Platform. Emma Carone, program manager for The Women’s Platform, collected demographic information, conducted informal observations and collaborated on data analysis.

We conducted twenty semi-structured interviews with participants and staff of The Women’s Platform in 2015, focusing on their life experiences leading them to engage in the platform. Interviews were conducted in English, with only one participant requesting a translator, so it should be noted that participants may have felt somewhat limited in their self-expression. Additional qualitative research included focus group discussions with the original seven participating nationality groups to develop priorities for the platform. We have also undertaken ongoing participant observations of Women’s Platform meetings, staff planning meetings and workshops as well as conducted observations at Women’s Platform member project sites and group meetings.

Interview participants were selected based on their high level of participation in the Women’s Platform and in their own nationality-based groups, primarily between January and June 2015. Many of these original Women’s Platform leaders, as noted below, are no longer as active in the program, and leadership has begun to shift to a group of women who see the Women’s Platform itself as their primary group affiliation. The initial 20 interviews cited here provided a well-rounded picture of the experiences and concerns of staff and participants during the formation of the Women’s Platform.

A second round of interviews with newer, emerging leaders (planned for June-July of 2017) will help evaluate the platform’s ongoing potential for leadership development, psycho-social support and economic stability.

We also collected basic demographic information for 111 participants in the Platform between November 2014 and June 2016 (data collection is ongoing),
including age, nationality, educational attainment and employment status. Of this participant sample, nine nationalities were represented, with 54% from Congo/DRC. Only five participants reported having less than a grade 10 education and 33 participants (30%) reported having at least some university or postsecondary education. At the time of data collection, 38% of participants reported being at least partially employed and 59% of participants reported not working at all. The participants were generally in their prime working and child-raising years; ages ranged from 16 to 56 years old, with 68% between the ages of 29 and 41 at the time of data collection.

As a collaborative research team, we regularly shared observations and key themes from interviews with one another, other Scalabrini staff and participant leaders of The Women’s Platform. Our interview consent form included a checkbox asking whether information from the interview could be shared with Scalabrini staff in order to improve services. Mundell also reminded Women’s Platform participants that, in addition to helping to facilitate the Platform, she was conducting ongoing research.

Engaged social science research seeks to address the power hierarchies that often characterise the relationship between researcher and research subjects, whether those subjects are individuals or organisations (Low & Merry 2010; Lassiter & Cook 2010). Through our collaborative research design, we developed a research project and process that can provide ongoing benefit to the research partners and participants. Regular discussion of the themes and concerns raised through this research have helped to shape the direction of The Women’s Platform and to make it more inclusive and responsive to participants’ needs. This paper provides an opportunity to share some of the tensions and considerations that have arisen in the context of this collaborative work.

**The Women’s Platform: Lessons for Migrant Organising**

As The Women’s Platform is still only in its second year of existence, it is too early to draw decisive conclusions about its effectiveness or the unintended side effects of this approach. Nonetheless, there are several important areas of tension The Women’s Platform experiences that are productive for considering migrant organising models.

**A. Possibilities for cross-national solidarity**

Because The Women’s Platform was initiated as a way to build on the success of one nationality-based women’s group, it was a logical approach to develop
nationality-based, locally led groups as the member units for the platform. Similar, institution-based approaches to building social capital have proved effective in a wide range of organising efforts (Stout 2010; Warren 2011; Wood 2002). Nonetheless, the approach had some clear disadvantages in this context.

Giulia Sinatti and Cindy Horst (2015), in their research on diaspora engagement discourse among European development agencies, highlight agencies’ problematic assumptions about migrants’ implicit connection to their territories of origin. Nina Glick Schiller (2009), meanwhile, has shown that a focus on the nation-state as the relevant geographic region of relationship for migrants conceals the ways that different localities benefit differently from remittances. Our own work developing The Women’s Platform helped reveal our early assumptions about the coherence and importance of nationality-based groups. Several of the key leaders involved in the platform identified strongly as members of nationality-based groups, such as the Somali Association of South Africa and Kwesu, a Congolese women’s group. But for others, nation-states were not relevant communities of origin.

One participant had found The Women’s Platform through her infrequent attendance at a church where several members were attempting to start a Rwandan women’s group. But her family connections spanned Rwanda, Burundi and Congo, and she did not feel a connection with the Rwandan group. A leader of this fledgling Rwanda group spoke about the flagrant lack of trust that survivors of the Rwandan genocide felt in interacting with other Rwandan immigrants:

You see, our community has a big problem, a big problem. Sometimes you can come here all as refugees, but sometimes I can come here and find someone who killed my whole family. So, it is not easy to talk to that one and to give all my ideas, no. Your mind closed, and she, her mind is closed. Maybe she’s not the one, but is the member of a family who killed my family. It is a big issue for us. Some of us are born in exile, too. They are born as a refugee. So, some are born in Kenya, in Burundi, in Tanzania, in the Congo, so our country has a big problem in how people must come and join as one community.

As The Women’s Platform evolved, it was clear that this one-size-fits-all nationality group model was only really relevant for a few more established and coherent immigrant groups. What had once seemed a useful way to build
local capacity started to seem more like a gatekeeping mechanism that was preventing the participation of women who did not identify or affiliate with a nationality-based group. As women have begun joining the platform as individuals rather than institutional members, the group has diversified, including migrants from a broader range of countries of origin.

Changing the model in this way may also have opened up even greater opportunities for cross-national and cross-cultural education and solidarity. From the beginning of The Women’s Platform, participants spoke of the powerful impact of learning about the successes of migrants from other parts of Africa. Educated Congolese Christians were excited to learn more about the experiences of Muslim Somali women who were seeking out educational opportunities they did not have in their home communities. During a recent videoconference with Women’s Platform leaders, a Congolese participant firmly but politely corrected a Zimbabwean leader who had erroneously claimed that Somali immigrants receive financial support from the Somali government. The short interaction highlighted the important role that personal, cross-national interactions play in dispelling stereotypes within the migrant community.

Even those participants who are also members of active nationality-based groups see The Women’s Platform as playing a vital role in cultivating cross-cultural interaction and innovation. As one platform leader explained,

Most of the people in Kwesu are from DRC, coming from the same background. When you come to Women’s Platform, it’s another thing. You’re meeting with women from a different background, different religion, different culture, you know. So that ... changes our way of seeing things. So, it’s very, very inspiring meeting other women. So for Kwesu to be in The Women’s Platform, it’s very, very, very significant for me.

In the early months of The Women’s Platform, we also observed that participants rarely made distinctions among refugees, asylum-seekers and economic migrants. For example, at one Women’s Platform meeting, a Malawian member pointed out that their group members were not able to take advantage of some of the opportunities being offered through the platform, because they did not have documents. The others responded sympathetically; no one attempted to assert that the Malawians were less deserving of opportunities because they are not officially refugees.
The question is whether the original intent of the institution-based structure of the platform, to cultivate and support local leadership, can be maintained through this new structure. In some ways, the individual membership-based model encourages a focus on individual uplift rather than systemic change. It also may be increasing dependence on Scalabrini as a mediator, placing more of the leadership onus on professional staff rather than migrant women themselves, an issue that will be discussed in more detail below.

**B. Micro-credit and expectations of sociality**

From the inception of The Women’s Platform, the established groups involved were engaged in small business development, though the financial models varied substantially. The original Zimbabwean group used an accumulating savings and credit association (ASCA) model to incubate new businesses among its members. The Congolese group appeared to have relied primarily on financial support from its key leader, who had slowly accumulated sewing machines to start a sewing training center that generated a small income to help pay instructor salaries and rent. The Somali group was affiliated with an NGO, the Somali Association of South Africa that provided space and other in-kind support.

The possibility of raising and receiving financial support for small business development was a prospect that loomed over most early discussions of The Women’s Platform, among both staff and participants. Many of the less developed groups’ capital investment needs were small: a new oven for a baking business, an ice cream machine for a street vender. But Scalabrini staff were concerned that even with support for these investments, these businesses would fail because of the groups’ lack of business experience and preparation.

Women’s microfinance programs generally are designed to allow poor participants to substitute social collateral for the financial collateral they lack. Caroline Schuster, who has studied microfinance programs (including micro-credit) in Paraguay, usefully summarises anthropological critiques of microfinance programs, that they are “extractive, in that they commoditize women’s social ties, and coercive, in that they fundamentally alter social relations in extracting financial value from them” (Schuster 2015b). Schuster herself points out that both proponents and critics of microfinance rely on a
characterisation of women as hyper-social creatures. Her work encourages us to explore how that sociality itself is constructed, that is, how women make themselves good microfinance participants.

Both staff and participants of The Women’s Platform have raised concerns that echo these critiques of the extractive and coercive nature of microfinance. They see The Women’s Platform as primarily a set of social supports based on relationships of trust and respect, with the possibility of business collaboration and funding growing out of those existing relationships. When new women arrive at the group with expectations of immediate financial assistance, both staff and longtime participants balk at what is seen as purely self-interested behavior. The ethos of The Women’s Platform is to build a broader understanding of self-interest that includes community responsibility. A Women’s Platform staff member who is also a member of the Congolese women’s group, Kwesu, explained:

The big challenge for me, it’s with my experience I have with Kwesu and The Women’s Platform – it’s like all the women when they are coming to the meeting, they are expecting something. Others are like, if I go there, maybe I will get money to start my business, which is not possible. And others are expecting if I’m there maybe I can just easily get the job I want, maybe in one month. They don’t think about the future, what we are creating [with] each other. What you have you can also give to other women for them to benefit.

Initially, participants from established women’s groups such as Kwesu seemed more socialised to these expectations than those who arrived at The Women’s Platform without strong existing ties. As another Kwesu member reflected,

You see, it’s just in our group, the ladies understand the meaning of ‘group.’ They know even when we don’t get today, but tomorrow we’ll get something. You understand? That’s our vision. We are coming, we are coming [to the group], we don’t know tomorrow. Maybe something good can come from here.

Several of the original members of The Women’s Platform described the tangible and intangible benefits that they derived from participating in a group without clear expected outcomes. The Kwesu member quoted above had a particularly poignant story of coming to Cape Town as a widowed mother of four, knowing no one until she attended a Kwesu meeting and found that it
was being led by a dear childhood friend. Her long lost “sister” not only revived her spirits but also helped her find a stable job and assisted her financially.

What a blessing! That was a blessing I’m telling you, because since I found my sister, my life changed. I know today if I have a problem I know where I can go. If she needs me she comes to me, if I need her I go to her. She is my family now. She is my family here. Now I say, I’m not alone. I have a sister.

Yet Schuster’s caution about the way that microfinance programs help construct and propagate notions of women’s sociality is relevant here. Not all women migrants in Cape Town are looking for the type of relationships that The Women’s Platform seems to require. Perhaps those who are most resistant to this model are those who are most desperate for immediate financial support. For those who can manage the train fare and the time, The Women’s Platform can provide psycho-social relief from loneliness and the stress of managing life and family as an unwelcome immigrant. But for others, the social requirements of the group can feel like just one more bureaucratic hurdle to receiving the financial support they need to survive.

C. Local leadership and measures of success

Scalabrini’s funding from the U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration will support (among many other programs) small business development grants for five businesses initially. Unlike traditional micro-credit programs offering solidarity loans, the money will not need to be paid back and therefore does not require the social collateral that can be so disruptive of existing social relationships. But because of this arrangement, Scalabrini ultimately retains control over how the funds are spent. For example, an early experiment was to seed a catering business run by Women’s Platform members from Zimbabwe using the Scalabrini Centre’s kitchen. Despite the prime location in the central business district, the business was losing money and wasting food. Several participants in the business stopped showing up regularly for work, forcing the one most committed worker to seek out other Zimbabwean immigrants to help at the last minute.

Scalabrini Centre staff felt they had to intervene, and ended up restructuring the business with strict requirements that participants work at least three days a week, without children in tow. The staff selected new participants (Congolese and Zimbabwean women who sometimes have trouble reconciling their language and culinary differences) and set up new systems for managing
inventory and pricing. The system has become much more efficient, and the participants are seeing an immediate financial output, but it will be many months before the migrant leaders have completed the required financial and business management trainings to regain control of the business. Similarly, with other businesses that have received financial support from The Women’s Platform, Scalabrini staff have stepped in to make management suggestions or advise on financial decisions. The project highlights the inherent tensions among the needs for immediate financial gains, long-term capacity building and ongoing leadership and agency of Women’s Platform members.

One strategy that holds great promise for the development of participant leadership for The Women’s Platform is the Peer-to-Peer mentoring program, through which platform members train other members in particular skills of personal or financial development. Importantly, mentors are paid for their services, though not as much as a professional facilitator would be paid. Women’s Platform participants have expressed how impactful it is to learn from the successes of other migrants with whom they can relate and speak freely. Peer mentoring is also at the heart of a new internship program that places platform members in workplaces to gain resume-building experience, some in business run by members of the platform themselves. The Women’s Platform supports these arrangements by providing transport costs for the intern and a placement fee to the mentor.

Many of the women who took initial leadership roles in The Women’s Platform are no longer active on a regular basis. Some have been able to find full-time jobs, others are going to school or working on their own businesses, and a few have left the Cape Town area. These original leaders were identified as having strong networks of people they could connect to the platform, and many of them saw themselves not in need of support but rather as conduits for information and resources. Platform staff describe current participants as being more “in need” of the support of the network. But this also means that they may be less well-positioned to take on leadership roles and can easily come to be seen as recipients of Scalabrini’s services rather than active collaborators in the development of The Women’s Platform.

Nonetheless, The Women’s Platform is working on new leadership models that do not require the kinds of institutional or national group-based connections
needed initially. The most active members of the platform have been invited to join a leadership group that plans and leads monthly platform meetings, receives ongoing leadership training and provides direction for the platform as a whole. These leaders, like the initial nationality-group leaders of the platform, have been selected by The Women’s Platform’s paid staff team, which has grown to include a full-time project manager, an assistant manager, an intern and part-time support from another staff member. The tension between professionalisation and participant leadership is one that has been present since the inception of the platform. As an early leader explained,

When it’s in the community, it’s comfortable. It gives a sense of freedom and control. When we call a meeting here in Scalabrini, people feel they must be professional. They don’t want to share their real problems. People don’t open up. They wear one or two masks.

The mostly white professional staff for the platform often express their sense that their presence can inhibit free discussion and easy exchange of ideas. However they have not yet hired an African immigrant (or black South African) as a primary staff member for the platform. This will be a key transition moving forward, to ensure that the platform does not become yet another development project whose primary beneficiaries are white staff members (Ferguson 1994).

D. Individual leadership versus collective action

The Women’s Platform has developed social norms that reward model participants who see themselves as responsible to other women, both inside and outside the group. Within this strong commitment to community, the approach to advocacy and social change is individual rather than collective. While the members of the platform lament the policy changes that have made South Africa more restrictive in integrating migrants, they do not generally see themselves in a position to advocate collectively for policy change. Their tenuous position in South African society has left most women feeling too vulnerable to participate in social protest. And because many of them come from countries where political dissidence has resulted in violence, sometimes to their own families, they are highly aware of the risks of such activism.

Instead, both staff and participants see The Women’s Platform as giving them access to information and resources that can arm them to fight for the rights to which they are entitled but which often are violated. When parents are
turned away trying to register their children at a government school, for example, they may know that education is a universal right in South Africa, but they feel they have no recourse. The Women's Platform provides both the knowledge of legal rights, the social support to advocate for oneself and, in some cases, legal resources to fight one’s case.

South African scholars have pointed out that, in the wake of the violence of 2008, migrant organisations have not mobilised strategic claims to "minority" status or cultural citizenship as have such movements in other parts of the world, including movements for cultural citizenship in the United States. (Polzer & Segatti 2011; Galvez 2010; Rosaldo 1997; De Genova 2002; De Genova 2005). Yet South Africa's constitutional and discursive claims as a "rainbow nation," notwithstanding recent moves to restrict migration to the country, seem to invite the use of such strategies (Griffin 2011). As The Women’s Platform moves forward, it remains to be seen whether the platform’s focus on individual responsibility to the community presages eventual collective action for fundamental human rights.

**Conclusion**

The challenges and opportunities of migrant integration that South Africa is currently experiencing are not unique. However, the context of post-apartheid democratic transition, attempted transformation of racial hierarchies and ongoing economic struggles, creates particular pressure for the country to integrate migrants in a way that advances social goals. As South Africa wrestles with ongoing political and economic challenges, immigration may play a key role in shaping the broader politics of the nation (McDonald 2000a; Nyamnjoh 2006).

The Scalabrini Centre Women’s Platform is a promising model for building multi-national migrant leadership not only for individual advancement but also potentially for systemic change. However, it will continue to require careful attention to the role of the mediating institution in constructing and maintaining gendered norms of sociality, racialised hierarchies of professional versus volunteer leadership, and expected outcomes of individual uplift and responsibility to community. There are inherent tensions in this work between migrants' immediate financial and social needs and the potential for long-term capacity building and leadership. If The Women’s Platform can successfully manage these tensions, it may ultimately be a force in developing a powerful migrant constituency for human rights in South Africa.
Acknowledgements

Many thanks to the members and staff of the Scalabrini Centre Women’s Platform for their willingness to participate in this research and for their insights. In particular, we are grateful for the leadership and support of Miranda Madikane, Director of the Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town. Thanks also to the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town for hosting Leah Mundell as a visiting scholar during 2014-2015.

NOTES

1 Scalabrini staff attempt to collect demographic information from all participants in Women’s Platform meetings, trainings or events. As of June 2016, 111 individuals had shared this information. All data are self-reported, though staff assists participants in filling out the form when necessary.

2 Bekker (2010) summarises these explanations differently, dividing them into the following categories: “(i) external structural causes, (ii) factors directly related to specific outbursts, (iii) factors relating to diffusion of outbursts, and (iv) perceptions concerning policing.”

3 The group used the general South African term “stokvel” to describe its financial approach. In this case, participants contributed regularly to a fund that was then distributed to members based on their business proposals to the group.

4 Scalabrini staff negotiated the fee with members of The Women’s Platform and agreed on an amount that is about 60% of what professional facilitators are paid. New facilitators will be paid less and work up to this amount. Again, this raises concerns about parity between the paid, full-time staff of the platform and the volunteer or part-time paid participants.

5 Nonetheless, the staff feel that the current leaders may have more freedom to develop leadership across networks that transcend nationality. One staff member who is also a refugee herself commented, “When they meet together you can see that they’re all leaders. The Women’s Platform leaders are taking over the platform, because now they are suggesting what kind of workshops they want, and they always give feedback when we need their thoughts.”
References


McDonald, D. 2000b. We have contact: Foreign migration and civic participation in Marconi Beam, Cape Town. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 34: 101-123.


Exploring youth migration and the food security nexus: Zimbabwean youths in Cape Town, South Africa

Sean T. Sithole* and Mulugeta F. Dinbabo**

Abstract

In recent times, debates on the connection between migration and development surfaced as essential discourses in contemporary development issues. Consequently, this led to the birth of what is currently popularly coined as the migration-development nexus. In addition, there has been an evolution of the food security topic in various developmental discussions. Nevertheless, little attention has been given to the relationship between international migration and food security in the context of development in the global south. Moreover, missing in the literature is the conversation on migration and food security with particular attention to youths who constitute a vulnerable yet economically active group. Furthermore, there has been an ongoing engaging debate on the impact of remittances, whether remittances for household use are developmental in nature or not. This study, in contributing to the above debates, explores the link between youth migration and food security, and is based on a quantitative empirical study on Zimbabwean migrant youths in Cape Town, South Africa. The research presents comprehensive perspectives on the complexities linked to the reasons for youth migration in connection to food security, the importance of remittances on food security in the place of origin and levels of food insecurity in the place of destination. Results from this study can provide useful data for various stakeholders involved in both international migration and food security development agendas.

Keywords Development, food security, migration, remittances and youth.

Introduction

The dawn of the 21st century heralded the migration-development nexus discourse which resurfaced as an imperative subject in the development

* PhD Candidate, Faculty of Arts, University of the Western Cape, South Africa, email: seansithole88@gmail.com
** Institute for Social Development, Faculty of Economic and Management Science, University of the Western Cape, South Africa, email: mdinbabo@uwc.ac.za
agenda and has expanded remarkably since then. Globally, the connection between migration and development has been an important yet controversial discourse which has led to an engaging academic contestation or scholarly debate and attention in the midst of policy makers, researchers and academics, among others stakeholders. Various ideas and recommendations have been put forward in recent times on how best to approach the migration-development nexus (Sørensen et al. 2002; United Nations 2006; Castles & Wise 2008; Bakewell 2008; Skeldon 2008; Piper 2009; Wise & Covarrubias 2009; Glick Schiller 2011; Brønden 2012; Sørensen 2012; De Haas 2012; Bastia 2013). This points to the fact that there is a vast expansion of interesting, yet greatly disparate literature on migration and development dialogue, showing its diversity and habitually ever-changing perspective.

The focus of the above publications and discussions was on the progressive impact that migration could possibly perform in developmental issues globally, and in developing countries in particular. The above literature also shows continuity and paradox through paradigm shift from macro issues which exclusively viewed migration at an international and national level in the context of economic growth, and on the other hand, micro extreme perspectives where migration through remittances is seen as a livelihoods strategy which is beneficial to the migrant as well as family members left behind in the place of origin. A number of scholars (Kapur 2005; De Haas 2005; De Haas 2007; Crush & Pendleton 2009; Crush 2012) have skeptical attitudes towards the notion that the household or individual use of remittances for basic necessities and not for productivity or investments, in turn, causes hindrance to economic growth and development. This is a naïve and ideologically bankrupt view which is lagging behind contemporary development issues. This is so because migration benefits to households and their livelihoods are an important aspect of sustainable livelihoods, especially the availability of income and remittances to buy food and other basic commodities. As noted by De Haan (1999: 31), remittances are not only used towards what many development professionals regard as productive investments, they are also a vital aspect of households’ strategic planning for survival.

In addition, another key aspect of this argument is the disengagement between migration and food security which is noted by Crush (2012), who argues that the major drawback of the discourse on migration-development nexus over the years has been the lack of methodological dialogues and limited attention on the linkages between human mobility and food security, especially in the
framework of south-south migration. Crush (2012) makes interesting points by arguing convincingly that food insecurity is shockingly not considered as one of the main determinants of human mobility, the debate overlooks the fact that migrants cross borders in search of areas with better accessibility and availability of food sources, as well as migrating in order to meet the basic needs of people back in the place of origin. Both migration and food security aspects are fundamental in the development agenda; consequently, in recent times, there has been a genesis of literature combining migration and food security. Nevertheless, the key argument of this paper is that missing from the existing and emerging academic debates on the marriage between migration and food security are narratives on the phenomenon of youth mobility in search of income for food security. Youths belong to a vulnerable group which faces challenges including high unemployment, social segregation, stigmatization, and low incomes and salaries, just to mention a few, which in turn lead to the phenomenon of youth migration. Hence, youths should be involved in the migration-food security nexus debate.

It is equally important to note that recently the international community has experienced a shocking rate of youth migration and food insecurity on one hand and a vast number of remittances sent to the places of origin on the other. In 2010, 27 million migrants globally in the 15-24 age category made up 12.4% of the 214 million international migrants, and when migrants in the 25-34 age category are included in the same year, migrant youths represented one-third of international migrants (UNDESA 2011: 12-13). In regards to food security, from 2011 to 2013, 842 million, or 1 in 8, people globally were suffering from continuous hunger and food shortages, indicating that the Millennium Development Goal of eliminating extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 continued to be illusive (FAO et al. 2013: 4). Furthermore, in 2013, the overall remittances totaled an astonishing $542 billion with $404 billion sent to developing countries and amounts expected to rise in the coming years (World Bank 2014: 2). In the African context, remittances have contributed immensely to macro as well as micro level development, especially for poverty reduction and sustaining livelihoods. This study argues that a development agenda that does not consider connecting youth migration and food security would be out of date on current developmental issues.

**Background and Contextualisation**

The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 brought about immense joy, euphoria and jubilation, a new economic giant in Africa was born and, for a decade
spanning from 1980 to 1990, the country was flourishing economically and socially. However, events in the 1990s signalled the beginning of the collapse of a promising economy⁶. From the start of the 21st century, hyperinflation, political and socio-economic crisis, led to mass exodus within and across the Zimbabwean border. In addition, the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe led to an increase in 'brain drain,' the emigration of skilled Zimbabweans from the nation state, especially professionals in the health and education sectors, because of better opportunities in foreign destinations (Tevera & Crush 2003: 1). In 2009, the Zimbabwean dollar's reliability vanished through the dollarization of the economy, as it was replaced with the US dollar and other foreign currencies (Noko 2011) that the country is still using today.

However, the economy continues to shrink, Zimbabwean youth are now hopeless because many university graduates have been turned into street vendors (Masekesa & Chibaya, 2014), Zimbabwe's unemployment levels are estimated to be 80%, with 68% of this percentage being vulnerable youths (Mukuhlani 2014: 138). Over the years, remittances from abroad have played a vital role for many in Zimbabwe. A 2014 estimation indicated that $1.8 billion was sent to Zimbabwe by Zimbabweans in the diaspora (The Africa Report 2014). As such, in the context of the crisis in Zimbabwe, remittances have saved the country from total collapse.

Prior to independence, Zimbabwe was mainly a migrant-receiving nation and then became a migrant-sending nation after independence because of the economic crisis (Tevera & Zinyama 2002; Bloch 2006; Crush & Tevera 2010). Zimbabwe's case has been viewed by Crush and Tevera (2010) as 'crisis-driven' migration, the socio-economic and political crisis has turned the once cherished breadbasket of Africa into a basket case⁷. The Zimbabwean case is a tragedy; the economy, health and education sectors, have been crippled, food insecurity and poverty are still major challenges, and millions of Zimbabweans, youth included, have migrated to other countries, especially to South Africa, for greener pastures. This exile includes food-insecure

---

⁶ These events included the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), draining of the government coffers through a bonus to liberation war veterans and the Land Reform Programme, all of which had a negative impact on the economy.

⁷ The words 'bread basket to basket case' are mainly used in reference to Zimbabwe, which used to produce a surplus of food and other resources for its people and other countries. However, in recent times with the food shortages and socio-economic crisis, the once full basket (Zimbabwe) is now empty.
Zimbabweans from all walks of life who have been pushed out by the disastrous situation in the country.

**Methodology**

The study was conducted at three locations in Cape Town, namely, Bellville, Rondebosch and Observatory. Cape Town is a city located in the Western Province of South Africa and is second to Johannesburg as the most heavily populated metropolitan in the country (Western Cape Government 2013). Cape Town is also the tenth most populous city in the African continent (Morris 2014). It is also amongst the prominent multicultural cities in the globe which makes it very attractive to migrants (Expat Cape Town 2014). Bellville, Rondebosch and Observatory were selected because they are residence to a large number of Zimbabwean youth, migrant students and workers. These areas also have a variety of food sources in an urban set up and represent two different suburbs, the Northern and Southern suburbs. This research adopted a quantitative method approach; 60 Zimbabwean youths were interviewed using a structured questionnaire. Respondents who participated in the quantitative structured questionnaires were selected using non-probability sampling, to be specific, snowballing sampling was used. The research was systematically carried out, and managed to reach its objectives. Nevertheless, the researchers were also mindful of some challenges in locating the target group under study, as migrants were reluctant to disclose their identity due to fear of discrimination, victimisation, xenophobia or prosecution because of lack of proper immigration documentation. Fortunately, social networks used to locate respondents proved to be very helpful.

**Literature Review**

The literature on the link between migration and food security in the context of internal migration has paid much attention to rural communities; however, with food security recently being recognised as an urban challenge, the focus has shifted to rural-urban migration. This is shown by several publications (Frayne 2007; Crush et al. 2007; Drimie 2008; Kassie et al. 2008; Frayne 2010; Tawodzera 2013; Pendleton et al. 2014; Dinbabo & Nyasulu 2015). The studies revealed that the social networks among rural and urban families are fundamental to survival strategies of the poor people in cities and that, to a lesser degree, urban agriculture contributes to sustainable livelihoods. Urban dwellers that face food shortages are those with few or no social links with rural communities. On the contrary, those with strong rural-urban links have
the privilege of getting food from rural communities that counterbalance exposure to food insecurity. The mutual benefit is also seen through the fact that remittances and food transfers are not one-directional, there is a rural-urban as well as the urban-rural transfer of goods, commodities and money. The existence of reciprocal connections between rural and urban areas is vital to the sustainable living conditions of distraught urban dwellers.

Several empirical studies in India were conducted linking human mobility and nutrition issues, with a particular focus on malnutrition, food consumption and dietary matters (Choudhary & Parthasarathy 2009; Bowen et al. 2011; Tripathi & Srivastava 2011). Zezza et al. (2011) examined the connection between migration and nutrition issues in third-world countries using migration at a local, regional and international levels, which resulted in various outcomes. Of great interest are the findings from the above research that indicated that child growth or improved dietary intake is linked to human mobility, especially in poverty struck and vulnerable communities, signalling the importance of remittances used to access nutritious and sufficient food.

The most thought-provoking response to migration and food security and an essential publication in the migration-food security debate is Crush’s (2012) examination of urbanism, internal and international migration in relation to food security in the African context. The article argues that food shortages and insecurity can surely be main causes for migration and a search for better income-earning prospects. Crush (2012) also found that the main cause of urban food insecurity is not scarcities but deficiency in food accessibility, that is to say, lack of a consistent and dependable source of income for food consumption. The paper also compared migrant and non-migrant families. The results indicated that both categories face food insecurity challenges, however, in some cases migrant households proved to be more food insecure, with both rural-urban and international migration rising rapidly as well as migrants or combinations of migrants and locals occupying the most impoverished locations in urban areas.

Various scholars have endorsed migration as a strategic decision used by many households and vulnerable communities for poverty reduction and improved livelihoods (McDowell & De Haan 1997; Scoones 1998; De Haan 1999; Skeldon 2002; Kothari 2002; Ellis 2003; Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015). On the other hand, remittances have been viewed as having positive developmental impact as well as being used as a source of income to reduce poverty and acquire basic needs especially during crisis years (Maimbo &
Ratha 2005; Adams & Page 2005; Adams 2011). Hence, remittances can be a form of social protection, enabling migrant families to have better ways to earn a living than non-migrant families (Kapur 2003).

Various studies in Southern Africa indicated that in recent times remittances have been vital as a basis of income for many households and economies (Pendleton et al. 2006; Maphosa 2007; Bracking & Sachikonye 2010; Crush et al. 2010). In the context of Zimbabwe, research (Maphosa 2007; Tevera & Chikanda 2009; Bracking & Sachikonye 2010) showed that money and goods transferred by migrants are vital to the families, individuals and economy of Zimbabwe. Their assessment also specified that in relation to the socio-economic and political watershed in the country, the main use of remittances is for basic needs like food, education, home construction and health services, among other things, and that the transfer of financial resources and other commodities by migrants has served many people from the effects of poverty and shortages of goods.

In connection with the above, this study argues that the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) put into perspective the link between youth migration and food security of Zimbabwean youths. The New Economics of Labour Migration signifies a major progression in the population movement discourse. With the growing attention on people-centred development in the last quarter of the 20th century, the New Economics of Labour Migration materialised with a critical view and expansion of the neoclassical theories which were viewed as passive in dealing with population movement and developmental issues (Massey et al. 1993). The hypothesis of this theory is that households or families strategically migrate to capitalise on income earnings as well as to reduce vulnerability to various threats. Hence, remittances offer a social protection, and the risk protection clarifies why human mobility can occur in situations where there are no differences in wages in the places of origin and destination (De Haas 2010).

The main perception of the New Economics of Labour Migration is that when people decide to migrate, the choices are not reached by individuals; rather they are made at a broader level through collective elements such as strategic family or household decisions, in order to increase financial security and reduce vulnerability and challenges related to market let-downs or unexpected risks (Stark & Levhari 1982; Stark & Bloom 1985; Taylor 1999: 74). Remittances are seen as central to better livelihoods by providing financial security (Stark 1980). As noted by Taylor et al. (1996), previous work
by neoclassical theorists tended to be too pessimistic and fails to address the importance of remittances in supporting or sustaining families and societies. In other words, the importance of remittances is absent in the pessimist theories on migration. Conversely, at the heart of the New Economics of Labour Migration is the fundamental role that remittances play in sustaining livelihoods of many households which, in turn, becomes the main reason for migration decisions.

The above literature did not take into account any investigation on vulnerable youths, in connection with migration and food security, with the main emphasis being on better livelihoods. Furthermore, there is over-emphasis on internal migration and food security or livelihoods; most of the literature is silent about migration and food security or livelihoods across borders. Taking into account the above-mentioned research gaps on the connection between migration and food security, this research presents an analytical framework and exploration of the link between youth migration and food security.

**Empirical Findings, Data and Analysis**

**a) Youth Background and Demographic Information**

The survey made a background check to confirm the nationality of the respondents; all 60 interviewed were Zimbabwean nationals. Out of the 60 respondents, 60% were males and 40% were females. The age breakdown in the survey included 36.7% aged between 25 and 29; 31.7% between 30 and 34; 30% between 20 and 24; and 1.7% between 15 and 19. In this study, the majority, 71.7%, were single; 21.7% were married; 5% were divorced; and 1.7% did not specify marital status. The majority of the individuals, 71.67%, were breadwinners; 18.33% specified that their relatives such as brothers and sisters were breadwinners; and 10% stated that their husbands were breadwinners. The survey also illustrated that 38.3% had no dependents; 18.3% had three dependents; 18.3% had two dependents; 11.7% had one dependent; 6.7% had four dependents; and 6.7% had five dependents. The heritage of an educated and literate Zimbabwean population was evident in the survey, with 60% having completed university level education; 30% having completed secondary education; 6.7% vocational; and 3.3% other categories.

**b) Youth Employment Status**

In this survey, the majority, 76.7%, indicated that they were unemployed prior to coming to South Africa, while only 23.3% were employed before coming to
South Africa. In recent times unemployment in Zimbabwe has become a massive national crisis, as stated by Rusvingo (2015: 2), with the unemployment rate estimated to be 85%. This is in line with the claim that since 2000 the crisis and high unemployment in Zimbabwe led to the emergence of informal dealings popularly known as ‘kukiya-kiya’ (Jones 2010)\(^8\). However, the current situation in South Africa was remarkably better, 83.3% of the respondents were currently employed and only 16.7% were out of employment. Among the 50 employed respondents, 88% were employees and 12% were self-employed. In addition, out of these same 50 respondents, 74% were employed part-time and 26% were employed full-time. Evident in this research is that Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown has caused high unemployment in general and youth unemployment in particular, with South Africa providing better employment opportunities.

**c) Reasons for Migrating to South Africa**

In the context of this study, the respondents were allowed to give multiple answers in relation to the drivers of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa. 65% confirmed that socio-economic crisis influenced their decision to migrate while 35% differed. Only 22% indicated that political crisis influenced their decision to migrate while 78% opposed this opinion. 63% indicated that food shortages influenced their decision to migrate whereas 37% differed. 25% had other reasons to migrate such as coming to school (Figure 1). To put this into perspective, migration is generally viewed as a response to poverty, vulnerability to various risks and poor access to basic needs, hence people move in search of greener pastures (Skeldon 2002). Within Sub-Saharan Africa, cross-border migration is mainly a result of economic factors (Dinbabo & Carciotto 2015).

---

\(^8\) ‘Kukiya-kiya’ is an informal strategy of doing any kind of business to earn a living (Jones 2010).
Figure 1: Reasons for Migrating to South Africa


In the case of Zimbabwe, poverty is very much linked to the determinants of migration where people run away from poverty to other countries seeking better opportunities and improved livelihoods (Dzingirai, et al. 2014). Unsurprisingly, the findings of this research confirmed that the crippled and disjointed Zimbabwean economy, as well as the chaotic social and political circumstances, have overwhelmed many Zimbabweans and pushed many youth out of the country in search of improved access to food and better opportunities elsewhere. The high rate at which Zimbabweans have migrated from Zimbabwe because of the deteriorating economy has been termed “survival migration” (Crush et al. 2012: 5). Additionally, since 2000, political ferocity and economic crisis in Zimbabwe has led to outwards migration at a high or unusual level (Hammar et al. 2010: 263).
d) Family or Household Influence on Migration Decision

The family or household influence on migration decisions was evident in most of the interview responses as 70% of the respondents indicated that their household/family members influenced their decision to migrate, whereas only 30% differed. General responses here were that family/household members advised that in South Africa there were “greener pastures,” “better opportunities,” “jobs” and that migration would help the upkeep of the family/household members. In addition, 63% of the respondents indicated that they migrated to South Africa in order to meet the food needs of family/household members back in the country of origin, while 37% differed. This is linked to the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) which states that migration is a strategic choice made at a household or family level, which is generally better than at an individual level and is primarily done in order to improve income and reduce or share the responsibility of possible risks (De Haas 2010: 242-243). This is also in line with the livelihood approaches to migration, as argued by Ellis (2003) that considers migration as vital to improving livelihoods of many communities.

In addition, there was a statistically significant (p<0.001) link between (1) the influence of food shortages/food insecurity and (2) the influence of family/household members on the migration decision. Furthermore, there was also a statistically significant (p<0.002) association between (1) the influence of food shortages/food insecurity on migration decision and (2) the migration decision in order to meet the food needs of the family/household members. Without a doubt, it is clear in this study that family/household members played a huge part in the migration decision in order to reduce the risk or vulnerability to food insecurity of themselves and the migrant family/household member.

e) Youth Migration, Remittances, and Food Security

The findings in this research reveal that most Zimbabweans remit to their households, family or friends in Zimbabwe, with the majority (75%) of the respondents noting that they send money to Zimbabwe while only 25% do not send money. One of the main notions of the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) is that human mobility and remittances sent back to the place of origin provide financial resources which help in reducing any potential risks (Taylor 1999). To put it in another way, central to the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) is that remittances sent back to the
place of origin play a crucial role in poverty reduction and improving the livelihoods of many households.

The frequency of remitting money to Zimbabwe was as follows: 42.2% every month; 26.7% whenever possible; 22.2% every three months; 4.4% once a year; and 4.4% twice a year. Average money remitted each time to Zimbabwe was: 55.6% between R801 and R1500; 22.2% between R0 and R800; 15.6% between R1501 and R3000; and 6.7% between R3000 and R8000 (Table 1). Unsurprisingly considering the backdrop of the decaying and crumbling Zimbabwean economy where opportunities are scarce, remittances behaviour revealed in this study indicates that resources are remitted back to the place of origin on a regular basis. In the context of Zimbabwe, a study by Dzingirai et al. (2015) indicated that households with migrants have an improved standard of living or healthier livelihood than those without. This is due to remittances which play a crucial part in reducing poverty by providing a source of income to buy basic needs.

Table 1: Frequency and Average Remittances Sent to Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of sending remittances</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every month</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every 3 months</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice a year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whenever possible</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total = 45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average amount sent each time to Zimbabwe</th>
<th>0 - R800</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>22.2%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R801 - R1500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1501 - R3000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3001 - R8000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8000+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total = 45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In line with this, as part of the study, respondents were asked whether they send money to be used for food consumption. A huge majority 82.2% said yes while 17.8% said no. In addition, they were asked whether they believe that the money they send is used for food consumption. 91.1% of the respondents said yes while 8.9% said no. Money remittances are important, however, this survey also asked respondents whether they also send any food items/groceries back to their place of origin: 10% of the respondents said they do send groceries while 90% said they do not. In line with this, migration can make an important contribution to the livelihoods of family or household members left behind in the place of origin through remittances which could increase the chances of consuming a variety of foods contributing to a balanced diet (Karamba et al. 2011; Zezza et al. 2011).

Ellis (2003) argues that if money remitted to the place of origin is used for food consumption it is logically mainly because of food shortages and, as such, plays a crucial role in establishing food security, especially in uncertain circumstances. In connection with this, there was a statistically significant (p<0.000) relationship between (1) the sending of remittances and (2) the sending of the remittances for it to be used for food consumption, as well as (1) the connection between sending remittances and (2) believing that the remittances are used for food consumption (p<0.000). Moreover, there was also a statistically significant (p<0.000) linkage between (1) the sending of remittances for them to be used for food consumption and (2) the belief that the remittances are used for food consumption. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant (p<0.049) relationship between (1) migration in order to meet the food needs of household/family members and (1) the sending of food back to the country of origin. Evidently, the data shows that one of the main reasons for migrating is to get income to send back to the place of origin. The remittances are sent to be primarily used for food consumption and the migrants who send the remittances do believe that the money is essentially used to buy food.

**f) Youth Migrants and Food Security**

This section provides information and analysis on the food insecurity level of Zimbabwean youth migrants in Cape Town. The measurement of food insecurity was done by means of the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS), Household Food Insecurity Access Prevalence Indicator (HFIAP), Household Dietary Diversity Scale (HDDS), Household Food Insecurity Access-
related Conditions, Household Food Insecurity Access-related Domains and the Months of Adequate Household Provisioning Indicator (MAHFP).

The average HFIAS score for Zimbabwean youth migrants in Cape Town was 0.13; the mean score of the HFAIS was 3.66; the median 2; and the mode 0. The HFIAP scores had noteworthy variances: 36.7% food secure; 25% mildly food insecure; 26.7% moderately food insecure; and 11.7% severely food insecure. This shows that 63.3% of the respondents were food insecure, whereas only 36.7% were food secure. The HFIAS and the HFIAP show low general levels of severe food insecurity amongst Zimbabwean youth in Cape Town.

In measuring the particular food insecurity conditions through the conduct and opinions of the participants, the Household Food Insecurity Access-related Conditions showed that 36.7% were worried that they would not get enough food while 63.3% were not worried. The frequency was 20% for those who said rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) and 16.3% said sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks). In terms of severe food insecurity conditions, only 6.7% indicated that there was no food to consume because of limited resources, while 93.3% differed. Additionally, 8.3% indicated that they went to bed hungry because of insufficient food for consumption. Moreover, a minority 1.7% point out that they went an entire 24 hours without consuming any food due to food scarcity.

Another important measure of food insecurity is the Household Food Insecurity Access-related Domains which point to the fact that 47.2% had an insufficient quality of food and 52.8% had the desired adequate quality of food. In regards to the quantity of food, 30% indicated that they had food consumption deficient, whereas the majority, 70%, had sufficient food intake. This means, basically, that in terms of food insecurity conditions over half of the respondents were not extremely worried about their situations, especially when it came to the quality or quantity of food. On the other hand, the food access related domains were insightful and showed that the majority of the respondents had high or adequate food consumption.

In the context of this research, the levels of food insecurity were also measured using the HDDS which deals with the quality of the diet consumed by respondents. The mean score of the HDDS was 6.56 of the potential maximum of 12 which specify that on average at least 6 different types of food categories were consumed by the respondents. On the other hand, the median and mode scores were 6 and 5 respectively, signifying that the respondents consumed at least or almost half of the food in the 12 food groups. The most consumed
categories were meat (96.7%), oil/fats (90%), sugar/honey (76.7%), cereals (73.3%), milk (73.3%) and vegetables (70%). On the other hand the least consumed foods groups were fish/seafood (6.7%), root/tubers (18.3%) and pulses/legumes/nuts (26.7%), as presented in Table 2. The figures show that on average the respondents were consuming half of the 12 food categories, as well as high amounts of meat, oil or fats, sugar or honey, cereals, milk and vegetables. This means, basically, that the Zimbabwean youth migrants in Cape Town were consuming high quality or generally sufficient nutritious diets.

Table 2: Food Consumption by Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Categories</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root/tubers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat/poultry/offal</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish/seafood</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses/legumes/nuts</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk/milk products</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil/fats</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar/honey</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous/any others</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Furthermore, the MAHFP which measures whether the respondents managed to get a consistent supply of food for a period of 12 months was used to measure food insecurity. The results pointed out that 53.3% of the respondents experienced months when they did not have enough food to eat compared to 46.7% who had enough food to consume. The mean score for the MAHFP of the respondents was 1.38, the median was 1 and the mode was 0. This shows that of the months of adequate food provisioning the respondents had at least one month during which they faced food shortages. In the context of the 12 months during which the months of adequate provisioning are measured (June 2014 – May 2015), January, as shown in Figure 2, was the
month during which most of the respondents faced problems because of the lack of resources.

**Figure 2: Frequency of MAHFP**

![Frequency of MAHFP](image)

**Source:** Field Survey, 2015.

This can possibly be attributed to the festive season spending resulting in what is commonly known as ‘January disease.’ In other words, this situation is seasonal; many respondents noted that they spend more money during Christmas and New Year holidays through traveling, buying food and sending remittances, among other expenditures. As a result, when they come back to the place of destination in January they usually face financial constraints, which in turn leads to low expenditure on food thereby causing food shortages.

**Exploring Various Factors and their Impact on Food Insecurity**

According to the empirical findings in this research, food insecurity levels among Zimbabwean youth in Cape Town seem to be very prevalent, 63.3% of the Zimbabwean youth migrants were food insecure while only 36.7% were food secure. Hence, it is important to understand the various factors or determinants of food insecurity.

To begin with, in terms of income, the empirical findings of this research indicated that all those who earned R1500 or less were food insecure while 77.3% of the food secure participants earned an average of R3000 or more. Using Pearson chi-square cross tabulation, the research findings proved that the correlation between income and food security levels was statistically
significant (p<0.039), representing the positive influence of income on access to food. Secondly, in regards to gender, the findings indicated that 50% of the food secure respondents were males while the other 50% were females, showing that there is no positive link between gender and food insecurity. This was further statistically justified by a having no significance (p=0.229). This is so because access to food by both female and male migrant youths was mainly dependent upon the opportunity to get a better income to buy food, such as better paying job; this is not particularly affected by gender based factors.

Thirdly, the assumption is that those who are more educated are likely to earn more and get better jobs than the less educated. Since the likelihood to earn more is related to having better access to food, those who earn more income are expected to have the financial resources to have improved access to food. However, the findings of this study show that even though some of the Zimbabwean youth migrants were highly educated, had good jobs and decent salaries which resulted in better access to food, most of them were not guaranteed to have good and high paying jobs which, in turn, give them financial power to have a healthier access to food. Correspondingly, a Pearson Chi-square test on the association between education and food insecurity was not statistically significant (p = 0.093) indicating that the two variables were independent of each other. In addition, among those who completed university education, 66.7% were food insecure. This is so because even those who were well educated were desperate to the extent of being employed as waiters or bartenders because the local economy is harsh on foreigners.

Lastly, this research found out that 45% of the respondents faced food shortages due to price increases while 55% did not face any challenges. The common shortages of food were “meat and cooking oil.” The findings of this study also revealed that there is a relationship between high food prices and food insecurity, using Pearson Chi-square measure the result illustrated that there is a statistically significant (p = 0.000) association between the two variables. This study reinforces the assumption that price increases can lead to food insecurity of many vulnerable communities, and that high or increased food prices can lead to a decrease in the consumption of nutritious and varied food items.

**Conclusion**

In exploring the relationship between Zimbabwean youth migration and food security in Cape Town, the key empirical data from this research discovered
that there is a positive link between youth migration and food security. The basis of this hypothesis is summarised below:

The findings confirmed that the main reasons for migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa were socio-economic crisis and, to some extent, political reasons. Most notably, in assessing the role that food insecurity or food shortages play in migration decision, the results indicated without a doubt that food insecurity/shortages proved to be one of the main reasons for migration.

In addition, family/household influence in the migration decision proved to be very common, that is to say, most households or family members took part in the migration decision of the youth migrants. Interestingly, in relation to this point, a large number of the participants revealed that they left Zimbabwe in order to help the family or household members back home with their food needs. Through the exploration of the connection between remittances and use of remittances for food consumption, the findings demonstrated that the majority of Zimbabwean youth migrants send remittances to Zimbabwe in the form of money, mainly to be used for food consumption, and were certain that the remittances they send are used to access food. It is notable that a large majority of the respondents were not sending any food groceries to Zimbabwe, as they preferred to send money.

The assessment of food insecurity levels of Zimbabwean youth in Cape Town indicated that the average HFIAS score was 0.13, mean 3.66, median 2 and mode 0, then the HFIAP indicated that 63.3% of the participants were food insecure, and only 36.7% were food secure. The research also revealed that there is a major improvement in food security for the youth migrants in South Africa compared to Zimbabwe. The major factor for the improvement of food security or better food access for Zimbabwe youth migrants, was earning income. Most of the interviewed migrants managed to get some form of employment and income, which meant they had the financial resources to buy food. With regards to dietary issues, the research revealed that the mean score for the HDDS was 6.56 out of 12, and the mode was 5, which signified that the respondents consumed about half of the 12 food categories used in this study. In line with the MAHFP, which measured the months during which the participants had food shortages or problems with food access, the findings showed that 53.3% had months during which they did not have adequate food for consumption, and the other 46.7% had no challenges or insufficient food during any of the months.
**Recommendations**

This paper establishes various challenges and shortcomings in giving a comprehensive account of the relationship between youth migration and food security. There is a need for collaboration, partnership, and action towards finding solutions, especially in the context of south-south migration. Four focal points are recommended in the context of youth migration-food security nexus in the global south:

- Firstly, there is a need to promote job creation or better employment opportunities for youth migrants since the outcomes of this research indicated that access to food is a challenge for migrants in general, and migrant youth in particular, due to the limited resources or lack of dependable income. Many youth migrants are students or employed as security guards, waiters and bartenders among other low-paying jobs, yet many Zimbabwean youths are well educated enough to get high-paying jobs. Promotion of employment opportunities or job creation for youth migrants by policy makers and local government departments through recruitment based on experience and qualifications would contribute to the host economy. Such employment opportunities would provide a dependable source of income which would be used for food consumption and remittances, which would also benefit those left behind in the place of origin.

- Secondly, this study revealed that some of the migrant youths consumed less nutritious foods due to a lack of knowledge, shown by an over-reliance on fast-food outlets and supermarkets, which resulted in over consumption of meat. This shows poor food utilisation. Hence, there is a need to address the challenge of unbalanced diet and consumption of limited nutritious foods. The governmental departments, non-governmental organisations like Scalabrini Centre, UNHCR, Refugee Centre, IOM and FAO, must also introduce food programmes, within their various programmes for migrants that educate and train migrants on the best practice in food utilisation, particularly on consumption of healthy plants-based diets.

- Thirdly, in recent times, migration and food insecurity concerns have been affecting many communities, yet they are still treated as two separate
concerns. Combining migration and food insecurity issues at local, regional and international levels is needed and policy making needs to be addressed. In the context of South Africa, migrants have been subjected to draconian immigration policies, xenophobia and various forms of segregation, while their food insecurity concerns are invisible or unattended. The integration of migration and food insecurity issues can be addressed through local and national departments, as well as on an international level through cooperation between the general populace, governments and non-governmental organisations such as UNHCR, IOM and FAO that deal with migration and food insecurity issues. In addition, a rights-based approach to migration and food insecurity issues should be included in the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals, especially with regards to migrant youths’ rights to food.

- Finally, this research showed that several studies have emerged that try to address migration and food insecurity matters, especially in the context of rural and urban connections. However, there are still many research gaps in the sense that little attention has been paid to migration and food security beyond borders or at the international level. Therefore, there is a need for more research on migration and food insecurity issues. Additionally, there is the need to contextualise youth in the research, discussions and debates on migration and food security. Information on the complex opportunities and threats that are part of the migration-security nexus, in general, and youth migration-food security nexus, in particular, is crucial as a framework for policy makers and various organisations in their policies or approaches.

References


Sørensen, N.N. 2012. Revisiting the migration-development nexus: From social networks and remittances to markets for migration control. *International Migration*, 50(3): 61-76.


