Turning a Blind Eye to African Refugees and Immigrants in a Tourist City: A Case-study of Blame-shifting in Cape Town

Greg Ruiters*, Felicia Lombard** and Denys Uwimpuhwe***

* School of Government, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Corresponding author. Email: gruiters@uwc.ac.za
** School of Government, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
*** School of Government, University of the Western Cape, South Africa

What role do municipalities play in limiting xenophobia in all its forms and what should these bodies do in promoting the integration of African immigrants? This paper analyzes a case study of Cape Town’s policies and programs concerning African immigrants and refugees following the 2008 xenophobic crisis, up to 2016. Municipalities as a separate sphere of the government have their own space to address socio-political problems and to shape local alliances and urban life. Despite being a tourist-led, gentrifying city which substantially draws on vulnerable African immigrant labor, Cape Town’s leaders and businesses, however, have no explicit policies or programs to address xenophobia – a ticking time bomb; and they tend to shift the blame to other actors. City leaders and employers see African immigrants in an instrumental way (as mere labor; a financial burden and not as potential citizens). This paper focuses on local government’s definition of the ‘foreign immigrant problem’ and its poor record of reducing the drivers of xenophobic conflicts in South African cities, recognizing that while cities are not the only players, they certainly are the closest to the problem. The paper concludes that the city needs a proactive, comprehensive approach, recognizing migrants and their organizations, especially foreign workers, legal immigrants and refugees, as key city builders, stakeholders and potential citizens in the city. The paper draws on interviews with city officials, migrants and asylum seekers in the City of Cape Town.

Keywords: Policy silences, Cape Town, leadership, local government, political inclusion, xenophobia
INTRODUCTION

According to Hogwood and Gunn (1985) policy should be analyzed for its covert aspects, its silences and non-decisions. As Hogwood and Gunn (1985) assert, policy is what governments do and do not do. The role of municipal street-level bureaucrats in bending policy to fit their prejudices and making policy as they implement it, is also crucial (Lipsky, 2010).

This paper argues that the problem in the City of Cape Town (CoCT) is three-fold: first, city leaders and key allies have no explicit policies or programs for assisting refugees and asylum seekers and foreign workers – a case of non-decisions and strategic silences. Secondly, they show little leadership around the needs and challenges of refugees and asylum seekers, shifting the blame to national and global actors. Their responses are essentially symbolic and they tend to shift the responsibility onto non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Thirdly, city leaders and powerful commercial interests in Cape Town, while blaming the national government for the presence of foreign Africans, see refugees and asylum seekers in an instrumental way (as a ready pool of acquiescent labor) and not as potential citizens.

The paper is divided into three sections. Section one focuses on the literature on xenophobia and the role of local government. The second section covers the CoCT context, local business practices, municipal policies (or the lack thereof) and how certain local officials (those interviewed) understand city policies. Section three considers the organizational responses of refugees and asylum seekers to threats and their interactions with the City; this section also discusses the role of non-governmental organizations. A total of 28 face-to-face interviews were conducted in 2015 and 2017, with City officials, NGOs, refugees and asylum seekers’ associations, individual migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Researchers reviewed the City budget for spending related to refugees and asylum seekers, with a focus on four policy areas: Metro Policing, Cape Town’s Social Development Strategy (CoCT, 2013), the Policy on Vulnerable Groups (Draft Policy, March 2013) and the Responsible Tourism Policy for the City of Cape Town (2009).

The research method is largely qualitative and interpretive. The paper does not compare Cape Town to Durban and Johannesburg where more explicit forms of xenophobia and harsher state action have been prevalent. A comparative study falls outside the scope of this paper. Importantly, this paper sees xenophobia as a multifaceted phenomenon that may surface in both episodic violence and covert, institutional ways. Institutional xenophobia (such as benign neglect) has been a marginal issue since much of the focus is on violence. Some argue that xenophobia has abated in some places because violence is less frequent.

IMMIGRANTS AND THE CITY CONTEXT

In South Africa, the intergovernmental system is meant to be cooperative and allocates functions so that the national sphere of the state provides foundational policies, while municipalities as a separate sphere of the government have their own space
to address socio-economic challenges and shape local alliances. City governments also have a responsibility to develop policies that promote integrated development, local economic development inclusive of non-racial societies, respect for diversity, and participatory local democracy (Palmary, 2002). Their roles as implementers and policymakers are frequently underestimated. Municipal governments are obliged to “take the lead in mitigating practices of exclusion and segregation that are so acutely felt in the places where people live” (Ray, 2003: 1) and develop local policies that reduce inequalities and integrate newcomers into vibrant workplaces and socio-political environments. They must also take the lead in mitigating spatial segregation, acutely felt in the South African cities (Pieterse, 2009). Social inclusion in cosmopolitan urban places will not simply happen with time or spontaneously through market forces.

Each city has its approach to these challenges. But most South African cities, in managing immigration, rely on the core national policies of public education, health care, public policing, the justice system and border control which are the immediate responsibility of national and provincial governments. Yet, “managing immigrants also depends on the quality of the countless interactions that occur between individuals, social groups, and institutions that exist in a city at the level of local workplaces, cultural and religious activity and residential areas” (Ray, 2003). Xenophobia is not only violently expressed but also operates through institutional practices that exclude and discriminate against foreign Africans within the Department of Home Affairs, the police, hospitals, and schools, based on their appearance, documents, or language.

South Africa has long been a country of immigration – from European colonial settlers to an exploitative migrant labor complex where Southern African workers served mining capital. But immigration has changed dramatically since 1994 when the apartheid system ended and South African cities became desirable for refugees and economic immigrants. According to Crush and Chikanda (2015), SA ranks 36th in the world for the size of its refugee population, and although South Africa receives many asylum seekers, it grants refugee status to very few. Nonetheless, by 2019 the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2019) estimated that South Africa had the largest number of immigrants in Africa (around 4 million). A refugee, as defined by the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, is a person to whom the South African state has granted asylum. Acceptance rates are less than half of the global average. Most immigrants remain ‘undocumented migrants, whose labor can be hyper-exploited.

Based on the 2011 census, more than 550,000 new immigrants moved to South Africa between 2001 and 2011 (an average of 55 000 per annum). That is an undercount but is nonetheless a substantial influx for a country of South Africa’s size. In 2016 the Western Cape received 296 000 internal migrants from other provinces and 106 000 international migrants (RSA, 2019: 15-16). Recent immigrants, including white immigrants (who make up 17% of the total), are five times more likely to have post-matric qualifications and generally enjoy employment rates of 78%, which is
substantially higher compared to South Africans at 58% (GroundUp, 2017).

In the post-1994 era, a growing number of African refugees and economic migrants (Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Malawians, Somalis, Nigerians, and Congolese) have found work in diverse fields and have settled in major cities including black townships. In 2005, international migrants comprised only 2.8% of South Africa’s population, but by 2019, this figure had climbed to 7.2% (IOM, 2019). In South Africa, about 20% (or 300 000) of the 1.5 million domestic workers are reported to be foreign migrants while migrants make up 4% of the general labor force (Africa Check, 2015). Migrants are 3.5% more likely than South Africans to be involved in sales and services and almost 5% more likely to be involved in crafts and related trades. Only 14.68% of international migrants are unemployed compared to 32% of South African national migrants (Africa Check, 2015). This is very unusual since, in most other countries, international migrants tend to have higher unemployment rates than locals (Africa Check, 2015).

Gauteng leads the national statistics in reported incidents of xenophobic violence since 1994, followed by the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (Mlilo and Misago, 2019). Over “200 Somali nationals were murdered in South Africa, most in the Western Cape, between 2000-2004 and media reports show that migrants have been targeted by youths in Cape Town areas such as Philippi, Khayelitsha, Dunoon, Gugulethu, Nyanga and Masiphumelele townships for years” (Jara and Perbedy, 2010: 25). A two-week countrywide spree of violence in May 2008 left 62 people dead and 150 000 immigrants homeless.

During the course of the violence, an estimated 20 000–30 000 were displaced in Cape Town and it is thought that as many as 30 000 may have left the city. It is not possible to provide exact figures as people not only fled to community halls, mosques and churches before being moved to camps but also sought refuge with family and friends in safer areas (Jara and Perbedy, 2010: 26).

During November 2009, 3 000 Zimbabwean seasonal farmworkers in De Doorns, outside Cape Town were forced to flee after xenophobic violence. Violent attacks by some South Africans, problems experienced obtaining official documents, workplace exploitation and everyday discrimination have become major issues for foreign workers and refugees but scholars remain deeply divided about defining and explaining xenophobia (Uwimpuhwe and Ruiters, 2018).

LITERATURE REVIEW: XENOPHOBIA AND THE CITY CONTEXT

There are diverging definitions of xenophobia in the scholarly literature. Far-right populists in Europe have exploited “fear about existential and ontological threats to spur the exclusion of unwanted ‘others’, such as Muslims, Roma, and refugees” (Kinnvall, 2017: 1). Recent scholarship on this phenomenon has focused exclusively on collective violent acts, and inflammatory statements of national and local city leaders (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Misago et al, 2015). Citizens in South Africa regularly draw on xenophobic state discourses and negative statements by politicians about
immigrants (Landau, 2006). Others hold that populist politicians have no incentive to protect foreigners since they are not eligible to vote (Mngqibisa and Netshikulwe, cited in Daily Maverick, 2018) and hence it is easy to scapegoat them. Moreover, Misago et al (2015: 24) argue that:

National government and relevant local authorities have thus far either tended to categorise violence against foreign nationals and other forms of xenophobic behaviour as part of ‘normal’ crime with no need for additional targeted interventions.

However, the general social explanations argue that xenophobia reflects the realities of deepening inequality, rising unemployment and frustrations of the poor in South Africa often leave out the issue of how general discontent is mobilised and channelled into collective xenophobic acts (Misago 2019) and how the silences of the local state are complicit in such processes (Maharaj, 2009).

Academic research on the discriminatory practices and the complicit role of local businesses that eagerly employ vulnerable foreign Africans (a kind of labor preference or xenophilia) and how the local state influences or overlooks these unfair labor practices, is uncommon. South Africans’ xenophobic fears about jobs being taken by foreigners are also seen by some as unfounded (Crush and Chikanda, 2015; Misago et al, 2015).

An exception is Maharaj (2009), who examines the challenges of international migrants in the eThekwini (Durban) municipality. He argues that:

The local authority has yet to engage constructively in addressing the problems of migrants and refugees, and the policy response has ranged from one of benign neglect to active hostility. Almost all the major policy documents of the eThekwini local authority make no reference to migrants (Maharaj, 2009).

Anti-immigrant violence by groups is a collective act, and one of the key explanations focuses on how this violence is organized and resourced, and the opportunities for such violence to happen (McAdam, 1986). Some analysts focus on only specific local factors and the organized nature of violence:

A strong explanation must account for the appearance of violence in some areas while others with similar socio-economic conditions remained calm…. Violence occurs in specific areas … where local government is weak or considered illegitimate (Misago et al, 2015: 24).

Yet, in Cape Town local government is considered both legitimate and strong and not complicit with perpetrators of violence. The benign neglect of townships by strong municipalities and by the wealthy cannot be underestimated. This paper argues that the focus should be on local governance, which is much broader than local government as the former is usually an alliance of fractions of powerful networked interests that govern a city (Harvey, 1989; Miraftab, 2007). Such alliances include wealthy rate-payers (who use the services of mainly foreign workers), the local business chamber, donors to political parties, city improvement districts, big property, tourism interests, etc.).
CAPE TOWN: ECONOMY, LABOR AND POLITICS

Cape Town is a popular global tourist destination. It has some of the most expensive real estate and private schools in the country; it also has some of the highest concentrations of multi-millionaires (mainly white). In 2016 Cape Town had a retail, catering and accommodation and financial services economy with 78% of jobs in the tertiary sector (City of Cape Town, 2018). During 2011, the area received 1.4 million foreign visitors (City of Cape Town, 2013b: 31).

It is no exaggeration to suggest that the success of the city and the profitability of tourism is built on the labor of its poor citizens and especially its recent foreign African immigrants. Moreover, Mathers and Landau (2007) suggest that South African tourism depends on the willingness of African migrants to risk crossing the border, often with artefacts to sell and invest in the South African craft markets. According to Mathers and Landau (2007: 530), “one only has to stroll the markets that tourist buses frequent to note that the vast majority of artefacts on sale are made and sold by Africans from anywhere but South Africa”. They assert that certain sectors of South African tourism is dependent on the endeavors and labor of migrants.

When Cape Town was run by the African National Congress (ANC) in the mid-1990s the mayor, Nomandla Mfeketo worked with a power block of the city managers, politicians, rich property owners and bankers, who mobilized to ‘save’ Cape Town from “going the way of Johannesburg” and “descending into a morass of crime and grime”, social decay and capital flight (Cape Town Partnership, 2009). They initiated and designed the Central City Improvement District (CCID) in 2000, a private-public partnership to provide “safety and cleanliness” and make Cape Town “a pleasant urban environment” to live and work in.

Governed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) since 2006, Cape Town has fashioned itself as a successful, non-racial, inclusive, well-governed city that seemingly works for social inclusion (McDonald, 2008). Under the DA the City of Cape Town (CoCT) has eight separate metro police units including an ‘anti-land invasion unit’ aimed at curbing informal settlements and an ‘anti-vagrant unit’. The increasing repressive local state apparatuses, in policing everyday life, are not unusual in tourist-based world cities (Lemanski, 2006; Miraftab, 2007, McDonald, 2008). Binns and Nel (2002: 240) point out that “waterfront developments and convention centres … in Cape Town and Durban have attracted strong criticism … they do not adequately involve community members, few benefits devolve to them, and the developments are undertaken without adequate concern being given to affected communities”.

There is another interesting twist in the Cape Town government’s rhetoric about immigrants since black South Africans have previously been labelled as immigrants by DA leaders. In 2012, Helen Zille, the then Premier invoked the term ‘refugee’ to refer to black African South Africans. The context is that the Western Cape has the lowest black African population of all nine provinces at 32% and the Eastern Cape, South Africa’s most underdeveloped province, has the highest black population.
at 86% (RSA, 2011). She suggested that the Western Cape (and Cape Town) was in danger, given the Eastern Cape African ‘influx’ taking resources and jobs that belong to the Western Cape. The narrative of fear appeals to the idea that Cape Townians (the majority ‘coloured’ and minority white groups) are being ‘swamped’ by ‘refugees’ from the Eastern Cape (who are also seen as predominantly ANC supporters). This ‘Western Cape first’ and Eastern Cape ‘invasion’ narrative has underpinned the DA’s electoral success among ‘coloureds’ and whites.

AFRICAN FOREIGN MIGRANTS PREFERRED AS WORKERS

Cape Town with its burgeoning tourist economy has attracted tens of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers, who have settled close to economic/work opportunities (in the informal shack settlements in areas such as Hout Bay, Dunoon, Masiphumelele). They also choose to settle in areas where they can set up ‘spaza’ shops (for example, in Khayelitsha where Somalis predominate) or they find casual jobs around Cape Town. Foreign migrants entering Cape Town appear to have become an ever more visible, vulnerable and influential sub-population in both black townships and central business areas (Hill and Bekker, 2014: 675).

Cape Town’s refugees and asylum seekers are mostly young people (in their 20s and early 30s) who have migrated mostly without their families. They often accept lower wages, work longer hours and tend to be exploited and are averse to joining trade unions (Taal, 2012; Dodson, 2018).

Moreover, migrants have changed labor markets: employers often prefer vulnerable foreign labor and “this vulnerability makes immigrants popular with management as they are cheaper and easier to control” (Taal, 2012: 21). As a manager at a top restaurant in Cape Town, where the majority of staff are foreigners, claimed, “foreign waiters, especially from Zimbabwe, are usually better spoken and offer phenomenal service to customers” (cited in Dirk, 2015). Another Canal Walk restaurant manager revealed that “the high work ethic of foreign employees was the reason they were more readily hired” (cited in Dirk, 2015). It was suggested that “South African employees are not “up to scratch for these jobs” (cited in Dirk, 2015). For instance, a Cape Town Fish Market and restaurant at the Waterfront employed 16 waiters, but only four were South African. Another manager at a major restaurant had 12 waiters but only one was from South Africa. He noted: “They (Zimbabweans) have the kind of personalities where they are able to keep our patrons happy and entertained” (cited in Dirk, 2015). A manager in Camps Bay claimed when it comes to hiring staff, it has more to do with the best candidate than whether the applicant is foreign or local. Five of the restaurant’s seven waiters are from Zimbabwe (cited in Dirk, 2015). There is thus a cocktail of racial, ethnic, national identity stereotypes at play in the split labor market.

The Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) noted:

It was important to understand that the people fleeing their own countries were among the best qualified and most enterprising workers. They were strongly
motivated and they competed fiercely for jobs and trade. In many cases, this competition was unwelcome and created some local resentment (CCCI, 2015). According to Taal (2012: 21) “Foreign workers are encouraged by management to see South African workers as lazy”. These sentiments might reflect a new split labor market formation, the preference among employers for foreign workers, and also unresolved residual hostilities between black and white South Africans. One interviewee highlighted that:

South Africans take advantage of the fact that foreigners are desperate and will work for lower wages. And in many cases, when the residence permit is about to expire, the bosses refuse to pay foreign nationals (Respondent D).

It is evident that this increasing role in visible services means that the footprint of foreign workers is considerable. However, this has produced significant resentment among black local workers and the unemployed towards both employers and foreign national employees.

DEFINING THE ‘PROBLEM’: OFFICIAL SILENCES

What are the official approaches to and definitions of the ‘problem’? The City over time has had contradictory definitions and messages. In 2003 when the ANC governed the province there were an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the City. A high level 2001 City Report noted that, “The ‘problem’ aspect of foreign migrants is overstated and that in many ways the presence of these migrants contributes positively to the economic and cultural development of the region” (CoCT, 2003: 13). But at this time, local government officials interviewed by Palmary (2002: 6) also felt that provision of services for refugees should be the responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs at the national level. A front-line CoCT official cited in Palmary’s study argued:

There is no land for these immigrants ... They occupy city-owned land illegally. So we take action against them. We're trying to get central government to take full responsibility for this. Because the city does not have the resources or the manpower to deal with this. Tonight I've got to go again, go deal with the immigrants.

In 2005, at a World Refugee Day event, ANC mayor, Nomaintdia Mfeketo put a positive spin on immigrants saying, “We are committed to developing a sustainable partnership. Through our social development directorate, we are assisting Tutumike with completing an audit of skills of refugees in Cape Town. We have been amazed at the results so far: 23 medical doctors, 6 engineers, 20 lawyers and 5 teachers. And this is only the beginning” (UNHCR News, 2005).

In 2006, the DA won the municipal elections. A series of violent xenophobic outbreaks in 2008 in Gauteng spread, about a week later reaching Cape Town. In May 2008, Somalis and Zimbabweans were attacked by mobs and their shops were vandalized and looted. In response to the humanitarian needs of people who left their homes and needed shelter and other basic items, the City prepared six safety camps
at former ‘coloured’ beach camping sites and the Youngsfield Military Base (City of Cape Town, 2008).

The DA decisively swung the definition of the issue towards blaming the national and international factors and showing how local city resources were being wasted on poor refugees from dysfunctional countries. These messages can be seen in the Mayor of Cape Town, Helen Zille's media responses to the 2008 wave of xenophobic violence, as captured by Mnguni (2010). Zille essentially labelled the problem as an “international” one, thereby shifting the focus away from the city to global factors. “They just haven’t applied themselves to how they deal with it,” Zille remarked of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Counting the financial costs to the city of having poor foreign blacks in the city, she argued that, “the UNHCR had an international mandate and budget to deal with problems”. She asserted that:

This is an international problem. Why are people forced to be refugees in the first place? R170m had been taken away from other service delivery projects to deal with the xenophobic violence of 2008 (Mnguni, 2010).

Cape Town mayoral committee member for Safety and Security, Councillor J.P. Smith similarly remarked: “Attacking other people incurs costs and the city paid R147 million to house, feed and protect dispossessed people in 2008. We had to use rates money to cover those costs” (Defence Web, 2010). Zille and Smith were appealing to their ratepaying voters when they referred to the waste of money and they implied that foreign refugees are an unfunded mandate.

Another cluster of official negative messages linked immigrants to crime and unrest. In interviews with J.P. Smith refugees and foreign nationals were also mentioned alongside ‘street people’ and crime (Smith 2019).

On the other hand, there is some evidence of local ward community development workers (CDWs) aligned to the ANC and the development forum playing a constructive role in calling township meetings between locals and refugees and asylum seekers and building solidarity during the 2008 crisis in Imizamo Yethu (IY) in Hout Bay. According to Pillay (2015):

Our team finds out that IY has a vibrant community life, and that its development forum (CDF) is very active. A range of political organizations operate here, and there are two very active community development workers (CDWs), who also happen to be officials of the ruling party. We find out very quickly that the CDWs are angry – not at foreign nationals, but because two years of community work to build relations between the locals and foreign nationals
is being undone by a very vocal and insistent group of residents in Hout Bay. The CDWs are angry because the white residents of Hout Bay, on hearing the stories about attacks on foreign nationals, are putting increasing pressure on the police to escort foreigners from the area. They are angry that white residents are arriving at IY and removing the foreign nationals in their employ themselves; and they are angry that all of this is done without consultation, particularly because after the foreign nationals leave the area, the looting of their shops, homes and businesses begins. Now, this is but one recurring story and I think it is instructive.

In Dunoon, for example, these meetings were called by councillors without official assistance from the City (Samodien, 2013).

VULNERABLE GROUPS

The CoCT decided to exclude refugees and asylum seekers from its final Social Development Strategy based on a belief that the problem is not a priority. In an early draft policy of the CoCT, the City identified five priorities. As depicted in the table below, immigrants were initially considered in goal 4.3 related to enhancing community participation and involvement.

![Figure 1: Extract from the draft Social Development Strategy Policy](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.4.1</td>
<td>A4.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of NGO sector &amp; empowerment of community leaders</td>
<td>Complement the capacity of NGO's dealing with refugee community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A4.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity building for community leaders to deal effectively with issues pertaining to sustainable relationships between foreign nationals and host communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Compliance engagement & enforcement

**A4.2.1** Facilitate the establishment of area based Business Forums, facilitate development and implementation of guidelines to regulate informal business

**A4.2.2** Regulate and monitoring selling of houses to foreign nationals to start small businesses

### Entrepreneurial Development and Mentoring

**A4.3.1** Empower both foreign and nationals and locals with entrepreneurial skills and mentoring services

### Cultural and Sport Activities

**A4.4.1** Implement cultural and sport activities to integrate foreign nationals and locals

### Poverty Mitigation

**A4.5.1** Involve foreign nationals in poverty reduction programs and social security networks

**A4.5.2** Ensure that in all programmes implemented/sponsored by government, foreign nationals are involved

**Source:** The City of Cape Town, 2012.

Even though the draft policy was not explicit on how foreign nationals were going to be integrated into the city’s development strategy, it indicated that some in the city leadership at least thought about foreign nationals and had an agenda. However, in the final version published in 2013, this aspect of ‘goal 4’ was entirely removed.

The 2013 Policy on Vulnerable Groups (PVG) defines certain categories of people as vulnerable in the CoCT (CoCT, 2013c). This policy (see definition on page 7 and throughout the document) completely excludes refugees and African immigrants. Undocumented female migrants and even unaccompanied children who are asylum seekers or refugees are not considered as part of vulnerable children (Mundell and Carone, 2016).

### RESPONSIBLE TOURISM

The CoCT’s Responsible Tourism Policy (2009: 3) defines responsible tourism as an activity “that creates better places for people to live in, and better places to visit”. The Responsible Tourism Policy, however, has a blind spot regarding the reality of mi-
grants in the CoCT. Where it talks about non-South African migrants (CoCT, 2009: 25), it merely calls for encouraging business relationships between foreign, local and emerging entrepreneurs. The policy also identifies local crafts as a priority. It says:

Give customers the opportunity to purchase locally produced crafts and curios, set targets to increase the proportion of sales of goods sourced within 20 km of the enterprise. Assist local craft workers to develop new products to meet market demand (CoCT, 2009: 26).

However, it is self-evident that most of the crafts sold in craft markets are from north of the Limpopo. Rogerson (2018: 157) found that:

In Cape Town, despite a pro-development rhetoric in the inner city, there is evidence of a subtle but systematic exclusion of street traders, including of migrant entrepreneurs. Little evidence exists of a coherent analysis by city policymakers to understand and foreground the contributions made by migrant entrepreneurs for the urban economy.

IGNORANCE AMONG CITY OFFICIALS, LOW PRIORITY OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS, LACK OF VISION AND TOKEN PROJECTS

To probe how the City sees foreign Africans, this study included interviews of mid-level officials in Trading Licensing services. At this level, the responses revealed that City officials (much like Cape Town’s DA mayors) were not clear about what was meant by terms such as ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘refugee’. Informants employed by the City indicated that they were not aware of any policies about foreign nationals.

By and large, local government officials view migrants’ access to services such as housing as the responsibility of the National Department of Housing. Local government respondents often failed to understand who refugees are and what rights they have (see Palmary, 2002).

According to a respondent:

As far as the city is concerned, we’re not making any provisions for them [migrants] at this present moment. I think they’re doing it for themselves…We are not really involved, as the Department of Housing… (Interview, Department of Housing, Cape Town).

The term ‘xenophobia’ is mentioned only once in the Disaster Management Policy. And here it is listed with social unrest. Moreover, the city has no language support services or learning centres to assist migrants.

Rather than formulating a solid policy, the CoCT initiated a token project such as hosting a forum for community dialogue about xenophobia, in honor of Mandela Day in 2011. This single event sought “to increase awareness about issues affecting foreign nationals and to encourage a spirit of unity and peaceful relations between South Africans and African foreign nationals” (CoCT, 2011).

In the 2014/15 events budget, zero funding was assigned to the World Refugee Day budget line item whereas the World Triathlon Series received R2,1 million (CoCT, 2015). In early 2015, then mayor of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille stridently
condemned the new surge in nationwide xenophobic violence. In a public statement, she proclaimed that, “We cannot let this be done, in the name of our country, South Africa” (CoCT, 2015). In 2015 de Lille donated R21 000 – a tokenistic amount – to a non-governmental organization (NGO) assisting the children of refugees and asylum seekers. In 2015 she also minimized the issue, proclaiming that Cape Town has a small minority of xenophobic people. Yet, she reported:

We have daily meetings with the South African Police Service and Metro Police to report on any potential threats of xenophobic attacks. Our early warning system is therefore in place. Members of the public are also urged to report any suspicion of impending attacks in their communities (CoCT, 2015).

A City-NGO agreement for a small sponsorship of R75 000 for World Refugee Day (2017) provides an indication of the low status of refugees on the City’s agenda and budget in 2017 (CoCT, 2017). In summary, the City of Cape Town has distinctly side-stepped its role and responsibility to provide a solid lead to minimize the xenophobia tragedy. Refugees and foreign migrants enjoy very low priority in the CoCT budget.

NGO’S VIEWS

In contrast to the lack of knowledge about refugees and asylum seekers among CoCT officials, four NGO workers interviewed for this study were able to distinguish between the different status categories among refugees and asylum seekers. In the NGOs responses, one participant stated that:

Yes, there are administrative categories in terms of documentation. The asylum seeker is the person who has made an application for asylum. This is a recognized refugee whose asylum application was granted. Then there is a migrant who is a holder of a passport and visa that corresponds with the purpose for their visit to SA (e.g. work, study). An undocumented migrant is someone who has no documents whatsoever to legalize their stay in SA. Then there are citizens and permanent residents. A visa is thus pertinent to a temporary resident and ‘permanent resident’ is another category (Respondent C).

An NGO worker (Respondent C) also indicated that “Refugees and asylum seekers have the same rights as South African citizens, except that they do not have the right to vote or form a political party”. NGOs assisting refugees, asylum seekers and migrants raised some interesting points. Two of the four NGO respondents referred to the need to address institutional xenophobia routinely found in government departments as well as inflammatory political rhetoric. Respondent C stated that “There’s a great need for training and creating awareness”.

All four NGO respondents felt that foreign nationals do not receive enough support from local government and stated that there are no special or additional services to assist foreign nationals, even in light of the 2008 xenophobic attacks. They indicated that they were not aware of any policy changes that had been beneficial to foreigners but they identified new ones that are not beneficial, such as the City’s amended trading by-law. PASSOP, an NGO which has especially fought the criminal-
izing of the informal sector, has suggested that the government should focus on real crime as opposed to enforcing “outlandish by-laws”:

The renewed harassment of informal traders by the police and city officials results in a breakdown of trust and makes informal traders especially vulnerable to criminal elements who extort ‘taxes’ and victimize them without them being able to rely on the police for protection due to the police being seen as being a part of an oppressive system (PASSOP, 2013).

Another respondent stated that:
I also think that they want to first save South Africans before foreigners. It’s not supposed to be like that, you are supposed to treat everyone fairly. The City also discriminates against those who do not have documents and offers no assistance to rectify this. They also often think that you have received your documents illegally, especially the metro police (Respondent D).

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS AS TRADERS AND ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

The black foreign traders interviewed (Malawian, Somali, Cameroonian, and Zimbabwean nationalities) were asked what they thought the CoCT Municipality could do to prevent xenophobia. Four of the five said that the city should improve security and protection services on the streets, especially the security of foreigners. One respondent indicated that:

The metro police, they will come here and I will show them even who stole from my stall but they will do nothing. But if you fight with the people then they blame you (Respondent J).

In 2015, refugee traders in Cape Town paid R879 per month to the City for renting a site, and R1950 for an annual permit – three times more than in Limpopo (Crush and Tawodzera, 2017: 5). Despite this, three respondents indicated that they had experienced hostility from Metro Police. A respondent operating in Wynberg indicated that “They must stop taking our stuff. When we do something wrong, they take our stuff and we must pay to get it back” (Respondent G).

Asked whether they felt that special allowances should be made for the employment of foreign nationals in South Africa, all five agreed. One female respondent stated that, “There should be a law in place that allows foreigners easier access to jobs. When South Africans come to my home country they get jobs, they are not left without jobs and we should be treated the same in their country” (Respondent I).

Another respondent indicated that:
We don’t get the jobs that we are qualified for in South Africa. South Africa does not see that we are teachers in our countries. Instead, we must come here and look for other jobs that pay a little money (Respondent K).

Cape Town has dozens of migrant organizations representing the interests of refugee and asylum seekers, as well as several NGOs that support refugees and asylum seekers by providing different services. There are also intimate relationships between
South African blacks and foreign Africans, for example through marriage (Sichone, 2008; Owen, 2015; Uwimpuhwe and Ruiters, 2018; ISD, 2018).

Each migrant organization has independent initiatives to assist its members but the local state has not effectively engaged with these organizations or assisted the refugees and asylum seekers. If, as Portes (1995) suggests, migration is rarely a single individual effort, then migrant organizations and networks need to be central to efforts to find solutions. For example, Somalis in townships initiated a 'self-protection program' and street committees. Moreover:

We encourage them also to be part of the local community where they are ...

Furthermore, we are creating street committees that will be composed of both Somalis and South Africans in order to encourage locals to protect Somalis (A.R. Sheikh, February 2016).

Language barriers were identified as being a problem for immigrants. Health services also provide an example of language and cultural discrimination. The Albayan Islamic Council Trust (AICT) leader asserts that Somali women are facing a big problem at clinics, as some women are being sterilized without their consent:

When our women go to maternity clinics they are abused and given family planning without their consent. Some of them find out that they can't have kids anymore while they didn't know when they had been sterilized. I think it is because many of them don't know English and are forced to sign what they don't understand (A. Rachid, October 2015).

The AICT is involved in integrating Somalis into the South African citizenry. This is done through skills transfer initiatives in which they teach South Africans how to run a small business. This organization also identifies people in the local communities who need help:

Firstly, as refugees we are helping South Africans by employing them in our businesses, teaching them how to start a business. We also help other immigrants, for instance last year we gave donations to Burundians in townships. We also do cleaning of this Bellville CBD; last year we did it twice and we are planning to do it again this year. We have a good relationship with the Darul Islam Foundation Trust, Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) and the African Muslims Agency (A. Rachid, 2015).

Immigrant organizations are involved in promoting social cohesion through civic education and cultural events. For example, the South African Somali Association organizes different educational programs for both Somalis and South Africans of different cultural backgrounds and promotes social cohesion between immigrants and citizens (A Khalif, leader of the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA)).

The Amis BK (Friends of Bukavu) brings together both South Africans and African immigrants through cultural events:

In 2011 and 2012 we had a volunteering project in Langa Township to teach South African students in public schools Maths and Physics, which is part of the integration. We wanted to show citizens that it is not true what people are
saying that migrants came to take their jobs and their women (A. Namufakage, Amis BK, February 2016).

The level of self-defence, organization and networking among migrants and external refugees and with NGOs has increased since the mid-2000s (Uwimpuhwe and Ruiters, 2018). Migrant organizations play a major role in social cohesion, albeit with very little active local government support.

CONCLUSION

While recognizing that city authorities are not the only players, they are certainly the closest to the problem. This study analyzed the CoCT’s policies vis-a-vis foreign African migrants, revealing that despite their growing numbers and significant contribution to the growth of the city, refugees and African immigrants remain at the margins of policies and the local government’s programs. The study found that there is a blame game between the local government and the central government about who is responsible for poor immigrants and the xenophobic conflict. This paper identified local government’s shifting definition of the ‘foreign immigrant problem’ and its poor record of resourcing and encouraging the integration of African migrants. The City of Cape Town has also underplayed the extent and scope of the xenophobia problem and the related labor market issues. It has missed opportunities to devise a more visionary, comprehensive approach to ensuring citizenship for all who labor and live in Cape Town. Refugees and foreign migrants are not taken into consideration in the formulation of the CoCT’s budget.

The study found that NGOs and refugee and asylum seeker organizations have much to bring to the table to alleviate problems and realize the vision of Cape Town as an African cosmopolitan city. As argued in an earlier paper, “given the dominant ‘methodological individualism’ and gaps in recent migration scholarship in South Africa, a fresh theoretical perspective and knowledge about organized refugee and asylum seeker formations, the activities and services they offer, their geographical reach and location, who they assist and what sorts of resources they can mobilize” is needed (Uwimpuhwe and Ruiters, 2018: 1122).

It is, therefore, crucial to increase the political will and capacity of local authorities, to ensure an inclusive response to the needs of migrants. A comprehensive response needs to take seriously the claims that working-class South Africans feel threatened by competition in the labor market and that employers are taking advantage of the new labor pool of insecure foreign African migrants. The CoCT should consider including migrants and representative migrant organizations in ongoing policy dialogues and its planning for housing and other programs. It should create spaces for positive encounters between various groups in public spaces, encourage inclusive public art, food festivals, exert social and other kinds of pressure through campaigns for decent work for all to ensure that employers do not exploit foreign workers who underpin the tourist economy and enforce equal treatment, apply equal standards and uphold regulations for all. It should provide training and awareness-
raising for local government officials and councillors on refugee and migrant rights. It should develop programs to educate businesses and landlords about refugees and asylum seekers and monitor those businesses and landlords who take illegal advantage of vulnerable migrants.

By valuing and recognizing migrants, especially legal immigrants and refugees, as key city builders and stakeholders in the CoCT, the exploitation of the insecurity of migrants could be minimized. Migrant exclusion not only leaves large sections of the population without the services they need but in the long run, they too become less productive. The City of Cape Town could nurture a Pan-African partnership with transnational players and be more tolerant of the presence of the poor in the city. Finally, local governments should have policies and funded programs built on co-creation and cooperation with both migrant and local civic and cultural organizations.
REFERENCES


sity of the Witwatersrand.


List of Named Interviewees
Abdul Rachid, leader of the Albayan Islamic Council Trust (AICT), interviewed in Bellville, October 2015.
Abdi-Rashid Shiekh, leader of the Somalis Community Board South Africa (SCB-SA), interviewed in Bellville, February 2016.
Abdul Khalif, leader of the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA), interviewed in Bellville, February 2016.
Amani Namufakage, chairperson of the Amis BK, interviewed at Observatory, February 2016.
## Anonymous Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee (pseudonym)</th>
<th>Area of Expertise</th>
<th>Place Interviewed</th>
<th>Date Interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CoCT Business Areas Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr A</td>
<td>CoCT Business Areas Management</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>30 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs T</td>
<td>CoCT Business Areas Management</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>30 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CoCT NGOs working with refugees</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms C</td>
<td>NGO (1)</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>7 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs D</td>
<td>NGO (1)</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>12 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs F</td>
<td>NGO (2)</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>12 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Q</td>
<td>NGO (2)</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>20 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal Traders in the CoCT Municipality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr G</td>
<td>Malawian trader</td>
<td>Wynberg</td>
<td>18 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr H</td>
<td>Somalian trader</td>
<td>Wynberg</td>
<td>18 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms I</td>
<td>Cameroonian trader</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>26 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr J</td>
<td>Somali trader</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>27 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms K</td>
<td>Zimbabwean trader</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>27 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr G</td>
<td>Malawian trader</td>
<td>Wynberg</td>
<td>31 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr H</td>
<td>Somali trader</td>
<td>Wynberg</td>
<td>31 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms I</td>
<td>Cameroonian trader</td>
<td>Cape Town CBD</td>
<td>25 August 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>