Violent Conflict and Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa: Government and Donor Policies and Programs in Search of Durable Solutions

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Abstract

The Horn of Africa (HOA) is currently engulfed in entangling and shifting cross border conflict, resulting in at least four major forced displacement situations. These conflicts emanate mainly from the Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea and involve large numbers of refugees as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Globally, there are an estimated 54.7 million displaced persons. More than a quarter (27%) of the globally displaced, are in Sub-Saharan Africa, with about 8.7 million or over half (58%) of those in the HOA.

On the one hand, forced displacement in the Horn places additional stresses on already weak local and national institutions and marginalized, underserved host communities. Services are often perceived to only benefit the displaced as opposed to receptor communities leading to envy and local conflict. On the other hand, displaced persons also have skills and assets that could be harnessed and utilized to benefit the local economy in pursuit of durable solutions. The complex cultural, social, and political nature of the region is compounded by an ongoing set of development challenges, including: demographic shifts; imbalanced service provision; the threat of pandemic diseases; and increasing contestation over scarce natural resources, especially water and grazing areas.

This article examines the underlying drivers of violent conflict, the impact on both the displaced and the receptor host communities, and the effectiveness of government and donor policies and programs. The research methodology

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included a literature review, field-based participant observations, and a series of in-depth key informant and focal group interviews in HOA refugee camps, host communities and major cities.

The search for a new paradigm shift from care and maintenance to resilience and self-reliance is underway. Given the now “protracted” nature of the displacement, the old encampment humanitarian approaches of care and maintenance are now giving way to a rethink from a development perspective by governments and donors alike.

Finally, from a prevention perspective, stemming forced migration at its source by improving security, governance, and livelihood opportunities in countries of origin are key to managing the displacement challenge. Regional integrated area development can convert fragile border areas which now serve as shock absorbers for conflicts within these fragile states to prosperous change agents opening avenues of cross border trade and development.

**Keywords:** conflict, displacement, Horn of Africa, integration and migration.

**Introduction**

The Horn of Africa (HOA) covers Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. It is richly endowed in human, social and natural capital. However, the region is plagued by a complex history of weak governance, insecurity, recurrent drought, increasing environmental degradation, entrenched poverty and endemic violence.

The region is currently engulfed in entangled and shifting cross-border conflict resulting in at least four major forced displacement situations. These conflicts emanate mainly from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, involving large numbers of refugees as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Five countries host over sixty percent of refugees in Africa: Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda and Chad. This does not include the growing number hosted in the South Sudan, where armed conflict is on the rise, or Djibouti, an important transit point to Yemen and the Middle East.

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11 While Yemen is impacted by the HOA refugee crisis and discussed herein, it is not conventionally considered a part of the Arabian Peninsula. There are an estimated 280,000 Somali refugees in Yemen.
Globally, there are an estimated 54.7 million displaced persons, comprised of 38 million internally displaced and 16.7 million refugees in foreign countries. An estimated 14.9 million persons (11.4m IDPs and 3.5m refugees), or more than a quarter (27%) of the globally displaced, are in Sub-Saharan Africa, with about 8.7 million or over half (58%) of whom are in the HOA (ODI/HPG and IDMC 2015; GPFD 2015). There are 1.9 million refugees in protracted situations with an average length approaching 20 years (Loesher and Milner 2011).

**Stresses and Impacts on Host Communities**

Forced displacement in the HOA places additional stresses on weak local and national institutions, as well as marginalised, underserved host communities. On the one hand, there are increasingly negative development impacts on human and social capital, economic growth, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability (CCSD 2014). In addition, such displacement can become a breeding ground for further conflict and political instability. On the other hand, displaced persons also have skills and assets that could be harnessed and utilised to the benefit of the local economy and the pursuit of durable solutions.

While there are increasing financial demands on host government budgets due to the influx of refugees and IDPs, humanitarian and development financing and technical assistance from the international community assists in addressing the needs of both the displaced and receptor communities.

**Major Development Challenges**

The complex cultural, social and political nature of the region is compounded by an on-going set of major development challenges including: demographic shifts; imbalanced service provision; growing threat of pandemic diseases; and increasing contestation over scarce natural resources, especially water and grazing areas.

Despite the recent attention brought to the growing challenges of forced displacement across Africa by the Kampala Convention in 2012 (GPFD and IDMC 2012), there is, as of yet, no single comprehensive critical analysis connecting the sources and drivers of displacement, refugee and host community dynamics, and the range and effectiveness of donor and host government policies and practices in the pursuit of durable solutions to the growing displacement crisis in the HOA (RMMS 2015). In seeking such
solutions, international agencies are facing a number of knowledge gaps. Several key questions immediately emerge. Are displaced persons or migrants in the HOA fleeing political oppression and violence, seeking economic opportunity and better lives, or some mix of drivers? Why do current policies and operational approaches of the international community and host governments often result in protracted displacement and dependence rather than integration and self-reliance? How can the hierarchy and sequencing of displacement drivers and context specific durable solutions be better understood?

**Policy and Operational Challenges and Options**

These fundamental issues pose a range of policy and operational challenges to the international community and host countries. They may be summarised in the following key concerns. Has the donor community failed to sufficiently understand and address the underlying structural causes of displacement? Has the academic community missed a vital and growing global research problem, thus being complicit in its relative benign neglect? What are the political, economic and social factors shaping conventional government and international policies of encampment and exclusion rather than integration and inclusion? How does the modality of displacement and migration (e.g., smuggling, trafficking, labour market opportunities, etc.) shape the design of solutions? Should one be looking beyond ‘country and sub-regional’ approaches and at ‘intra-regional’ integration possibilities? Is a differentiated approach to the forced displacement and migration challenges of the HOA needed? In short, what are the political economy forces, knowledge, capacity and financial gaps facing donors and host governments in addressing the multiple causes and durable solutions to forced displacement in the HOA?

In dealing with the above challenges, there is growing international recognition that development actors should engage earlier and adopt a longer-term approach, in collaboration with displacement affected governments, host communities and international humanitarian partners. In confronting conventional wisdom, Alexander Betts et al (2014) note that, “refugee communities engage in production, consumption, exchange, entrepreneurship, and the development of financial and capital markets. They have many of the core features of any other economic systems.” Building on existing assets, it is important to shift the mind-set of donors, governments and NGOs from seeing the displaced as victims with needs to survivors with capabilities; from dependency to self-reliance and resiliency. A paradigm shift
is also required that balances and links the humanitarian protection of the displaced with the need to also address the social and economic development impacts on host receptor communities in a ‘holistic’ manner.

The options typically presented in seeking durable solutions to forced displacement are local integration, return and repatriation to the country of origin or resettlement in a third country. In the search for durable solutions, this paper examines the underlying drivers of violent conflict, examines the impact on both the displaced and the receptor host communities, and assesses the effectiveness of government and donor policies and programs.

**Methodology**

This paper is based upon a literature review, field-based participant observations and a series of in-depth key informant and focal group interviews in HOA camps, host communities and major cities. Over 50 individual interviews and 15 focal group discussions were held with a range of stakeholders including government officials, donor and non-governmental agency staff, host community leaders and displaced persons.

Three field visits were made to the HOA over the course of 12 months, ranging from one to three weeks on average. The field visits included the main HOA countries and most of the major refugee camps including Dolo Ado, Amami and Shire in Ethiopia; Kakuma and Dadaab in Kenya; Ali Addeh in Djibouti; and Kiryandango in Uganda. Interviews were also undertaken in the urban centres of Kampala, Addis Ababa, Djibouti-Ville, Juba, Nairobi, Cape Town and Stellenbosch. Somalia was off bounds due to persistent security threats.

Sudan and South Sudan were visited during the author’s earlier research on the demobilisation and reintegration of armed combatants within the Framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement under the auspices of the United Nations. Information was gathered during this work on all war-affected groups, including displaced persons. Recent events in South Africa, particularly affecting the relationship between Somali refugees and host communities in Durban, Johannesburg, and Cape Town, have necessitated the inclusion of South Africa as an impacted country in this work.

**The Demography of Forced Displacement**

In 2014-15 there were an estimated 49.3-54.7 million displaced persons globally (Boehler and Pecanha 2015). About 61% or 30.2 million were in a
protracted state of displacement, meaning that they had been displaced from their communities of origin for at least three years\(^2\).

In a region with an estimated 140 million inhabitants, the HOA currently contains over 2.2 million refugees and more than 6.5 million IDPs (NRC & IDMC 2015; UNHCR 2015a). The bulk of the IDPs are distributed among four HOA countries: South Sudan (1.5 million), Somalia (1.1 million, and 370,000 in Mogadishu alone), Ethiopia (397,200) and Kenya (309,200) (NRC & IDMC 2015; UNHCR 2015a).

Somalia is the largest HOA refugee originating country, with some 972,000 refugees. Ethiopia is the largest refugee hosting country in Africa with 682,761 refugees, while Kenya hosts the second largest number of refugees on the continent, with 589,994 refugees (55,519 in Nairobi alone) (RRMS 2015). Except for the recent crisis in South Sudan, most of the region’s refugees and IDPs are currently in protracted displacement. Sudan is host to over 300,000 refugees from neighbouring countries, including 150,000 from South Sudan since December 2013. In 2014, a deepening conflict led to the displacement of about 557,000 new IDPs, including 430,000 new IDPs in Darfur and 86,000 in South Kordofan and Blue Nile (IDMC 2015; UNHCR 2015a; UNOCHA 2015).

It would be an oversight to discuss forced displacement in the HOA without reference to Yemen. Although most literature does not consider Yemen to be a formal part of the HOA, it is now both a receiving point for refugees coming out of the HOA and, more recently, a departure point back in by those same refugees and others from Yemen, given the intense fighting there. It is noted that some 300,000 persons are now in the displacement mix in Yemen. With the recent Saudi intervention and no clear end of the fighting there in sight, it is hard to say how this will evolve or predict its eventual impact on the region. Saudi Arabia has recently deported some 150,000 Ethiopians.

In general, it is difficult to accurately determine the exact scale of displacement given that many displaced migrate into urban areas and are not in camps as such (IDMC 2015; NRC 2015 & IDMC 2015; UNHCR 2015a). Political uncertainty, violence, drought and governance failures have led to

\(^{12}\) IDMC reports that, “In 2014 there were people living in protracted displacement for ten years or more in nearly 90% of the 60 countries and territories monitored by the IDMC” (NRC & IDMC 2015).
“cycles of displacement, return and subsequent displacement” for millions of refugees and IDPs in the HOA over the past 20 years (Majidi n.d.). In fact, a ‘transitional phase’ of voluntary return often occurs with male refugees taking ‘look and see’ visits to communities of origin to assess the security situation, check on their properties and relatives left behind and scope out work prospects. This also often leads to a temporary break up of families, as women and children are left in the camps, placing an additional burden on the women (Majidi n.d.).
Table 1 below summarises displacement in the HOA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Refugees originating from country*</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
<th>Refugees Hosted*</th>
<th>Percentage Women**</th>
<th>Percentage Children Under 18**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24,509*</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>354,474</td>
<td>10,000 (2013)</td>
<td>2930**</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>124,952</td>
<td>397,200 (2014)</td>
<td>665,881 (Jan 2015)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>10,822</td>
<td>412,000 (Jan 2013)</td>
<td>569,772</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>970,763 (Mar 2015)</td>
<td>1,107,000 (2014)</td>
<td>12,239 (Mar 2015)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>638,402 (Mar 2015)</td>
<td>1,474,500 (Mar 2015)</td>
<td>257,673 (Mar 2015)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>703,567</td>
<td>3,100,000 (Jan 2015)</td>
<td>245,603</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>29,800 (Jan 2012)</td>
<td>433,595 (28 Feb 2015)</td>
<td>51% (28 Feb 2015)</td>
<td>61% (28 Feb 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,815,171</td>
<td>6,530,500</td>
<td>2,167,844</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Underlying Drivers of Conflict and Displacement

As indicated above, the causes and drivers of HOA displacement are complex and entangled. Resource or environmental scarcity, leading to violent contestation over scarce natural resources from land to water, is a dominant theme in the forced migration narrative in the HOA. Combined with a prolonged drought in the region, these factors lead pastoralists into closer and closer contact and competition with their sedentary agricultural neighbours, eventually resulting in their relocation into urban shantytowns such as

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*UNHCR has recently undertaken a revalidation of the refugee population in Djibouti and the preliminary findings of the exercise show that there are about 12,000 refugees in Djibouti.

** April 2015.
Djibouti-Ville. The persistent poverty and weak institutional structures governing the allocation of scarce resources in these societies is a combustible formula for violence and conflict. An additional displacement driver in the HOA is flight from oppressive regimes, as is the case in Eritrea and Sudan today. The political economy of the region not only pits country against country in fragile, poorly marked and ungoverned borderlands (e.g. between South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya), but also ethnic and clan groups against one another as is predominant in Somalia.

Although the focus of this paper is on forced displacement due to violence and armed conflict, it should be acknowledged that a single cause such as armed conflict is rarely the only cause of forced displacement. It is also a region where pastoralism is the traditional mode of subsistence for a large portion of the population and natural and man made disasters have, in irregular intervals, affected populations and caused displacement. As noted earlier, there is often a complex set of circumstances, which drives displacement. For the HOA in particular, several key drivers of displacement can be identified as follows:

- **Shifting pastoralism.** Pastoralism is a tradition among many communities in the HOA. In Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya, large parts of the populations are pastoralists and even more are agro-pastoralists. Consequently, this means that they migrate according to seasonal patterns and climatic variations. Grazing grounds have been reduced and movement has become more government regulated with the new administrative boundaries and individual property rights. These changes have resulted in increased resource-based ethnic conflict.

- **Environmental degradation and food insecurity.** Effects of increasing environmental degradation including drought, floods, diminishing pasture for cattle and competition for water, firewood and other livelihood resources, contribute to displacement. The increased competition for these scarce resources also contributes to armed conflict, for instance, between pastoralists and sedentary communities.¹³

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¹³ For an elaboration on the impact of climate change on human migration in Southern Africa see ‘Cross-Border Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change:
• **Socio-ethnic conflict** is a prominent feature in the region and often leads to violence and displacement. Cattle rustling has displaced many communities in South Sudan, Northeast Uganda (Karamojo) and Northern Kenya (Turkana), while clan differences have led to support for various ‘war-lords’ in Somalia. For example, the Nuer, Dinka and Madi have come into conflict in South Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia over farming and grazing rights.

• **Loss of livelihoods and weakened social fabric** in areas of origin have complemented insecurity as a main driver of migration and displacement. Assets are lost, livelihood opportunities are diminished, and the social networks and fabric of communities are weakened due to armed conflict and forced displacement.

• **Lack of economic opportunities, particularly for youth.** According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2013 youth comprised approximately one third of the world’s current population. Estimates for 2014 suggest that 10-35 year olds comprise 40.5% of the global population. In discussing increasing youth urbanisation, Oyelaran-Oyeyika noted that, “there are more people under the age of 25 today than ever, totalling nearly three billion - or half of humankind – of which 1.3 billion between ages 12 and 24. Most live in urban areas” (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2014). A growing youth bulge in the HOA accounts for the bulk of the population in the region being under 25 years of age, contributing to increased competition for economic opportunities. Such labour market competition is a major driver of displacement, leading to migration of young people – the majority of whom are male – to more economically prosperous regions of Europe, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and South Africa.

• **Poor governance.** Corruption, inefficiencies and low technical and managerial capacity in government institutions limit the states’ abilities to provide security, law, order, and basic services such as education and health. Lack of these services is a ‘push-factor’ for displacement not only in Somalia, but also in Eritrea, Sudan and South

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Sudan. A specific feature in several countries is the tension between the centre and peripheral regions due to inequitable division of power and wealth and governments’ lack of respect for ethnic, religious and language differences.

- **Violent conflict.** Violent conflict in the region is closely related to poor governance, but also to the other ‘drivers’ identified above. Although it is possible to distinguish between the following types of armed conflict, it should also be noted that there are overlaps between them:
  
  - *War between states* (either directly, e.g. between Eritrea and Ethiopia, or through proxies, e.g. allegedly in the ‘Three Areas’ between South Sudan and Sudan)
  
  - *Civil war* (e.g. presently in South Sudan and at a lower scale in Sudan and Somalia)
  
  - *Ethnic based armed conflict* (e.g. South Central Somalia between ‘war-lords’, and the violent political crisis in South Sudan which takes on ethnic dimensions)
  
  - *International linked terrorism* (e.g. Al Shabab in Somalia and Kenya)

In sum, the drivers of displacement are a complex mix of political oppression, violence, food insecurity, economic opportunism and governance failures. While not using the terminology of mixed migration in this paper to capture these multiple drivers (including political asylum seekers, trafficked persons, economic migrants and refugees), it is often closely related to forced displacement due to violent conflict as such. Let us now examine some specific country cases.

**The Interplay between the Political Topography and the Ethnic Demography**

An underlying thread that weaves through the degrees of cooperation and conflict among and within the HOA countries is the interplay between the political topography and the cultural demography of the region emanating from a long colonial heritage. This interplay also shapes the degree of local integration as opposed to the other standard options of repatriation and resettlement for the displaced.
**Ethiopia: A Tale of Two Displacements (Shire and Dollo Ado)**

In Ethiopia the contrast between the two major refugee situations in the Northeast (Shire) and Southwest (Dollo Ado) of the country is truly a ‘tale of two displacements’. Eritrean displaced are located in the Northwest and oriented toward resettlement and integration in third countries. The Somali are located in the Southwest and are focused on return, repatriation and reintegration to Somalia. During field visits and interviews in refugee camps and host communities in these two distinct areas, it was observed that the reception of Eritrean refugees and host community Eritrean Ethiopians’ in the Northeast as compared to that of Somali refugees and Somali Ethiopian host communities in the Southwest, highlight the different drivers and impacts shaping social and economic integration, return or resettlement.

The Eritrean refugees in Shire are political and economic migrants fleeing forced military conscription and seeking economic opportunity, such as freedom from fear and want. They are generally receiving transitional assistance en-route to other countries of opportunity in Europe and the Middle East (e.g. Italy, the Nordic Countries and Israel). This is an understandable coping strategy serving as a bridge to possible resettlement, jobs, remittances and new citizen rights. It is basically a reaction to the political oppression and narrowing economic employment opportunities in Eritrea. The Eritrean refugees were mostly young males. In effect, displacement of an adult child abroad becomes an investment for the future for an Eritrean family remaining behind.

The Eritrean refugees seem to be more readily integrated, or at least accepted, in local host communities with similar Tigrinya cultural roots in Northwest Ethiopia. As reported in several interviews, this is evidenced by the increasing number of ‘out of camp’ refugees inter-marrying with ethnically related host community members and/or utilising host communities as transitory way stations in their onward economic migration to Europe and other neighbouring countries. Thus, the remarkably high numbers of unaccompanied minors (under 18) and single youth-headed households are reported in field visits as about 40% in the Shire camps of Hitsats, Adi-Harush and Mai Aini population (reported by Regional UNHCR office to be roughly 67,520 in all three camps).

In reality, the cross border cultural affinity of Eritreans living on both sides provides a ready way station for those seeking to travel on to Europe through
Sudan and Libya, as well as an opportunity for integration through marriage and work in the local hosting area. The cultural connectivity (extant bonding social capital) with ethnic groups on relatively fluid borders, enable many refugees (especially youth) to migrate to informal sector employment either in the host urban centres or abroad to North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Ironically, Eritrean interviewees complained as to why they were not receiving the media attention that Syrian refugees were getting, despite their plight. It was observed that donor governments tend to see their situation as a bilateral issue between Eritrea and Ethiopia. However more recently, boat sinking and loss of life in the Mediterranean, has featured prominently in the news and many of the refugees involved are Eritrean.

In contrast, the Somali refugees in Dollo Ado are primarily fleeing armed conflict, environmental scarcity and drought heightened food insecurity in their South Central Somalian region of origin. The complaints and demands mount in Dollo Ado camps, ranging from increased risk of malaria and the excessive pressures on basic services of health and education, to few recreational outlets for youth, no ambulance for emergency evacuation of pregnant women, insufficient feeding centres, shortage of firewood and no access to the national electric grid as an alternative energy source. Clearly this is an extremely poor and marginalised region of Ethiopia even without the additional burden of the Somali refugees on the local environment and economy.

On the one hand, it appears that environmental threats, primarily the cutting of trees for cooking (competition for scarce energy resources) and overgrazing (livelihood contestation), are significant concerns of the Dollo Ado host community. On the other hand, the Somali refugees are also welcomed by the local Ethiopian Somali community. This is demonstrated in the labour and trade exchange between the hosting community and the camp refugees. It was reported that the refugees often provide day labour to the riverine irrigated fields of the host community in exchange for cash and food to supplement their diet in a sharecropper arrangement. The host community values the market opportunities which refugees with cash present when buying local food and other basic needs.

Having noted the competition and cooperation between host communities and refugees above, refugees stated several times that life was better in the camps than in Somalia where there was “nothing to go back to”, especially in terms of livelihood opportunities, security and basic services such as
education. In fact, it was reported that cash remittances apparently are actually flowing in the opposite direction from the refugee camps to points in Somalia.\(^\text{14}\)

In sum, the presence of refugees has had a mixed impact – some negative and some positive – on the local economies. While the local economies of the refugee hosting areas have been primed by refugee consumption and the spending of international and national agencies, the increased food and fuel prices and competition for firewood and water (i.e. market distortions) are negatively affecting the poorer members of the host communities. While, to some extent, members of the host communities are benefiting from basic services offered to refugees (e.g. health, education and water), there remains an enormous need to extend basic services in these very poor, underserved border areas of the host country.

Both areas (Shire and Dollo Ado) have enormous service delivery needs and a clear potential for growth and development provided that investments are made to create livelihoods opportunities for the refugees and host communities in a dual targeting approach. While in Gambela, the region of Ethiopia hosting South Sudanese refugees, it was reported that displacement is mainly caused by internal conflict created by the government program of ‘villagisation’, which is tantamount to a tactical land grabbing mechanism.

The predominantly Somali refugee camp in Ali Addeh, Djibouti (about 14,000) is ‘prima face’ a semi-arid incubator of economic despair and social exclusion bordering Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. When interviewed, the camp youth requested skill training and credential verification to make them more attractive to the Middle East labour market. They typically migrate through the ports of Djibouti to Yemen, the Sinai and points beyond, assisted by an

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\(^\text{14}\) For two interesting studies on cash transfers and vouchers in Ethiopia see: Jean-Martin Bauer, Aschalew Feleke and Kedir Shemsu. 2013 ‘Markets and Cash Transfers in Ethiopia: Insights from an Initial Assessment’. Addis Ababa: The World Food Program. It appears that markets can respond to cash and voucher transfers, although a mix of in kind food and cash-vouchers is advocated in the transitional near term. Also see, ‘Assessment of Financial Access in Helloween and Kobe Refugee Camps in Dollo Ado Area of Southwest Ethiopia’. 2013 ICOS consulting PLC, funded by ILO. The latter study maps the informal and formal financial service providers in the refugee area of Dolo Ado as a prelude to enhancing access to micro credit, related to strengthening livelihood opportunities.
informal industry of middlemen traffickers, brokers and boatmen.

The cultural connectivity (extant bonding social capital) with ethnic groups on relatively fluid borders enables many refugees (especially youth) to migrate to informal sector employment either in the host urban centres and/or abroad to North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. They leave behind the old and very young in a humanitarian industry protected welfare environment for the most part devoid of economic opportunity and consumptive power, short of a few small businesses serving the camp population and the remittances sent back to the camps by ‘overseas refugee workers’. It should be noted that with the growing conflict in Yemen, there has now been a growing reverse flow of Somalis back to Djibouti.

The refugee camps in Shire (about 67,520) and Ali Addeh (about 14,000) are ‘de facto’ reserve labour pools for the Middle East in particular. The Eritrean and Somali refugee camps may be ‘protracted’ wards of the UN, but the people, particularly youth, are highly mobile in search of more open labour market opportunities. In short, while the camps have become the outward symbol of the ‘protection’ industry, their inhabitants, particularly in Shire and Ali Addeh are on the move, relegateing camps to ‘transit points’ for the young and able and UN subsidised social safety nets for the old, infirm and very young left behind (Humphris 2013; Meknonnen and Estfanos 2014).

Kenya: Refugee Camp or ‘de facto’ Free Trade Zone (Dadaab)?

Informal labour exchange and trade between displaced and host communities is a common phenomenon in the HOA as already noted above in the case of Dollo Ado, Ethiopia. Refugee camps, such as Dadaab in Kenya with a population of some 475,000 and Dollo Ado with over 205,000 refugees receiving remittances and wanting to supplement income and diet, represent market opportunities for surrounding host communities.

There is growing informal trade in goods and services beyond the refugee and host communities in Dadaab (Kenya) as Somali traders move goods from Dubai through the port of Kismayo (Somalia) back and forth to the camp and its surrounding environment, ‘de facto’ relegating the camp to a tax free economic investment and free trade zone. It is common knowledge among Kenyans that Dadaab refugee camp is the best place to buy imported tax-free cars, scooters and electronic goods, among other commodities. The Somali refugee trade links extend to Turkana camps (there is even a thriving Somali operated bus line between Turkana and Dadaab camps) spanning from the
Northeast to the Southwest Kenya and into neighbouring county markets.

**Does Economics Trump Ethnicity or Vice-versa?**

**Kenya**

In Kenya, the *Kakuma* (Turkana) camp, of mainly South Sudanese mixed with Somali, there is an absence of cultural affinity with the hosting Turkana community. Tensions run high between the host community and the refugee camp, especially around grazing and water use in a resource scarce environment. This situation is unlike in Dollo Ado, where the cultural fit between the Ethiopian Somali host community and Somali refugees helps to mediate the economic contestation over scarce resources.

In addition to the contestation over scarce environment resources (water and firewood in particular), the cultural conflict between Turkana peoples and South Sudanese refugees does not encourage social cohesion between refugees and hosts. As reported in focal group interviews, the Turkana feel the Sudanese look down upon them. They find Sudanese refugee graveyards and dumps amusing as they handle death, burial and waste differently. They see their very way of life threatened, especially among their youth who come into contact with the refugees.

**South Africa**

In South Africa, while not normally considered in discussions and analysis of the causes and impacts of forced displacement due to armed conflict in the HOA, one cannot but mention the recent events resulting from HOA displacement, particularly involving Somali businessmen. The Cape Province, has had its own unique experience with displaced persons and host community conflict dynamics with Somali, Zimbabwean and other refugee populations. Violent xenophobic responses to refugees in South Africa due to competition for scarce jobs, wage distortion and rent inflation in the local economy are well documented (*Charman and Piper 2012*). Recent surveys in South Africa reported that over 45% of the respondents felt that “foreigners should not be allowed to live in South Africa because they take jobs and benefits away from South Africans” while 40% think that there should be strict restrictions placed on foreigners seeking entry into the country and 24% felt foreigners should be completely prohibited entry (*Maaure 2013*).

South Africa once hosted the largest number of asylum seekers in the world. Akin to Uganda’s generous policy and legal framework, under the post-
apartheid refugee and migrant legal reforms, groups such as the Somalis are granted refugee status with freedom of movement, work permits and access to basic services. While successful Somali entrepreneurs become symbols of envy and frustration among the South African poor in informal settlements, they remain relatively invisible to South African and migrant elites living in secure gated communities serviced by private security personnel that are now estimated to be double the size of South African’s police force (Abdi 2013). More recently, the government has introduced a number of restrictive practices including closing down some refugee reception offices. Overall the number of asylum seekers has decreased.

In 2008, when similar xenophobic violence erupted against South African non-nationals resulting in some 62 deaths and 35,000 displaced persons, the then AIDS activist movement, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), shifted from advocating for HIV victims’ rights to fighting for refugees’ rights, spanning multiple human rights issues, activist networks and constituencies. This movement evolved into the Social Justice Coalition (SIC) in the Western Cape, a community based civil society organisation addressing a broader range of Human Rights issues. Then, even the terminology utilised by the state regarding refugees talked in terms of “temporary shelter” and not “refugee camps” per se. As Robins noted, “refugees were increasingly depicted by government as illegal, criminal, troublesome, ungrateful and undeserving” (Robins 2009).

In Durban, Gauteng and Cape Town, South Africa, both in 2008 and more recently in 2015, there have been violent attacks by South Africans of Zulu decent on migrants from Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The Department of Home Affairs reports about 70,000 new asylum claims in 2013 from over 80 countries worldwide. Among these, some 9,000 are from Ethiopia and Somalia alone (Pugh 2014). The outward cry of local South Africans in the townships accusing African “foreigners” of taking their jobs in an environment of high youth unemployment, has led to violent attacks and calls for them to return to their home countries.

Somalis and others in informal settlements with limited access to the formal labour market, manage small stores (spazas). Their success becomes a symbol

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15 The Refugee Act requires 180 days for the determination of status but, in fact, asylum seekers spend years waiting for a determination, finding it difficult to find stable work in the interim (PASSOP 2013).
and target of South Africans they serve in these “no go zones” where crime, poverty and unemployment reign (Abdi 2013). Mistrust and resentment loom large as refugees are stigmatised as criminals and bearers of disease. Local politicians such as Zulu King Ghatilensi have used them as a political mobilising pawn. As Dr. Roni Amit from the University of Witwatersrand has recently noted, “the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) in South Africa has adopted a much expanded assumption of illegality. The DHA often acts outside of the legal framework under the guise of security. Migration has been framed as a security issue” (Amit 2014).

The impact of forced displacement on the host or receptor communities is complex and manifold. Clearly the clash of cultures in Natal, South Africa and Turkana, Kenya discussed above can lead to violent conflict, but this is mostly a result and not a cause of violence emanating from the economic competition for scarce resources and the increasing class divisions among the poor themselves.

In South Africa, it may not be cultural or racial bias per se (although ethnicity has become a mobilising factor for recent violent attacks on Somali traders) but rather the pooling of resources and sale of goods and services at lower prices and subsequent local competition, that is resented by some fellow Africans in the South African townships in particular. The recent violence perpetrated by poor South Africans upon the successful Somali immigrant shop owners in marginalised townships and use of the term ‘Afrophobia’ as opposed to ‘Xenophobia’ in characterising events on the ground, are subtle but clear indicators that economics trumps ethnicity as the core motivator of violence.

Poor governance can also play a role. The weakening of the judiciary and dominance of the ANC Executive Committee has led to conditions in “Lindela” or transit camps for deportees as tolerable and a weigh station as they are now being rounded up and reported in “Operation Fiela” following recent clashes. It has also been further argued that post-apartheid xenophobia is a result of the merging of the politics of resistance and emerging state or nationalistic politics in the attempt to define citizenship and a new South African identity formation (Neocosmos 2006). Some neighbouring countries

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16 Neocosmos (2006) notes that post-independence Africa may have been ‘de-radicalised’ but not ‘democratised’ with the advent of ‘Africanisation’, now called ‘Affirmative Action.’ This relationship has been further forged in State public-private
such as Malawi have initiated repatriation programs with some 3,200 Malawians having fled South Africa in the wake of the violence. However it is reported that, given the few economic opportunities in their home country, there is now a steady stream of Malawians returning to South Africa despite their fears and risks (Masina 2015).

The Impact of the Interplay between Economics and Ethnicity

Market Distortions

The dominant impact in all these HOA settings is the creation of market distortions particularly in prices, wages and rents. Host communities have seen the price of charcoal in Dollo Ado go up almost four-fold from 40 Bir to 150 Bir per bag and a sack of sugar from go up nearly three-fold from 300 Bir to 800 Bir. Refugees are willing to work for a margin of what local wages had been beforehand, thus perceived to be taking away rightful or entitled jobs from host locals. The competition for limited social services (especially health and education) also becomes a point of contention. Host community health centres become overcrowded and under served and schools suddenly have excessive enrolments with children often speaking a totally different language, thus challenging teachers and the systems to adjust.

Basic Service Overload

Refugees tend to attract additional social services such as health and education to previously underserved, marginalised border regions. However, the perception that services only benefit the displaced as in Turkana, becomes reason for envy and local conflict. Where governments such as Uganda’s are attuned to this unintentional threat to local stability, they have been quick to enhance service provision to the local host community. Ensuring some degree of basic services balance and social cohesion between camps and host partnerships of the more recent ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ movement, culminating in the post-apartheid process of ‘national building’. This, in term, required ‘national unity’ which entailed a political process of common identity and legal rights, duties and benefits (access to credit, social services, etc.) embedded in social relationships that distinguished hosts or natives from strangers or foreigners. The establishment of Bantustans was merely a mechanism for social and labour control and provided a ready labour reserve, particularly for white capital formation such as mining. Also see M. Mamdani. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. London: James Currey.
communities is a major challenge in this situation. This is particularly important where new cultural groups such as Dinka and Newar are coming into Madi and Acholi areas.

**Environmental Degradation**

Another major issue emerging in Dollo Ado, Kakuma and other refugee camp areas in the HOA is environmental degradation due to energy production, particularly wood-source fuels. This was also an obvious outcome in Turkana and Dadaab. In many cases, an equilibrium or accommodation short of integration has been achieved, where the incentives to return diminish in the face of continued and unpredictable insecurity of places of origin. ¹⁷

**Weakened Social Networks and Uneven Access to Information**

Family and social networks have been weakened as a result of protracted displacement to a diversity of locations. This has resulted in poor information, particularly on conditions of return. It has been reported in one return survey of Somali refugees in Kenya, that “only an estimated 18% of refugees have contact with people in their area of origin” (IOM and UNHCR 2014).

**The Volatile Mix of Economic Contestation and Ethnic Mobilisation**

Violent conflict in the HOA countries and beyond (having effects even in South Africa) is a manifestation of social and economic grievances framed by exclusion and marginalisation associated with deep poverty, vulnerability, constrained socio-economic mobility and contestation over scarce resources including jobs. This contestation manifests itself in violent ethnic mobilisation. Clearly economics trumps ethnicity as the deep structural cause of the violence. However, ethnicity is the major mobilising tool.

The need to be cognizant of inadvertently enabling market distortions in prices and wages of local goods and services, creating perceived if not real social service imbalances, hastening environmental degradation and growing ethnic conflict, are major displacement issues. While economic contestation is at the root of conflict between the displaced and hosts, ethnicity is more often

¹⁷ While not discussed in depth here, providing mechanisms for dealing with trauma (particularly among unaccompanied minors) and dispute resolution between displaced and hosting communities are also important new development challenges.
than not a mobilising feature for the perpetration of violence. In sum, for most refugee and host community encounters, the degree of ethnic or cultural fit between the displaced population and the host community is a key variable in shaping the degree of receptivity and non-violent accommodation.

**Government Legal and Policy Responses: Acts of Fear or Necessity?**

The legal frameworks and policies of hosting countries regarding the displaced revolve around five main issues: (1) access to basic services; (2) the right to work; (3) the ease of mobility; (4) the ownership of property; and (5) a clear path to the choices of citizenship, return or resettlement. The degree to which host governments subscribe to international law and norms related to these issues is of critical importance to shaping durable solutions for the displaced.

Although governments are signatory to various conventions and acts effecting the HOA over the years (including the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention, the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the 2006 Refugee Act, the 2009 Kampala Convention, and the 2012 Uganda Refugee Regulations) they have not always been sufficiently translated into effective program implementation due often to a mix of political will and local capacity.

**Uganda**

On the one extremity, Uganda (now hosting over 350,000 displaced: 188,000 Congolese in the South and Midwest and 154,000 South Sudanese in Adjumani, Arua and Kiryandongo districts) has a progressive legal policy that provides gazette plots in settlements through which refugees can farm the land and enter into lease contracts (UNHCR 2015a). This ‘out of camp’ approach has generally resulted in a vibrant trade and exchange between the hosting communities and the refugees, as discussed earlier.

The government and the UNHCR have been taking strategic steps to strengthen the resilience and self-reliance of the refugees and hosting areas since the 1999 Self Reliance Strategy (SRS) for Refugee Hosting Areas, continuing with the 2006 Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) and imbedding a refugee Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA) in the National Development Plan II (2015-2020). These steps have culminated in the Refugee and Host Populations Empowerment (ReHope) program that aims to
bridge humanitarian and development assistance in self-reliant and resilience strengthening actions (UNHCR 2015b). This innovative program and its limitations will be discussed further in an analysis of donor responses below.

In addition to providing user land rights to refugees, such programs are included in national development plans, as Uganda is now doing in the Northern Uganda Development Plan (NDP II). This ensures attention to the issue of displacement as well as budget to support the design and implementation of plans and programs.

**Kenya**

On the other extremity, despite developing a draft policy and Refugee Act in 2012, Kenya has made little progress in moving the policy beyond a draft stage and implementing of the Act itself. In effect, it has framed the displacement issue through a security lens. It has relied heavily on the conventional camp approach with large, tightly controlled encampments in Dadaab (estimated to house about 350,000 refugees) and Kakuma (housing an estimated 120,000 displaced). The Dadaab camp is effectively the third largest city in Kenya. Work permits and freedom of mobility are out of reach. Tensions between the camps and surrounding host communities are apparent with frequent incidents. One interviewee characterised the Kenyan camps as “open prisons.” The security incidents at Westgate Mall and Garissa school referred to above led to “Operation Watch”, a security sweep of urban areas throughout the country to round up Somali displaced and either return them to the camps or repatriate them to Somalia itself. In 2013, the Kenyan High Court ruled against such actions and a tripartite agreement establishing a legal framework for voluntary returns was signed between UNHCR, and the Kenyan and Somali governments. This has placed Kenya in the international limelight and under the scrutiny of various human rights groups. Voluntary repatriation has been encouraged but there are few takers given the insecurity in areas of return in Somalia.

**Ethiopia**

Ethiopia has traditionally sought a balance between managing tightly controlled camps on its borders with Somalia and acknowledging large historical Somali ghetto areas, especially in Addis. It maintains an encampment policy that requires refugees to obtain permits to leave the camps. However, in August 2010 the government introduced a new policy permitting Eritrean refugees to reside outside camps if self-sufficient or
supported. With a more “open camp” policy toward the Eritrean situation, given the cultural fit between refugees and receptor communities, there are higher rates of inter-marriage and integration than usual. On the border areas, given the cultural consistency between Somali Ethiopians in the South, Eritrean Ethiopians in the Northeast and Sudanese Ethiopians in the Eastern Gambella region, there is thriving labour exchange and trade in goods and services between the camps and neighbouring communities. The Barbera corridor between Ethiopia and Somalia has become somewhat of a thriving trade route between the countries.

**South Africa**

South Africa’s legal and policy framework has increasingly come into conflict with its quest for democratisation. The ‘Aliens Control Act’ of 1995 basically negated rights of immigrants, particularly the freedom to trade and work, treating them as illegal and criminal by confiscating their assets, harassing and deporting them. Following on the heals of the 1998 Refugee Act, the draft ‘White Paper on International Migration’ of 1999 used rising unemployment as a means of discouraging immigration and enforcing the Aliens Control Act. The only concession was to the mining sector when it became a bill in 2000.18

It was reported in a recent round table discussion on Xenophobia in South Africa that since the 2008 events there have been over 350 deaths and only a single prosecution of the perpetrators in Afrophobic related incidents (Amit et al. 2015). Clearly failures of the rule of law, particularly evidenced in the slow pace and backlog of the judiciary and the late actions of the South African police force, serve as a de facto signal of impunity for such criminal acts.

**Djibouti**

Despite hosting a large camp in Ali Addeeh on its southern border and growing displaced shantytown areas in Djiboutiville itself, Djibouti does not have an explicit refugee law or policy. The general displacement trend is to use Djibouti as more of a “transit point” than a “final destination”. Of course, given its limited availability of arable land job opportunities, one would expect

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18 See the 1998 Human Rights Watch Report on ‘Xenophobia in South Africa’, documenting the Inkata movement and Buthelezi’s inflammatory statement blaming crime, unemployment and spread of diseases on ‘foreigners’. HRP was later criticised for prioritising illegal aliens over the then 50 percent of South Africans living in poverty.
this pattern. Interviewed youth in Ali Addeeh described a situation whereby the elderly and very young in the camp are supported by the generous safety net of the international community while the young and able migrate back and forth to Yemen and elsewhere to work and send back remittances to buttress consumption in the camps. Here, economic opportunity, conflict induced insecurity and climate change merge to form a constellation of interrelated factors driving ‘mixed migration’.

**Puntland, Somaliland and Somalia**

Puntland adopted policy guidelines on IDPs in 2012, and Somaliland developed a draft policy framework in 2014. However, the implementation is slow and the jury is out on whether the capacity and resources will enable effectiveness. Somalia itself adopted a policy framework on displacement and an agency for refugees and IDPs in December 2014. The New Deal compact, supported by the international community in 2014, presents an opportunity to address the issue of durable solutions. However, it is hobbled by a weak state that is critical to implementation.

The “warehousing approach” to refugees, registering, feeding and protecting them, comes face to face with the desire to move and integrate elsewhere, be it in the hosting environment or beyond Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

The environmental and labour market limitations of Djibouti typically require moving beyond to the Gulf States. An interesting finding in Djibouti was the desire for youth looking to migrate for jobs to have access to better labour market information as well as some kind of skill certification. Here, perhaps a stronger vocational counselling element might be introduced especially for youth in the camps.

**International and Regional Policies and Programs**

Donors exhibit a range of responses to the crisis situation in the HOA. On the one hand, UNHCR has moved considerably from a “camp management” approach to a more “open camp” approach as mentioned above, acknowledging that the care and maintenance in camps is neither a sustainable nor realistic solution given the numbers of displaced now already outside camps in peri-urban informal settlements or on the move through neighbouring host countries. The operative donor language is “building resilience and self-reliance” which translates into providing a basic safety net of transitional food, shelter and basic services while enabling skill
enhancement for onward labour market migration and employment elsewhere.

As discussed above, in the Uganda case, these steps have culminated in UNHCR’s flagship initiative- the Refugee and Host Populations Empowerment (ReHope) program that aims to bridge humanitarian and development assistance in self-reliance and resilience strengthening actions (UNHCR 2015b). Its focus is on integrated programming combining legal advice, service delivery, livelihood support and giving voice to refugees in the planning and programming process in a holistic manner. The approach differentiates between rural and urban livelihood support, combining access to land, technology and markets for the rural displaced with skill enhancement, entrepreneurship, business assistance and access to credit for urban livelihoods.19

This innovative and comprehensive approach acknowledges that the old “camp-based” approach of prolonged humanitarian assistance is not sustainable, especially under conditions of protracted displacement that have become the norm in the HOA. However, as mentioned earlier, the ReHope program does have limitations, most important being that the insufficient amount of land allocated limits farming to subsistence agriculture and prevents any real transformation through mechanised agriculture and agro-industry in these areas. A second gap is the need for improved community policing and access to justice, perhaps by financing mobile courts and trained local mediators. Finally, there remains the issue of balanced service delivery with regards to classroom and teacher disparities. Some even argue that there is a need to go beyond primary education provision and offer more scholarships to refugee children for secondary education in order to promote social mobility and break the vicious cycle of displacement.

UNHCR’s support for scholarships for Eritrean displaced is an interesting twist and a relevant development intervention. Also in due to the large number of unaccompanied minors, the camps are forced to create “community kitchens” for feeding (estimated feeding of 1000 children per day) and unique walled shelter areas that fence in unaccompanied minors for joint supervision by so called “house mothers”. In effect, in the words of the

19 Considering livelihood, FAO has been studying areas of origin, travel routes and hosting areas of settlement, intervening to improve water and heard management, providing market information and restocking as a means of prevention.
UNHCR regional director, “the UNHCR program here is creating communities not camps as such.”

An interesting unspoken tension between host governments and the displaced is how to manage the subtle political balance between wanting refugees to be self-reliant, but not so progressive that they compete with and monopolise local community resources. Indeed there is always the lurking issue of moral hazard, as successful pilot integration schemes such as ReHope run the risk of attracting more refugees.

In cooperation with regional economic communities (particularly Inter Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (ECA)), the African Union (AU) has established the African Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA) to deal with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. In this context, it has set up a continental early warning system (CEWS) a standby security force (ASF), a panel of wise men and a Peace Fund (PF) to support humanitarian assistance, peace-making and peace building efforts in the region. These organisations have focused on mediation and conflict resolution for the most part, bringing parties together to establish peace and assisting enforcement through peacekeeping missions such as the African Union Assistance Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia.

The African Union Boarder Program (AUBP) has taken the additional step of developing cross-border services, such as health and customs control, to facilitate the movement of people, goods and services (economic exchanges). The underlying theme is to strengthen the governance capacity of these here-to-fore ungoverned and relatively ungovernable border areas. IGAD has also sought to facilitate dialogue on transport and export in the extractive industry, technical assistance for regional environmental standards, skills development as well as conflict mediation. Its Migration Policy Framework is an effort to harmonise various regional migration policies, strengthen inter-governmental coordination, build capacity and enhance community involvement. There have also been efforts to collaborate on regional integration with the African Development Bank (AfDB) around infrastructure through the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund managed by IGAD.

The World Bank’s Operational Policy 8.10 for Emergency Lending and 2.30 for Conflict and Development are the key policy instruments enabling a quick and relevant response to displacement situations. The main regional approach in the HOA thus far has been to restructure or amend existing projects. The
primary example is the HOA Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project (RPLRP). This operates cross border and is being implemented in collaboration with IGAD. It seeks to strengthen IGAD’s conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN)\textsuperscript{20} with additional resources, equipment and training (World Bank 2014). On the analytical side, the World Bank conducted an initial study on the impact of the Dadaab refugee camp on the host community environment in Kenya (DRC 2010). A second similar study is underway for the impact of the Kakuma refugee camp in Northwest Kenya on the surrounding Turkana host community.

The World Bank’s Third Northern Uganda Social Action Project (NUSAP III) currently under design will seek to address displacement challenges impacting refugee host areas. Other relevant instruments such as the Third Peace and Development Plan can be targeted to include refugee-affected areas, with particular concern for women and children. It is a planning and finance framework with a clear programming stream through NUSAP III and provides a framework for community monitoring results. It is innovative in that it includes community participatory appraisal processes, disaster or catastrophic risk insurance, micro credit and social accountability mechanisms. In addition, the World Bank is exploring extending the government assisted conditional cash transfer program to displaced through the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), shifting the emphasis from a dependency-producing provision of food toward increased self-reliance and return through livelihood and related skills development.

It is clear that issues of environmental degradation can be addressed by providing alternative energy and fuel sources, such as wind farms, solar power, natural gas and surface water conservation. The World Bank’s Horn of Africa Study analyses the displacement issue within the larger development and reconstruction analysis of the HOA (World Bank 2014b; World Bank 2015b).

In addition to the above key international actors, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has recently approved a project in Southern Ethiopia to assist areas where Somali refugees are about to return. The Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the Danish and Norwegian Refugee

\textsuperscript{20} CEWARN has an estimated annual budget of $1.5 million funded by member states, the USAID, GIZ and several Scandinavian countries in a joint financial arrangement (JFA) facility.
Councils (DRC and NRC, respectively) have also been actively analysing Somalia context and piloting small recovery initiatives including provision of communal water points, skill enhancement and profiling needs assessment (Bryld and Kamau 2013). Finally, the European Commission has programs targeting both refugees and host communities with a security accent on access to justice, mobile courts and policing solutions.

**The Search for a New Paradigm: From Care and Maintenance to Resilience and Self-Reliance**

Given the now “protracted” nature of the displacement, the old encampment humanitarian policies of care and maintenance are now giving way to a rethink from a development perspective by governments and donors alike. Identifying the “development deficits” or gaps (such as security, livelihood, conflict resolution and human trafficking) between the displaced and the host communities is an essential first step. Targeting the most vulnerable among the displaced, integrating them into domestically provided social services rather than stand alone IDP programs and extending the local social safety net where feasible, are priorities. Enhancing “mental mobility” or a change in mind-set among the displaced is a necessary adjunct to social and economic access and mobility. The “dependency syndrome” engendered by old warehousing approaches is now being transformed.

As Betts et. al. (2014) have observed, refugee communities exhibit similar features of normal economic systems, that is, “they (refugee communities) engage in production, consumption, exchange, entrepreneurship, and the development of financial and capital markets” (Betts et al 2014). What appears to be the determining factor in the success or failure of refugee self-initiatives in the economic sphere, is the openness of government policies regarding property rights or user rights, the right to work and the freedom of movement. As mentioned above, Uganda not only provides land for agriculture, but freedom of movement to trade between the camp in Kyrangwali settlement, Kampala, Arua, Gul, and even beyond Uganda to Tanzania and South Sudan. While not without its limitations, Uganda’s approach provides a tipping point to influence neighbouring country’s policies on displacement and migration.

To the extent that livelihood programs and some form of user or property rights complement a transitional safety net of basic service provision, at minimum, a limited opening for some form of “transitional integration” within
local economies is possible. However, where refugees are seen as distorting the local economic wages, prices and rents and competing for meagre job opportunities with local communities, there has been pushback and resistance by hosting governments and communities’ members. The degree and intensity of such local pushback is only moderated by the cultural and ethnic fit between the refugees and the receptor communities, as in the case of Eritreans in Northeast Ethiopia and earlier discussed Somali Ethiopians bordering Southwest Mandera triangle with Somalia and Kenya.

To further illustrate the ethnic reach across refugee hosting environments, one needs only to see the transport links established by Somali bus and minivan companies between Kakuma and Dadaab camps in Kenya. Again, ethnic and clan bonded social capital networks trump geopolitical borders. Of course the flow of remittances, especially through the Somali Hahwala system of informal banking, helps to fuel production and trade wherever Somali live and work.

The formula of refugee business success is rounded out by access to satellite information and communication technology (ICT) and Internet connectivity of mobile phones, along with financial access and networked social capital, human capital skills and host government policy space. Betts et al (2014) reported that over 66% of the displaced in Kyangali settlement and 96% of those in Kampala have mobile phones.

Clearly, further investigation into a new paradigm that emphasises a more open public-private sector system of managing refugee flows is warranted. This is particularly evident when balanced against the risks of conventional methods that encourage conflict by painting the displaced into corners of insecurity and local competition. This brings one back to the trade-offs between the durable solutions of integration, resettlement and repatriation within the overall framework of open and closed camp mentality.

**Addressing Borderland Push and Pull Factors**

Addressing both push and pull factors in the camps and prospective areas of return in an integrated ‘holistic’ manner is key to achieving durable solutions. Here, the link or bridge between humanitarian and development approaches is critical. The push factors entail skill and self-reliance development of refugees while in the camps, while the pull factors are security, basic service access and property rights in the areas of return.
The UNHCR, partnered with World Bank, may wish to extend or shift its traditional safety net approach from a dependency-producing safety net (providing food, shelter and basic services), to a “transitional safety net”, emphasising livelihood interventions, mitigating the dependency mind-set and, thus, preparing the displaced with skills for strengthening self-reliance and positioning for eventual economic reintegration upon return.

Despite the de facto cross-border trade (human and capital mobility) among the displacement affected countries in the HOA, there remains an enormous need for economic and social infrastructure addressing environmental degradation, physical infrastructure and job creation in both receipt and return areas. A Cross-border Regional Integrated Area Development approach would stimulate the development of the border areas in the three countries and facilitate regional trade, stability and return.

Merging stabilisation, security and development would provide the bridge linking humanitarian protection to building resilience and socio-economic development. It could be truly transformational, going beyond palliative transitional solutions or holding patterns for the extreme poor (refugees and IDPs) living in dire, uncertain conditions.

The location of the camps, mainly in marginalised border areas, may ironically be a silver lining. They have shined a “spot light” on the unequal development in receptor countries and here-to-fore marginalised border areas. So much so that the camps may, in the long run, attract greater public investment and attendant state budgetary resources, particularly towards improving infrastructure and basic services, in areas that may otherwise may have continued to be neglected.

In the Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia border area called the Madera Triangle, a Cross-border Regional Integrated Area Development approach could address the refugee impact on host communities as well as the pull factors for refugees in a comprehensive manner, benefiting local communities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. It also fits into the decentralisation and federalism thrust of all three countries. The displacement situation in Dollop Ado provides a great opportunity for such a regional cross-border displacement project. For the refugees in Dollo Ado, return to their areas of origin in South Central region of Somalia is the only feasible long-term solution. Lack of security, poor access to basic services and limited livelihood opportunities, were identified in focus group interviews as the key constraints to their return.
While uncertain security is a concern, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Somali refugees have been willing to take risks and undertake itinerant farming, moving back and forth between refugee camps on one side of the border and farming and herding in communities of origin on the other side. As indicated above, studying and understanding these coping livelihood modalities would be critical to building on extant refugee capacity and ingenuity. Such a development intervention could address both push and pull factors necessary for a durable regional solution to the protracted displacement crisis.

**Partnering for Peace**

The AU supports inter-continental policy collaboration emanating from such forums and programs as the “Kampala Convention” and the “African Union Border Program” (AUBP). The objective of the AUBP is to promote regional coordination and cooperation, build capacity and enhance community involvement. Population movement is not a new phenomenon in the HOA. Displacement due to violence does not occur in isolation from these seasonal migratory and climatic cycles and trends. With reference to pastoralists in particular, there is a need for a regional approach to facilitate and protect pastoralist livelihoods.

Infrastructure, basic service access, training, capacity building and micro-finance are a key constellation of investments that, if done in an integrated area development manner in areas such as the Madera Triangle or the Turkana area bordering South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, could form the critical mass necessary to transform the economies of these marginalised areas. This would promote regional development and refugee integration and reintegration in a single stroke.\(^2\) Of course, this integrated area development approach could benefit from increased donor coordination perhaps through the formation of a joint displacement and development secretariat, a shared action plan and a special multi-donor displacement fund.

**Harmonisation of Country Policies and Programs**

Such innovative institutional initiatives as discussed would have to be complemented by country policy and legal reforms that accent key elements:

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\(^2\) There is a history of such successful integrated area development projects in the 1960s, such as the Camilla Project in Pakistan to the Mekong River Development Project in Southeast Asia.
(i) some form or path of citizen rights short of outright citizenship (some form of legal recognition); (ii) property rights or long term land use rights; (iii) the freedom of movement; (iv) the right to work or work permits; (v) and skill verification.

The African Union Border Program (AUBP) is one example of bringing together various actors in a coordinated integrated regional development and conflict prevention management initiative. Another idea is to complement these efforts at coordination and local regional capacity building with development of special boarder area economic zones that can attract investment with favoured capital access and tax policies, along with infrastructure connectivity. In many ways, as presented earlier, the Dadaab refugee camp has actually evolved into a de facto “free trade zone”. However, to enable such integrated cross border development to take place these areas, the displaced located in them need to be given voice and factored into national, regional and local planning and budgeting processes. In the case of Somalia, one might envisage this in contrast to conventional top down, state-centric development, as the state is being rebuilt or reconstructed from the periphery to the centre in a loosely constructed federal system.

Working together, the UNDP, WFP, FAO and UNHCR have a Somali initiative, “Drought PDNA Assessment”, focusing on commercialisation of pastoralism, basic services and local capacity building. The overall program is multi-sector, focusing on livelihood development, community policing, food security through a mix of food and cash transfer to stimulate an agricultural supply response, alternative fuel sources, environmental protection and basic service delivery. Analytical work is also underway on water reservoir and irrigation development. The overarching aim is the normalisation of refugee life.

Bilateral donors such as Turkish International Cooperation Assistance (TICA) continue to provide humanitarian relief, while USAID and DFID are taking cash based and market oriented approaches. Here, the radical perspective of seeing Dadaab as an economic powerhouse in that region of Kenya, meshes nicely with treating it as a de facto free trade zone with well developed market reach into Kenya, Somalia and other countries.

From Shock Absorbers to Change Agents: Developing the Borderlands

As noted earlier, policies addressing forced displacement are based on a continuum in which the displaced are perceived as a threat or risk on the one hand, a burden somewhere in the middle, and an asset on the other end of the
continuum. From a prevention perspective, in the end, there is little doubt that stemming forced migration at its source by improving security, governance and livelihood opportunities in countries of origin is key to preventing and managing the displacement challenge. As discussed above, regional integrated development can convert fragile border areas, which now serve as shock absorbers for conflicts within these fragile states, to prosperous and open avenues of cross border trade and development.

It is clear that policies in relatively authoritarian democratic regimes such as Kenya and South Africa can lead to extreme practices of State technocratic or managerial xenophobia and discrimination in programs that advocate rounding up refugees and deporting, incarcerating and/or returning them to camps such as ‘Usalama Watch’ and ‘Operation Fiela’.

Here the concept of State Sovereignty comes face to face with the protection of human rights. Unfortunately the recent experience of “Afrophobia” in South Africa is not a question of individual rights but one of national politics. Guarding against this outcome would be necessary.

**Next Steps: The Alignment of Durable Solutions**

In summary, the alignment of durable solutions to address both push and pull factors in a decentralised integrated local area development approach encompasses the following main actions:

(a) **Harmonising country policy and legal frameworks** to ensure that there is consistent and regulated freedom of movement, ability to work and clear identity documentation or papers.

(b) **Including refugees in national and local development plans**, as Uganda is now doing in the Northern Uganda Development Plan (NUDP III), to not only grant attention to the issue of displacement but also budget to support the design and implementation of such plans and programs.

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22 Lebogang Seale’s (2015) quotes ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe: “South Africa can’t allow illegal migrants to roam around committing crime”. In defense of ‘Operation Fiela’, Seale further quotes Mantashe: “You can’t say the state must do nothing, must allow illegal immigrants, must allow undocumented people in society, it must leave unlicensed firearms in society... being dictated by NGOs on crime fighting strategies puts South Africa at risk of having a mini state within a state.”
(c) Creating livelihood opportunities through combing skill development, agriculture and SME investments and employment generation.

(d) Mitigating environmental deterioration by addressing the need for alternative cooking fuel and employment through labour intensive reforestation.

(e) Strengthening social infrastructure and addressing imbalances in access through the provision of schools, health centres, safe water and sanitation facilities (UNICEF-Somali Regional State of Ethiopia, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development 2013).

(f) Promoting connectivity by enhancing basic transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure in underserved, marginalised border areas.

(g) Providing conflict management, mediation and conflict resolution capacity through training community members and leaders.

(h) Addressing the social psychological and basic needs of the most vulnerable, particularly unaccompanied minors through specially targeted and customised programs.

(i) Ensuring Donor and NGO coordination and financing to provide a critical mass of technical and financial support in order to enable the capacitation of local authorities and close the gaps between policy and implementation in addressing the needs of the displaced.

Finally, as one Ethiopian Minister interviewed astutely observed, “we don’t need another study, we need to mobilise resources for regional infrastructure and connectivity through social and economic development." This will require political will as well as economic resources.

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